A parallel government up to 25 March 1971
On 8 March, barring army garrisons, in East Bengal, people's rule led by Sheikh Mujib became the order of the day. Mujib's directives, popularly known as Bangabondhu's ten commandments, influenced every sphere of activity with defiance to the military regime. This movement alarmed the people of West Pakistan in general and military authorities in particular. The non-Bangla speaking business community (the majority were West Pakistanis) even in East Bengal had been pestering the military government for salvaging their sinking business. This proved two things: first, the Bangalee movement led by Sheikh Mujib was becoming really efficacious and second, the military was losing control over the administration of the government. However, in a bid to lift the declining economy and mitigate hardships of the common Bangalee, in East Bengal, Tajuddin Ahmed, Awami League's general secretary, issued "clarifications" and "exemptions' in banking hours, in the operation of road and sanitary services. The treasury in East Bengal began to make payments. Posts and Telegraph department delivered letters and telegrams within the limits of East Bengal. These clarifications and exemptions bore ample testimony to the fact that Sheikh Mujib and Awami League was running a parallel government in East Bengal, which was not even dreamt of in West Pakistan.
On 9 March, Sheikh Mujib reassured people of a sincere implementation of his six-point programme (DAWN, Karachi, Pakistan, 10 March, 1971). Since the civil administration was already cooperating with the disobedience movement by obeying the orders of Sheikh Mujib, by 5 March it had successfully covered the entire civil administration in East Bengal. This again exhibited the presence of a parallel government, which was virtually functional in the eastern wing. The crucial question for President Yahya did bear on the loyalty of the Bangalee elements in the Bengal Regiments (2nd Bengal Regiment located in Joydevpur, left over of 8th Bengal, in Chittagong, 1st Bengal in Jessore, 3rd in Rangpur, 4th at Mainamati, Comilla, East Bengal Regiment Centre in Chittagong etc) and the East Pakistan Rifles (EPR -- now BDR).
The effect of the control over administration by Sheikh Mujib had begun to tell upon the Pakistani elites (living in the East Bengal and West Pakistan). All on a sudden they started feeling stranded and became panic stricken. This reached a new high on 8 March, when Lt General Tikka Khan had to swallow his pride. Mr Justice BA Siddiky, the Chief Justice of Dhaka High Court, refused to administer him the oath of office as Governor and the General could find no other judge to oblige him. Tikka Khan had to be content with his military hat only. This was a successful guerilla political operation, which directly advanced the course of the movement with the use of non-violent measures.
On 14 March, Bhutto exhorted that the power, at the centre, be transferred to the majority parties of both the wings, while in the provinces, it should be handed over to the parties there. The same day, Gen. Yahya Khan, in a publicised attempt to find a political solution to the crisis, in East Bengal, flew to Dhaka; but his actual purpose was to buy more time to be able to prepare for a military crackdown. The eluding clique (of Pakistan) was getting alarmed at the legitimacy, which the Awami League's administration was fast acquiring in the eyes of the world. Tikka Khan warned every government employee to report for duty within 24 hours, failing which their dismissal would be combined with their prosecution by special tribunals. The outcome was fairly predictable -- Bangalees defied en masse.
But, Mujib fell into a booby trap set by President Yahya. Negotiations between Sheikh Mujib and Yahya Khan, covering all aspects of administration and the economy of East Bengal, continued between 15 and 25 March, 1971. Yet, it is interesting to note that the negotiation did not break down though the complexion of the President's negotiating team was bitterly provocative to the Bangalee leaders. Indeed, the negotiation team provided more undulations than a smooth surface to the delicate political discussions. Mujib privately remarked to a friend: "Yahya has brought his monsters. Does he expect me to talk to them?" Sheikh Mujib in order to maintain his dignity deputed three lieutenants including Tajuddin Ahmed and Dr Kamal Hossain to negotiate with the official Pakistani team and reserved himself for the apex meeting with the President.
Mujib and Yahya Khan had a round of talks on 19 March, the day Brigadier Jahzeb Arbab made a futile attempt to capture arms and ammunition of the 2nd East Bengal Regiment stationed at Joydevpur. This was the first confrontation between the Pakistan army and the Bangalee population (an event that deserves separate treatment). Frustrated Brigadier Arbab returned to Dhaka garrison on the same day, killing several innocent people near Joydevpur Chowrasta. Later, Bhutto joined the talks of Mujib-Yahya. On 22 March Bhutto announced to the press, that a tripartite understanding regarding the transfer of power, between the two major political parties on the one hand and the army, on the other (DAWN, 23 March, 1971), had been reached! This was a bluff, an usual political maneuvering by Bhutto, following the final meeting between the advisors of Gen. Yahya Khan and the Awami League on 24 March, an announcement was expected which never came. Rather, it was learnt that some central figures of Pakistan suddenly left Dhaka on the morning of 25 March.
The journalists, many of them foreign nationals, covering the negotiations, had been reporting optimistically upto 24 March. For instance, AFP reported on 24 March, quoting an 'impeccable source' that Yahya Khan was to proclaim virtual autonomy for Bangladesh within 24 hours (Washington Post 25 March 1971). Yahya Khan also surreptitiously flew back to Pakistan on 25 March even without Bhutto's knowledge. Prior to his departure, Yahya Khan gave a green signal to the army 'to sort them out.' On Yahya's safe arrival at Karachi, the Pak army beg a slaughter in Dhaka, Chittagong and throughout the eastern wing of Pakistan. This turned into genocide by Pak army.
On 26 March Gen. Yahya Khan, publicly announced the crackdown in a radio broadcast, twenty-four hours after it had been effected. He charged Sheikh Mujib for 'treason' and banned his party. The White Paper published by Pakistan, in August 1971, "On the crisis of East Pakistan," termed the army's action, of the night of 25-26 March as pre-emptive in nature; because, "reports had become available of Awami League plans to launch an armed rebellion in the early hours of 26 March, 1971. This was a cruel joke. The paper further read that in the opinion of President Yahya Khan: ..... "It became quite evident that the intention of the Sheikh and his advisers was not to come to an understanding on the basis of one Pakistan ............ , create complete chaos in the country. Through this plan they expected to establish a separate state of Bangladesh."
The parallel government headed by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman upto 25 March entered into a new phase of independent and sovereign government on 26 March 1971.
Columnist Nuruddin Mahmud Kamal is a Muktijoddha
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