A historic beginning, again

The operative parts of the Joint Statement are: (a) to continue the bilateral dialogue, the purpose of which is (b) to restore normalcy and cooperation. (c) All Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) need to be implemented, "keeping in mind practical difficulties"; (d) the piece de resistance was (they) 'also discussed the issue of J and K' and 'all options for a peaceful, negotiated settlement should be explored sincerely'. (e) The two "agreed that CBMs will contribute to generating an atmosphere of trust and mutual understanding so necessary for the well being of the peoples of both countries". (f) Gas pipeline to India through Pakistan was recommended "in the larger context of expanding trade and economic relations between India and Pakistan".

What else was discussed we do not know. A contradicted report said that Siachin Glacier came up for discussion. But what progress, if any, was achieved is not obvious. The controversial report said that Indian Army was afraid that once-agreed the "redeployment of the troops of both countries" takes place to positions before 1984 Pakistanis will come and occupy those heights. Now that the report has been denied, it is useless to go into the obscure details of where and how far should the LoC is to be extended. The position as it obtained between 1972 and 1984 in Siachin areas can however serve as a basis for agreement. Pakistan can and should provide the assurance that it will not move into the positions vacated by India. That would end the ridiculous sporadic war on world's highest battleground in which more soldiers die of frostbite than by enemy fire. It simply shows a rather infantile ill will on both sides.

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On Kashmir what has been agreed is that both sides will explore all possible options for a peaceful and negotiated settlement of the issue in a sincere spirit and purposeful manner. The only qualifications given to the desired settlement of the issue are that it should be peaceful and bilaterally negotiated; there is not a word about the people of Kashmir or their rights or desires. The purpose of this possible settlement extends no farther than the satisfaction of India as well as Pakistan, with no reference to anyone else or anything. However historic this breakthrough may be, there can be doubts about its substance.

All the rest of issues -- seven in number -- seem to have been lumped under the category of CBMs, although the two worthies believe that these (CBMs) "will contribute to generating an atmosphere of trust and mutual understanding so necessary for the well being of the peoples of both countries". Everything from an easier and more civilized visa regime and Khokrapar railway and bus links to the grave security problems created by two hostile Nuclear Deterrents is being treated as amenable to peaceful resolution qua individual problems through mere CBMs.

What is a CBM? Ordinarily it signifies some links and safeguards to generate trust in the other side so that they can get down to seriously negotiating a final solution of the problem dividing the two countries. Here, what we have is seven disputes. They are problems or disputes in their own right. They need resolution through give and take by the two sides. CBMs can help in clearing up mists of mistrust so that the two antagonists can resolve their differences in an atmosphere where neither side thinks that the other is out to cheat or get the better of the other. CBMs are about atmospherics, not substance of any dispute.

The two leaders have said the CBMs of all categories should be implemented. But they immediately qualified this soft desire with "keeping in mind practical possibilities". They seem to imply that some CBMs may not be a "practical possibility". This is intriguing. One can concede that India may not be politically able to give Jinnah House in Bombay for fear of Bal Thakeray or Pakistani authorities may not want Khokrapar rail and road links on security considerations. These are exaggerated difficulties not impossibilities.

Why have they qualified the phrase about CBMs with "practical possibilities", although the two have expressed a robust confidence that "CBMs will contribute to generate an atmosphere of trust and mutual understanding so necessary for the well being of the peoples of both countries". This walahalla of trust and mutual understanding is not qualified by practical possibilities. And these CBMs, all by themselves, are supposed to provide the necessary condition for the well being of the two peoples. Which CBMs would these be? One is left guessing. Although obviously the term CBM has been stretched to the limits -- all categories under discussion -- one subject with which the term has been associated with has not found specific mention: the question of Nuclear weapons on both sides.

Could it be that the near certainty with which the CBMs' role has been lauded as leading to the well being of the two peoples -- with no qualifications -- is about atomic weapons. Anyone would think that two hostile nuclear deterrents, sitting cheek by jowl in South Asia -- especially in the context of these two feuding nations, so prone to frequent military tensions and to war psychoses -- will demand immediate and adequate attention at the highest level. Not discussing it in depth and not saying something clearly and precisely in the joint statement detracts something from the rhetoric of historic breakthrough.

Let us not underrate the problem posed by nuclear weapons in the arsenals of India and Pakistan. It is even more urgent and important than Kashmir. It is true that Pakistan's long hard pursuit of a Kashmir solution, conceived in a militarist mind set, has sired nuclear weapons after 1971 experience. The Bomb was conceived as an equaliser for India's undoubted superiority in conventional arms. Origins of the Indian Bomb are mysterious; it is claimed to be in pursuit of national greatness, being the currency of power and influence. It might actually be so but this writer suspects that 1974 PNE was related to Pakistan's pursuit of the Bomb. India reminded Pakistanis about the advances it had made and that it has atomic weapons too. It is inconceivable that Mrs. Gandhi had no reports of what Pakistanis were up to.

Hardliners in Pakistan, usually the military, developed a hubris of their own by the middle of 1980s. They said goodbye to the quietist course dictated by the Shimla Accord and started a more assertive Kashmir policy, edging out JKLF and converting the 1987-90 secular and nonviolent movement by Valley's Kashmiris first into an armed insurgency and later Islamic Jihad, strong in the belief that while they can do what they please, India cannot do anything too injurious to Pakistan. That is the reason BJP government first ordered five nuclear explosions and later made a diplomatic overture by the bus ride into Lahore. Pakistan effectively rebuffed Vajpayee's offer of talks by Kargil operations. After that India did what it did in 2002.

The 2002 experience sums up the situation nicely. Kargil had shown that Pakistan was not afraid of the Indian Bomb. India's massing of troops for an invasion in 2002 showed that India was in effect saying: 'we are not deterred by Pakistan's nuclear weapons; we will invade despite them'. Notionally they were daring Pakistan to use its doom's day weapons first so that they will wipe it off the map later. The threat by either side was not idle; both have tremendous capability -- but only to cause destruction in the other. Neither side has any defence against such weapons. Well, anyone who believes in the doctrine of deterrence is living in a make believe world of his own; 2002 a real life war game with nuclear weapons. But neither could muster the courage to do the real thing. Let's all heave a sigh of relief that the two did not live up to their overly macho bravado.

But the damned issue remains alive and kicking: the two Nuclear Deterrents are staring at each other. The idea that enough "trust and mutual understanding" can be generated by CBMs needs exhaustive examination. What do Manmohan Singh and Parvez Musharraf propose to do after CBMs have created a better atmosphere? Neither faces the fact that CBMs are palliatives and not solution. If other issues remain unresolved, the two will speedily begin clashing again. Not only Kashmir problem has to be resolved -- to the satisfaction of Kashmiris, all Kashmiris -- the Nuclear problem too has to be resolved. Besides, many things like facilitation of travel and intellectual and cultural interaction -- are ends in themselves. They are the criterion of how civilized and peaceable the two are.

MB Naqvi is a leading columist in Pakistan.