Post Breakfast

Perspectives for the new NATO

Muhammad Zamir
The past months have not been easy for the transatlantic alliance or the transatlantic partnership. It has been characterised by security changes in different parts of the world and profound disagreements among certain EU members and the United States. NATO, under a new Secretary General will also be embarking on a new phase in its evolution and will consequently face some daunting new questions for which a lot of hard thinking will be necessary.

This year has presented a number of opportunities and challenges for Europe, America and Canada. These include rebuilding Afghanistan; bringing the Iraqi situation to a stable conclusion and waging a war against terrorism not only through military means but also through evolving diplomatic relations and judicial cooperation. The last and foremost anxiety has been the rebuilding of EU- NATO relations.

As has been evidenced recently in various meetings in Washington and New York, Europe and North America both feel that they must try harder to put their differences over Iraq behind them. Another example of the new transatlantic efforts to forge cooperation was evidenced in the US campaign for a Security Council resolution on Iraq. Despite the differences between France, Belgium and German on the one hand against military intervention in Iraq and the US on the other, the worst days of the transatlantic rift appear to be over.

For the first 50 years of its existence, NATO focused on the threat from within Europe. Today, with the process of rebuilding Europe nearing its finality, the spotlight has shifted to the threat from outside Europe, in particular, the mortal threat of global terrorism. Today, NATO's field of vision extends to Central Asia, the Middle East and North Africa. This is being euphemistically termed as the "nexus of global terrorism."

Similarly, the character of NATO is also changing from being a defensive alliance to a potential offensive grouping. In this context emphasis is being given to peacekeeping efforts. There is also a shift in its focus. Initiatives are being examined regarding Afghanistan. Over the next weeks NATO will debate whether peacekeeping forces should remain concentrated in Kabul or be deployed to other parts of Afghanistan, as has been suggested by the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, and various other non-governmental organisations.

NATO believes today that long-term stability in Afghanistan is crucial, both in terms of peacekeeping and development assistance. NATO planners are carefully scrutinising the lack of infrastructure in health care, education and other areas in Afghanistan. This itself is a major departure from previous NATO involvement outside Europe. In doing so, NATO understands that this will entail a fundamental rebuilding of the country and development aid from donors. This also reflects NATO's acceptance of US views pertaining to Afghanistan.

NATO's problem has however been Iraq. Although, sixteen European governments have soldiers on the ground in Iraq, the big boys are all absent. Hence the need to seek a new UN Security Council Resolution for giving the US a larger umbrella role in Iraq. The US wants the UN and through that format other countries, but its insistence on retaining the military command is proving to be a challenge for everyone else.

Currently, the USA has undertaken a two-pronged operation. The USA, after its initiative in the UN, is now trying to swing large sections of European public opinion (that opposed the war in Iraq) through NATO. To do this, they are pointing out that if Iraq can be reconstructed into a society that is more stable and just, then both the Iraqi people and the NATO partners would be better off. Whether this strategy succeeds in Brussels will largely depend on what happens in New York.

Analysts wary of new challenges within NATO under a new Secretary General, also perceive other problems in future US-European relations within NATO. They are drawing attention not only to the capabilities gap, but also to the deployability gap. It is now being recognised that since the first Gulf War, there has been a revolution in military technology and doctrine. Continental warfare has been replaced by expeditionary warfare. Instead of deploying large numbers of soldiers, the emphasis is now on "strategic lift." This in turn translates into secure communications and precision-guided munitions (heavily used in the second Gulf War).

Unfortunately, only some NATO members have accepted this new technology and new doctrine. They include France, the United Kingdom, Poland, Norway, Bulgaria, Romania and the three Baltic republics. They have all invested heavily in new technologies as required under the new doctrine. Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg and Canada have however not yet made the shift from a reactive to a pro-active approach. It would be worthwhile to note here that Germany's defence spending accounts for only 1.4 per cent of gross domestic product which is below the 4 per cent NATO average. Given the current economic crisis, it is also unlikely that Germany will agree to spend more. This will in turn create additional tension. These are divisions which have to be addressed.

Today, NATO countries understand that they have to be able to deploy soldiers far from their own shores for peacekeeping operations. It is here that hard strategic decisions will have to be taken.

NATO has already supported the development of the EU's Rapid Reaction Force but now understands that it is just as important for NATO to have a response force as well. NATO realises that it needs the ability to project a significant amount of force within a relatively short period of time, to put soldiers on the ground and get the job done. A debate has started as to whether it is acceptable if only some countries are able to take on these challenges, while others fall behind for budgetary and capability reasons. The USA is particularly pointing out that German leadership is vital at this critical juncture when seven new NATO members are due to enter the alliance in May 2004 (coinciding with the entry of 10 new Member States into the EU). This twin enlargement of both NATO and EU is being considered as decisive in building the new Europe.

It is largely anticipated that the seven new countries set to join NATO next year will strengthen the alliance. At the same time it is being underlined that because of their different view of history, they will also be more "tough-minded" about the collective need for defence.

One thing is clear. NATO's centre of gravity would shift significantly after the entry of these countries into the alliance. After 2004, about 40 per cent of NATO member states will be former Communist countries.

It is believed that after 2004, NATO will keep its doors open to new members. Under the same analogy, it is being suggested that it would be just as vital for the EU to do the same. This obviously points towards Turkey (already a member of NATO). The emphasis for such an argument probably arises from the logic that everyone would be better off if European countries were in both.

This consideration of new perspectives for NATO has also resulted in their policymakers appreciating that it is important for NATO to maintain good relationships with non-member partners to the east-- Russia and Ukraine. It is now felt that both are crucial to stability for Europe and also NATO.

It would be worthwhile to recall here that NATO in the recent past has already started working with Russia on a daily basis on issues such as joint peacekeeping, counter-terrorism and non-proliferation. NATO-Ukraine relations are less developed, but efforts are principally underway to identify future areas of cooperation.

Most NATO experts have also indicated that in addition to looking east, NATO must also look south, towards the Middle East and northern Africa, both of which are important from a security and political perspective. Different workshops in Brussels and Berlin are indicating that the EU is far more advanced than NATO in this respect. It is presumed that in the coming years, this aspect will receive greater attention from NATO as well.

Another problem will also have to be addressed. It is the question of developing better relations within the EU in security and political fields. It is being understood that it is in NATO's interest to see that the EU forges its own security and defence policy. This will have to emerge if future EU-NATO cooperation as laid down in Berlin-Plus agreements (on how both parties should work together) is to succeed. This is a very sensitive area. Among other things, the doctrine states that the EU would refrain from developing institutions duplicating those already existing within NATO. Recent calls from Belgium, Germany, France and Luxembourg that the EU build its own military headquarters in Belgium runs directly counter to this principle. This is an issue which has to be resolved.

In the meantime, it is heartening to note that despite a lot of dust, all sides are trying to avoid confrontation within NATO. Responsible Europeans are advising on the need to avoid reflexive anti-Americanism. Americans are also being asked to reject unilateralism. There is great merit in this effort.

Both sides need to work together within multilateral institutions such as the UN. After all, they have a common interest in defending and working towards peace, justice and the reconstruction of poverty-ridden societies. Unnecessary distraction will divert attention away from serious issues like trade, health care and poverty reduction that are foremost in the agenda of developing nations.

Muhammad Zamir is a former Secretary and Ambassador.