The 'war on terror' and the limits of power

The destruction of the WTC, but more than that, the breach of American security system, and the coordinated and systematic operation that was conducted by the perpetrators of these horrendous act, only demonstrate the vulnerability and powerlessness of even the most powerful state against determined groups, bent upon committing acts of destruction and mayhem.

Certain realities, heretofore not reckoned with, have become clear. It was for the first time that mainland US was subjected to terrorist attack, a possibility that nobody was willing to concede, and, given the US geographical situation, its impregnability was taken for granted. But neither the Atlantic nor the Pacific was guarantor of US safety anymore; power was circumscribed by what others were capable of doing to you and not what you were capable of doing; use of raw power has become an anachronistic concept; aggressive unilateralism achieves but only limited objective, and in the process compounds the situation.

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We also are almost three years into the "war on terrorism" that was formally launched by the US with the war in Afghanistan, and the world continues to be seized seriously with the issue of international terrorism. While there is a consensus that the "war" must go on, the big question is -- how? Also, a question on the minds of all is whether the world is safer now than when the "war" was launched? Security still remains the prime concern.

The setback in the "war against terror" can be ascribed to the use of raw power, and its failure to deliver for the US.

Mr. Bush's comment at a campaign rally in West Virginia recently is noteworthy. While he says, "Since the terrible morning of September 11, 2001, we have fought the terrorists across the earth -- not for pride, not for power, but because the lives of our citizens are at stake" his warning that you are "either with us or with the terrorists" reflects an aggressive approach to using US power.

However, the limits of the power of the most powerful nation on earth were made abundantly clear to all immediately on the day of the attacks. It was made even more so by the events that have unfolded since, particularly in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The Taliban in Afghanistan were a legitimate US target, having provided a safe haven to Laden and his group after he was expelled from Sudan. While the world generally accepted the rationale for going after al-Qaeda and the Taliban in the fight against terrorism, the US method of doing so, by demolishing through aerial bombing whatever was left of a pulverized Afghanistan after almost twenty years of internecine conflict was unacceptable.

Unfortunately, much to their chagrin, both the US and its surrogate against the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan, Pakistan, have found it hard to negotiate the al-Qaeda and the Taliban.

After three years into the operations to free Afghanistan one wonders if there is anything free about it. Very little of the Karzai writ runs in Afghanistan. Very little area other than those occupied by the US bases is under the control of the US. It seems that the Taliban are back in business in the south and southeast. The warlords control the rest. Even if one were to dismiss Zawahiri's recent announcement as premature optimism, by all available accounts the al-Qaeda is still winning the war.

Failure in Afghanistan to achieve even the fundamental objective has exhibited the limits of raw power.

While linking Saddam to al-Qaeda was a convenient ploy, which sold well with the US public, intelligence was doctored and all sorts of fabrication of facts and figures were resorted to in the process. The fundamental error in equating occupation of Iraq, a country that had nothing to do with bin Laden or terrorism, with the "global war on terror" has put the Bush administration in a quandary. This is because, according to some analysts, while he flaunted Iraq as his new front on "war on terror" his failure there is likely to be construed as his failure in his "war on terror."

Narrating recently on TV the successes of the American policy in Iraq, Condoleezza Rice mentioned three developments to justify her contention. According to her, the hand-over to the Interim Authority was done as per schedule, the Interim Government is running the affairs in Iraq, and that the 2005 election is on course.

While the Bremer hand-over was a tactical compulsion, the security and political developments since then belie the suggestion that the Iraqis are not being back-seat-driven by the occupation forces in the so-called running of their own affairs.

The limit of the interim government's political clout in resolving difficult political issues on their own was amply demonstrated late last month when it had to invoke the support of a religious cleric, convalescing abroad after a heart operation, to strike a peace deal with Sadr's militia in Najaf.

In fact Baghdad, Sadr City, Najaf, Samara, Baquba, Kufa, etc are but the manifestations of the deep resentment of the common Iraqis against the continued and illegal occupation of their country. It is also an expression of dismay and frustration at the much promised freedom and peace remaining elusive.

Thus, failure to achieve even the most fundamental objective in Iraq has again exhibited the limits of US power.

Unfortunately, the stocktaking exposes a very bleak picture of the US efforts against international terrorism. One needs to ask the Australian Prime Minister, reportedly busy reinforcing his embassies all over the world, or the Indonesians who were its victims twice in recent times, or the Pakistanis, whose senior military leadership, including the President himself, were targets of very recent terrorist attacks, or the people of Beslan, whether they feel more secure now than before October 2001.

The cul-de-sac that the Bush administration finds itself in is a confirmation that raw power is not the panacea for political problems and that aggressive foreign policy manifested through offensive unilateralism compounds it even more.

When unilateralism is used to support base aspirations, it goes beyond the acceptable norms of "enlightened self-interest." That is when isolation becomes a reality, power becomes sterile, and compliance of others is achieved only through arm-twisting.

The author is Editor, Defence and Strategic Affairs, The Daily Star