Attack on AL rally: Threat to national security

Brig Gen Sakhawat wrote, "Our law enforcing agencies remained hollow, when billions of taka were spent during the last three decades on so called modernisation." He then went on to describe how money was squandered on trivial issues like changing uniforms and ceremonial parades and not enough was done to modernise the forces. I differ on this issue with the writer.

The fact is that the police and other law enforcing agencies, including crime detection, criminal investigation, and the judicial prosecution departments, did not get the right priority in the national budget. The meager budget that was allocated was barely enough to pay the personnel, leaving very little for training, equipment, and logistics.

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Where were we spending billions of taka then? It went to build an oversized but ill-equipped military that was to defend Bangladesh against external aggression. Compared to the giant defence budget, the police budget was a midget. While preparing against a hypothetical enemy, we neglected to address the mushrooming danger of internal threat. Even in the question of internal threat, our focus since 1972 had been the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT); a sizeable portion of our army had been stationed there. But CHT insurgency never threatened the mainstream Bangladesh political leadership or challenged our democratic polity, as is being done now.

In 1996, at a seminar organized by BISS, I argued that the threat of external aggression against Bangladesh was minimal to nonexistent then or later, whereas there was clear and present danger from within -- both from the extreme right and the extreme left. I argued that our security forces, including the armed forces, should be trained and equipped so that they would be capable of meeting the danger posed by these extremist forces. Now we can clearly see that our army's tanks, navy's frigates, and the air force's fighters are of little use against the threat that has emerged. The military force structure, training, and equipment are designed to thwart a conventional attack on our frontier. Our armed forces, though quite huge in size, are not adequately trained or equipped to deal with the internal security situation. That is why, when deployed, such as in Operation "Clean Heart," despite all good intent, they end up creating an unwarranted mess.

Brig Gen Sakhawat rightly pointed out the danger posed by arms smugglers to Bangladesh's national security. For too long we have been denying the fact that the insurgents across the border, in connivance with local collaborators, are using Bangladesh as a transit route for arms. Huge arms caches, seized or accidentally discovered from time to time, were hushed up. We were told to shut up, lest we tarnish the national image abroad.

I recall the incident of a truckload of small arms and ammunition that was accidentally discovered by villagers in Bogra. The truck that started its journey from near Tripura border was heading North-East. A look at the map will reveal the probable destination, i.e. Nepal. Who would be the probable customers for this huge supply? The answer is Maoist guerillas in Nepal, of course.

Then take the case of the biggest arms haul in Chittagong. An oceangoing ship must have brought those sophisticated weapons to the outer anchorage, unloaded them on to a barge, which brought the weapons to a government jetty to be loaded on trucks. Somehow the plan misfired and the weapons with the trucks were seized by the police. It was apparent from the type and quantity of weapons seized that those were destined for very advanced and organised guerilla outfits outside the border. However, within hours, our politicians were pointing fingers at their opponents as possible culprits. Months later, the only people in custody are some labourers, truck drivers, and small time smugglers. Which ship brought the arms, from where, where were they destined, who are the local collaborators and beneficiaries -- all these questions remain unanswered. Such huge arms smuggling needs meticulous planning and coordination at very high level. The question is, how high is that level?

I cannot but comment on some of the strategic issues brought out by the Brig Gen. He wrote, "It would not be out of place to mention that one of the strategic considerations that drove India to support Bangladesh liberation was the prospect of unlimited access to the East." I am yet to see any document, memoir, or history book, where it was mentioned that back in 1971 "the prospect of unlimited access to the East" was a consideration for India to go to war against Pakistan.

In fact, the then Indian Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi, was reluctant to go to war. After March 1971, she and her government, along with the Soviet Union and many others, tried in every way to convince Pakistani President Yahya Khan to come to a just and honourable solution of the Bangladesh issue. While preparing for war, she kept the windows of negotiation open till the very end. That Mrs. Gandhi was not for war was evident from the fact that she was addressing a public meeting in Calcutta in the afternoon of December 3, 1971, while the Pakistan Air Force launched attacks on Indian air bases. On being informed of the air attack, she rushed back to Delhi, conferred with the military commanders, and then ordered a counter attack. The first Indian air attack did not come till well past the midnight of December 3-4. Downsizing Pakistan would be in the strategic interest of India, but to say that that was the prime motive for India's support to our Liberation War would be to deny Indian leadership and the people the moral high ground of standing beside a populace that was fighting for independence and was subjected to genocide by a military regime.

Brig Gen Sakhawat wrote that India was interested in using Chittagong port in order to keep a watch on Chinese naval activities in the Bay of Bengal. Now that is stretching imagination a little too far. First of all, for China, Bay of Bengal is a far lower priority then South China Sea, Straight of Malacca, Japan Sea, or the Pacific. Secondly, the Chinese Navy is still essentially a coastal navy, years away from attaining capabilities of sustained operation in distant waters. Thirdly, the Chinese are making frenzied economic progress. Their leadership is presently focused on gaining international respectability; they want to be accepted as a responsible member of the international community. I do not foresee that the Chinese leadership would venture into any form of adventurism in the future.

It is in this context that India and China are going to forge greater friendship and cooperation as two major powers of Asia. Even if in some distant future, Chinese navy does operate in the Bay of Bengal, the Indians have their bases in the Andamans -- guarding the entry and exit, beside strings of bases and facilities all along the western coast of the Bay. Why would they bottle up their navy in an already bottled up port called Chittagong? Indian proposal (if, there was any) of use of Chittagong for transporting goods to and from North-Eastern India should be examined by Bangladesh from a commercial viewpoint. If it makes economic sense, we may accept it, otherwise reject it. Just look at Pakistan! They are negotiating with their arch rival India for the pipeline that would carry gas from Iran to India passing through their territory. It is all simple economics. If additional customers for our port bring us increased revenue, we should go for it. Just because the customer is an Indian should be no bar.

Brig Gen Sakhawat rightly pointed out the threat posed by the "Islamists" to the security of Bangladesh. Prior to August 21, even mentioning the existence of "Islamists" or religious extremists was taboo. Now I see these terms being used frequently. Was August 21 our 9/11?

In Bangladesh today, moderate Islam is on the wane, extremism is on the rise. Our situation is somewhat similar to that of Indonesia. Islam in Indonesia was, for centuries, a synthesis of local and Islamic culture and traditions. There was never any conflict, until the new breed of Islamist under Jamia Islamia (JI) started preaching the Wahabi brand of Islam.

The Indonesian government had long denied the existence of any militant groups in the country until the Bali bombing -- a catastrophe that came as a shattering blow to the government's claims. Interestingly, in Bangladesh both the AL and BNP government tried to cover up the issues. Not a single bombing incident was properly investigated and people were denied the right to know the fate of the investigations -- irrespective of whether AL or BNP was in power.

It was like nurturing a cancer hoping that it would cure itself. Such self-denial never pays. I hope the attack on AL rally on August 21 will help us all to wake up to the danger that is lurking within. I hope both AL and BNP will come together on this issue and confront it squarely before the Frankenstein destroys them both.

Bangladesh today faces the twin danger of extremists from the far right in the form of Bangla Bhai and his likes, and from the extreme left, in the form of Sharbaharas. The socio-political situation is ripe for the proliferation of both. Widening rich-poor divide, increasing landlessness, poverty and unemployment are the breeding ground for the leftist extremists. At the same time, there has been a proliferation of madrassas of all kinds that are producing thousands of obscurantist mullahs, totally alienated from the rest of the world and are likely Jehadi recruits.

To conclude, I once again thank Brig Gen Sakhawat for a very well-written piece that sounded a timely warning.

Air Commodore Ishfaq Ilahi Choudhury, ndc, psc, (Retd) is a freelance writer.