Pak army attacked Joydevpur on 19 March 1971

Pushed to the extreme, the people organised meetings, protested against the military regime that conquered its own country (Pakistan), first in 1958 and then in 1969. Over the years, resentments grew, which peaked in March 1971. Bangabondhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (popularly known as Sheikh Mujib) gave voice to the gagged throat of Bangalees and demanded equal treatment for the people. The rulers (Pakistan army) did not appreciate the idea. They wanted to stop Sheikh Mujib and the people. Clashes were imminent. The first such clash before the beginning of the War of Liberation took place at Joydevpur, about 35 kilometers from Dhaka. This was the first encounter between the unarmed people of East Bengal and well-armed troops that came from Dhaka cantonment.

The leaked out news of 19 March must have alerted both the Bangalee leadership as well as the military commanders. The latter were already confined to the various garrisons since 7 March, 1971, the day of disobedience expressed loud and clear at Ramna Race-course in Dhaka. In the midst of hundreds of thousands strong crowd (highest ever assembled in a public meeting in Dhaka), the unchallenged leader of East Bengal, Sheikh Mujib's thundering charade subdued the roaring crowd who swayed like the waves. With the spontaneous magic slogan Joi Bangla the crowd began to disperse with the Sheikh. His measured speech, not more than five hundred words, still resonates in the ears of our people. In the words of Shaheed President Ziaur Rahman (then Lt Colonel of a victorious army), the speech was a green signal for the nine-month long liberation war that started on 26 March 1971.

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Although the Pak army suddenly disrupted the transmission of the speech, the full text had to be transmitted on the following day i.e. 8 March 1971. The people got the message and a total non-cooperation movement that begun on 1 March intensified. Sheikh Mujib's Dhamondi residence (at Road No. 32) virtually became a parallel government house where from policy directives began to emanate and the entire Bangalee nation, with no-exception, responded by offering unqualified support to Sheikh's authority they accepted with their heart and soul.

Visible effects of the non-cooperation movement began to manifest immediately. All sorts of supplies and provisions almost stopped to the army. The troops began to consume substitute canned foods that were brought by air from West Pakistan. Bangalee officers located in East Bengal garrisons no longer enjoyed the trust and confidence of the West Pakistan military rulers. In the backdrop of these circumstances, the hawks initiated a new ploy. While Gen. Yahya Khan, the President, proposed negotiation, military build up continued at a neck break speed. Dhaka airport was virtually turned into an operational air base, heavily defended and security measures tuned up on war footing. Like many others, we two friends (myself and Dr Mozammel Hossain, a senior scientist of the Atomic Energy Commission, whose radio recorded version of 25 March night operation was to be used for war crime trial in 1972) used to collect airport information through a Bangalee Air Force officer Ft Lt. Nurul Islam almost every evening as he was on Air Traffic Control (ATC) duty and pass on those information on to Bangabondhu's residence through a contact person. That, we thought, was the minimum we could contribute to assist Sheikh Mujib's planning effort during the early part of 1971.

Nevertheless, the situation was explosive, the atmosphere was charged. In this tension-ridden time, nothing seemed to have the faintest ray of hope for any settlement. The non-cooperation movement gained such an unprecedented success that it was only within the limits of the cantonments that Pakistan existed. With the exception of random shots here and there in the early part of March 1971, killing of unarmed civilians continued. However, very interesting though, no arrest was made of the top Awami League leaders. President Yahya Khan offered an apparently innocent proposal for negotiation between the government (army) and the people of East Bengal. On the face of Sheikh Mujib's announcement that he was taking over the administration of East Pakistan from the clutches of Martial Law (please see the author's article "A parallel government up to 25 March 1971", published in the DS on 18 March 2004), Yahya, on March 15, flew in Dhaka with a big assembly of Generals and policy planners of Pakistan. The negotiation continued between 15 and 24 March, 1971. In the pageantry of negotiations, Bhutto's absence was conspicuously felt. Soon, he flew in Dhaka and joined the negotiation that ended in a fiasco by 25 March 1971 as if the mock negotiation needed his presence to accomplish the target.

Be that as it may, I always have an indefinable feeling of joy in the narrations unfolding the events of 19 March. The uncertainties and anxieties of four dramatic hours (between 12-30 pm and 4-30 pm) in particular always rekindle my memory whenever I talk of the heroes of 2 East Bengal Regiment in particular and liberation war in general.

My sentiment, heart and soul are deeply attached to the 2 East Bengal Regiment because I was inducted into the unit in the Sylhet area during the initial phase of our liberation war as a civilian staff officer. The memories of the war and the association with the valiant freedom fighters such as Major KM Safiullah (later Major General, first Chief of Army Staff, Bangladesh), Major Moinul Hossain Chowdhury, Capt ASM Nasim, Capt Azizur Rahman, Lt Helal Morshed and Lt Ibrahim always rejuvenate my enthusiasm about Muktijuddha. These officers were promoted to Major General except ASM Nasim who became Lt General and the seventh Chief of Staff, Bangladesh Army, 2 East Bengal Regiment during the war (perhaps in September 1971) was upgraded to a brigade and was named S-Force and I found myself deputed to Sector-3 (a mixed unit of guerilla freedom fighters and regular army).

Before the main story of 19 March, a brief background of the Bengal Regiment that faced the wrath of Pak army would be interesting. The imposing century old palace at Joydevpur was turned into a citadel that garrisoned the 2 East Bengal Regiment, popularly known as Junior Tiger. I was told that during the rising political crisis in the months after the general election in late 1970s many unusual happenings influenced the minds of the Bangalee officers and troops. They pinned their hopes and aspirations on Sheikh Mujib and firmly believed that as the leader of the majority party (in the general election), he would lead the country. At one point President Yahya emphatically declared Sheikh Mujibur Rahman as the "future Prime Minister of Pakistan." On February 27, 2 East Bengal was assigned the task to enforce law and order at Mymensingh and Tangail. Two companies of the battalion were deployed there. The battalion HQ with the rest of the troops remained at Joydevpur, which was part of a clever move by the Pak army. The actual motive that worked behind this seemingly discordant order was perhaps to screen off the Bangalee troops from the main-stream of activities that was to follow shortly afterwards. With the gradual process of decimated deployment, the battalion would be reduced in its capability and effectiveness to a large extent. But beyond the perceptible, in this deployment, there laid the hidden seeds of freedom to defect in full strength when the time was ripe. Pakistan army's bad motive latter turned out as a great advantage of 2 East Bengal Regiment.

As part of the plan, 57 Brigade's attack on Joydevpur population (as well as 2 East Bengal elements), was to give them a lesson as they were protesting against the Pakistan army convoy that arrived from Dhaka cantonment. In fact, a strong armed contingent led by Brig Jahzeb Arbab Khan made their way to Joydevpur to disarm the troops of 2 East Bengal Regiment (a mixed Bangalee and West Pakistan troops with majority Bangalees and a Bangalee commander). This was a classic example of the military junta's plan to test the strength of the Bangalee dominated unit. Brig. Arbab expected, as a matter of routine, the Bangalee unit to observe military discipline and cooperate with the senior commander without any hesitation. What he perhaps couldn't appreciate was that the Bangalee officers and troops had already heard the rumour about disarming the battalion; even civilian population of Joydevpur anticipated a clash. So, they were prepared to face the invaders. The historic confrontation thus took an interesting shape.

When the 57 Brigade troops arrived, the civilian population of Joydevpur surrounded the entire area. They obstructed the movement of outside troops. To remove the barricades, Brig Arbab's order to "use maximum force" revealed the attitude that he had in mind towards the Bangalee civil population. With seventy strong jawns of 32 Punjab, the invader was invincibly armed with the 7.62 millimeter Chinese light machine guns (LMGs), the automatic fire power of almost an entire infantry battalion. So, from a position of strength Brig Arbab thought "nobody can stop us." Even with one third of the total battalion troops, 2 East Bengal Regiment located at Joydevpur was ready to face all eventualities. On the arrival of the Brigadier, the crowd of about 50,000 grew restless and a commotion ensued. Tension mounted, Brig Arbab ordered 'fire and clear the barricade.' Major Moinul Hussain Chowdhury, as per instruction, opened fire but in his order he added in Bangla 'fire below' or 'fire over the head.' Meantime, the crowd also opened fire. As the events took a dangerous turn the Brigadier became furious. Two civilians got killed and several others injured. The skirmish continued for about twenty minutes. Finally, Brig Arbab could escape with his troops.

The 2 East Bengal Regiment (for that matter any Bangalee regiment) thus got its first exposure of a frontal military clash with the enemy (Pak army), before the full-scale genocide that began on 25 March 1971. During 19th to 25th March the battalion had a formal change in command (from Lt Colonel Masood, a Bangalee officer to Lt Col Rakib, though a Bangalee by birth, he remained a dubious character for three days up to 28 March and ultimately managed to escape and report back to the Pak army as a loyal officer). From 28 March, the battalion did foresee their future under command of Maj KM Safiullah, then second in command of 2 East Bengal. He led his unit successfully throughout the war of liberation and reached with his small scout contingent on the day Pakistan army surrendered in Dhaka. The Major, during the war, was promoted to the rank of Lt. Colonel to command a brigade starting in September 1971. After the happy ending of the war of liberation, he wrote a book entitled "Bangladesh at War." In his book he wrote, "Pakistani troops at Demra surrendered to the Joint Command at 1.45 pm. At 3 pm Moin (Commanding Officer of 2 East Bengal -- the italics are mine) started for Dhaka. Around 2 pm I got a message from 57 mountain division to be present at the airport to receive Lt General Aurora at 3.30 pm. Thus, the 2 East Bengal Regiment's two key officers reached Dhaka on the victory day.

The drama that was begun on 19 March by 57 division of Pak Army came to a gloomy and sad end (for them) on 16 December 1971. After about nine months, the former Commanding Officer of the 2 East Bengal (Lt Col Safiullah) was invited by 57 mountain division of the Allied Force to attend the signing ceremony of a well-deserved victory. The victory, however, came too soon. The enemies were not crushed. Yet, the people of Bangladesh witnessed a defeat of Pakistan army in a theatre of operation with a record of disgraceful genocide of the innocent people of East Bengal in 1971. A mammoth crowd, happy with joy of victory, arrived at Ramna Race Course (now Shuhrawardy, Udyan) to express solidarity once again (after 7 March 1971). It was indeed a day of rejoicing, a day of victory of the people of Bangladesh. But the price was high indeed. In the words of an eminent philosopher, "If blood is the price of people's right to independence, Bangladesh has over paid."

Columnist Nuruddin Mahmud Kamal is a Muktijoddha.