Putin charts a new course for Russia

The whole situation has been brought to the fore once again through the reluctance of Russia's leaders to grant Chechnya the independence that they have been striving for nearly a decade.

This latest incident led to human rights groups taking up arms on both sides. Those supporting the Chechens pointed out the great suffering that the people of Chechnya have undergone for the last seventy years -- exile to Kazakhstan under Stalin, being allowed to return home by Khrushchev and then being denied the chance of nominal independence after the collapse of the Soviet Union. They also alleged that something like ten per cent of all Chechens, perhaps as many as 200,000 people, had been tortured and murdered by inept, marauding Russian troops in the years since Putin's predecessor, Boris Yeltsin, launched the Chechen conflict ten years ago. They have in this regard noted that women Chechen suicide bombers might have been created because of the 'brutalisation' of the Chechen people and the 'widespread use of war-rape by contract soldiers.'

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Akhmed Zakayev, the European Representative of the Chechen Republic's last freely elected President, Aslan Maskhadov, took this one step further. He alleged that western governments had to share responsibility for this latest bout of terrorism because of their silence about Russia's human rights violations in Chechnya. He went on to state that double standards were in vogue among western nations with regard to state-sponsored violence in different parts of the world.

Nevertheless what is important is that Chechnyans appear to have several influential friends both within Russia and abroad, and that is slowly being taken cognizance of by Russian authorities. This group includes pro-US Russian critics like Boris Nemtsov and Vladimir Ryzhkov (men associated with the extreme neo liberal market reforms) and neo-cons like Boris Berezovsky and several US neo-cons like Richard Perle, Eliot Abrams, Kenneth Adelman and US Thinktanks like the Carnegie Andowment, Rand Corporation and the American Committee for Peace in Chechnya. These organisations in particular, have been assiduous over recent months in arguing against Moscow's claims that there is a link between the Chechens and the Al-Qaida. These prominent voices use the Chechen rebellion as a stick with which to beat Putin.

The latest Beslan atrocity appears to have given Putin the necessary handle, not only to re-evaluate policy but also to agree upon decisive steps to centralise a more hierarchical approach to administration.

In the wake of this catastrophe, President Putin's reaction appears to have been evoked by two factors -- nostalgic Soviet patriotism and Russia's ancient suspicion about possible encirclement. His response was that terrorists were trying to leave Russia without defences either to the east or the west. He was also bitterly critical of the prevailing status within the internal administrative structure. He not only blamed the rash of bombings all over Russia and the Beslan disaster as having resulted from Russia being 'weak' but that 'the weak always get beaten'.

This frustration and anger have been reflected in Putin accelerating efforts to create a more authoritarian and centralised form of rule.

Critics have, however, suggested that such measures have been introduced to divert common Russian citizen's attention from rising social and economic tensions and quell public dissatisfaction and anger. In this context, they are pointing fingers at the many structural economic reforms that Russia will require to undertake in the coming years -- rise in domestic price of oil and gas which will hit people's utility bills, privatisation of medicine, potential closure of kindergartens and even schools in smaller towns, mainly in the northern Caucasus (in areas prone to potential violence).

Whatever the criticism, Putin appears to be quite firm about his agenda to stop the 'disintegration of the state, the break-up of Russia'. He believes that the changes that are being introduced will be crucial for future stability and will have to be undertaken even if Russians cannot 'live in as carefree a manner as before'.

Regional governors, cabinet colleagues and senior bureaucrats have now jointly initiated steps to agree on 'appropriate measures on foreseeing and preventing terrorism in any form'.

The shake-up, biggest since Putin came to office four years ago, is likely to concentrate power in one pair of hands. Other far reaching steps will include the FSB (formerly KGB) controlling the border and playing a more central role in defining core administrative policy in the name of creating unity.

Efforts will now presumably also be taken to create a Russian version of the US Department of Homeland Security, through a strengthened FSB, which will coordinate the different ministries and law-enforcement agencies who are associated in curbing terrorism. Steps will also ostensibly be taken to raise the profile of Russia's Security Council or 'the little Politburo' which is chaired by Mr. Putin and includes all the 'power' Ministers -- defence, interior, foreign affairs as well as the Prosecutor-General.

President Putin has already changed the Parliament's Upper House and the Federation Council so that regional Governors and legislative leaders no longer sit in it. One anticipates that this progressive evolution might eventually lead to the President appointing Governors rather than these officials being elected.

Such steps would in a manner of speaking, restore within Russia, the Soviet system of hierarchical party rule from Moscow.

I believe that Putin's restrictive steps might be accepted with some degree of calm within mainland Russia but is bound to lead to difficulties with his southern neighbours and the expanded EU. In the Caucasus, Russia's frontal and strong-arm tactics to re-establish authority will meet with greater resistance from dispossessed Chechens, not because of Islamic fundamentalism but more because of their nationalistic belief. Similarly, the new nationalist government in Georgia is unlikely to help seal its frontier (in the Pankisi Gorge) with Russia when it is trying to remove the Russian troops from the disputed territory of South Ossetia, which was within Georgia's borders in Soviet times. Georgia in fact, has already stated its concern over Russian pre-emptive action.

Azerbaijan may also be unwilling to help clamp down on its Chechen Diaspora as Russia appears to have failed in getting Armenian troops out of large areas of Azerbaijan, which they occupy.

Similarly, the expanded EU, which now includes many east European states and even some Soviet republics will be watching events in Russia with great caution. Emergence of inflexibility and rigidity in Russian politics will definitely not be received enthusiasm. Latvia has already been vocal about Russia's conduct of security operations and some others have also expressed serious concern about Russia's handling of the protracted Chechen crisis. They have already expressed their doubts about internal military solutions rather than the pursuit of international mediation and talks between the Russian government and Chechen political representatives. Such advice, quite understandably, have not been received with any enthusiasm by Putin.

There will be criticism of Putin's new policies. Vladimir Pribyovski, head of the think-tank Panorama has said that terrorism is being used as a pretext to change the federal structure of the country'. Others are also alleging that the planned measures will probably lead to changes in the Constitution which will enable Mr. Putin to try for a third term in office in the elections in 2008. Presently, there is restriction to two terms only.

The US Administration, as expected, has made mild noises about Russia 'pulling back on some domestic reforms'. President Bush also remarked that Kremlin's security overhaul could 'not only undermine democracy' but also affect the delicate balance in Russia within the central government 'between the executive branch and the legislative and judicial branches'.

Whatever be the view of others, Putin and Russia appear to have drawn a line. The recent decisions reiterate that the Caucasus is vital to Russian interests -- its southern border is strategic and that it continues to be Russia's road to the Middle East and crucially to the oil resources of Azerbaijan.

Putin now believes that, should Chechnya become independent, the whole Caucasian powder-keg could explode with Russia losing for ever its ancestral power over the south. Such an equation, to him, is unthinkable.

Putin, known for his dislike of Gorbachev, also knows that ordinary Russians judge their leaders by their ability to control and increase state power. The President with his KGB background, believes his new tough measures will be seen as a personification of authoritarian democracy and closer to the historical Russians as an example of Putin not being a push over, trying to copy some one else's model of democracy. He might be right.

Muhammad Zamir is a former Secretary and Ambassador.