You reap what you sow

Try as powerful unseen forces may to set one group of Iraqis, the Shias, against another Iraqi group, the Sunnis ­- the 10th of Muharram suicide bombing and other attacks on Shia targets in Karbala and Baghdad ­

- the main battle lines in Iraq remain Iraqi Arabs versus Americans and their collaborators: other Coalition troops or Iraqis employed by American-nominated Interim Governing Council. Arabs and their friends remain skeptical about who masterminded the March 2 attacks on Karbala and the Kazimia shrine in Baghdad. Iraqis in general continue to look at Americans, civilians or uniformed, as interlopers who must leave.

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What precisely has been achieved by Paul Bremer the US proconsul? Can the Interim Council go on safely governing Iraq as an authentic, sovereign government after June 30 next? Can the Council stay safe behind the (new) walls around their compound in Baghdad even for one day, if the US and Coalition forces were to go home? Does any intelligent reader expect the US to reduce its deployment in Iraq in, say two, five or even 10 years? Which gives courage to the Council.

Indeed questions regarding possible changes in US policies in and about ME resulting from the upcoming Nov 2 US elections can be answered. First both Bush and Kerry support the broad thrust of American policies vis-à-vis ME ­

- and indeed the rest of Asia. Secondly, US foreign policy is not an election issue; bipartisanship has ruled for long. Can anyone see any difference in the US policy vis-à-vis Israel or about the Arabs since 1970s ­

- right down to 2004? If John Kerry gets elected come November, he will act in Iraq and the rest of the ME in exactly the same way as the Powells and Henry Kissingers have advised their Presidents to do; only nuances may be different. Disagreements over foreign affairs before elections are not significant.

Look closely at the 'new' American policy under President Bush. Why did the US come to occupy Afghanistan? They say they came to punish Osama bin Laden. Now three questions arise. Suppose Gen. Musharraf's boys manage to catch OBL and hand him (and his acolytes) over to the GIs. What happens to the US presence? Would the GIs and their coalition partners go home, glowing in triumph? Secondly, can anyone actually guess when will White House decide to leave Afghanistan to its devices, now that a supposedly democratic dispensation has been created for it?

Thirdly, how many outsiders regard the Bush decision to invade Afghanistan to be due to OBL being the culprit responsible for 9/11? How many disagree that a previously-planned US entry into Afghanistan had a lot to do with (a) making a 'necessary' geo-strategic advance into Central; (b) that the scent of oil in Central Asia was strong; (c) that US bases (that could be suitably expanded in crises) close to Russia's soft underbelly would be a helpful circumstance; (d) getting closer to Chinese heartland can enable US diplomacy to counter Chinese influence and of the Shanghai Six; and (e) along the way, the US can consolidate its position in South Asia with many bases bolstering strategic partnership with India and keeping Pakistan Army usefully employed in catching al-Qaeda and Taliban fugitives at a trifling price. So, are the Americans really anxious to withdraw from Afghanistan?

It has been noted that the Americans are unlikely to leave Iraq anytime soon. The question arises as to what will their military presence do to Iraq and the region? The main achievement of the US war on Iraq may be the final liquidation of the Iraqi state. It is not yet definitive. But who can forget how Iraq came to be a state? It was created in the aftermath of WWI under Picot-Sykes

agreements over the disposal of the defeated Ottoman Empire, along with Trans-Jordan. Earlier it was just a part of the Ottoman Empire, like all the Arabs. British chose to occupy these areas because of their strategic location, centre of Arab world, their fertility and the expectation of oil; their own plans for Palestine against the background of Balfour Declaration. All have noted the demographic plurality of newly created state of Iraq: its northern part is largely Kurdish, central parts are Sunni-dominated and the south is mainly Shia that amount 60 per cent in all of Iraq.

Thanks to the quirks of Arab-Islamic history, few realised the extent of Shia numbers in ME; most new Arab regimes were Sunni-dominated, and one, Lebanon, was Christian-dominated. The only known Shia-dominated country was Iran, a non-Arab Empire. But few realised, until the British had had to put down a Shia revolt in southern Iraq in early 1920s, that a majority of Iraqis were Shias. It is only now known that Shias constitute a majority in Bahrain or that there is a Shia minority living in Saudi Arabia's oil-bearing region. As a result of modernist and crypto-democratic ideas pulsating in the ME after WWI and WWII, the British stooges in Iraq were overthrown in later 1950s.

Americans, by finishing off the Baathist regime, have also destroyed the social and political order in Iraq. The question now is: can the Iraq's Humpty Dumpty be put together again? One fears that the old order has gone for good. The effort to recreate the old state of Iraq can easily fail. The Kurdish areas are actually demanding independence from the Arabs, though they talk of only autonomy for fear of Turkish invasion. Turks are determined to prevent the emergence of a Kurd state anywhere. Sunnis who had ruled the roost in Iraq are gravely apprehensive of what the Shia majority will do come elections and a representative government. Shias remember their own massacres first by the British in 1920s and later by Saddam Hussain after the 1991 War in addition to the political strait jacket in which they were kept by the Baathists.

How explosive is the meltdown of this demographic mixture was shown by what happened on the Ashura Day in Karbala and Baghdad -­no matter who inspired it. One is not sure who instigated it. Like all colonial powers with no intention of relaxing control over the levers of power and wanting to determine the persons who nominally exercise power, the Americans too fear people's unity. They are thus suspected to have resorted to the familiar divide and rule tactics, as Robert Fisk has noted.

Anyhow, the position is that the transfer of power on June 30 will largely be a hoax. So long as the America's occupation Army is in Iraq, sovereignty will stay with the GIs' Commander or his boss. No civilian set up can now function for an hour in Baghdad until it has the blessings of the US. All constitutions that Paul Bremer may flaunt will be pieces of paper insofar as realities of power are concerned. Anyhow the question is: what is the US Army doing in Iraq and what were the American interests for which Iraq has been conquered.

Inevitably that two obvious connections are being made: one is of course oil, the second largest reservoir. The US means to control its production, transportation, who refines it and who buys it. US Army's presence will ensure that. Secondly, the Americans are not simpletons who did not know Iraq's complexities: A radical anti-Israeli regime in Baghdad needed to be destroyed -­ no matter if the country falls apart. US troops can ensure the security of its nominees who appear to rule Iraq, in whole or its parts: Kurds, Sunnis or Shias as new states. These can suitably intrigue, quarrel, fight or merely remain wary neighbours. So much the better if Iraq does split up in a few months or years so long as US troops stay on and new regimes are chosen mainly by the US. Absence of a strong Iraqi state will work wonders for Israel's security; Palestinians morale can be expected to crumble. Then there are profits to be made in the reconstruction works, in the rearming of new armies and of course in rebuilding the infrastructure of the oil business.

Holistic thinking of what the US is engaged in is necessary. It has, more or less, secured South Asia, with both India and Pakistan vying for closer US friendship. Pakistan has given at least four military bases to the US and is fighting shoulder to shoulder with it against Taliban and al-Qaeda remnants. The US has, in addition to its armadas in the Persian Gulf, two bases in Afghanistan and so many in Central Asian Republics. It can now play a stronger hand in Central Asia ­- not to mention its overpowering presence in Asia-Pacific regions, complete with suitable alliances.

It is not political abuse to say that the US has already built an Empire that does not go to the length of old-style colonisation. European colonialisms were frank: they openly exploited the resources of their colonies through special trade regimes. But they also accepted responsibility of running them and helped build modernist structures to ensure growth and more profits in trade. A measure of development, political and economic, did result. Inside the new US Imperium, there is no acknowledgement of any responsibility: you take what you can for as long as you can and move on. Some progress, that!

MB Naqvi is a leading columist in Pakistan.