Noh drama in Kashmir

The one four-letter word that modern generals rarely use is "risk." Alexander at Gaugamela against Darius III in 331 BC and Babar at Panipat against Ibrahim Lodi in 1526 AD might excite military romanticists, but they leave practicing soldiers cold. Alexander took on over 200,000 Persians with just 50,000 Macedonians, placing his faith on strategy and destiny. Babar faced an army of over 100,000 with about one-tenth that number, putting his trust in a park of artillery and conviction. But sensible generals know that God is generally on the side of big battalions. As Stalin asked when told about the power of the Church: how many battalions does the Pope have? By reducing the number of troops, India's Prime Minister is not really diminishing ability. So is it just another empty gesture? No, if only because it is a vital signal.

The key difference between a dictatorship and a democracy is that in the former the government is stable but the system is unstable. In the latter governments are unstable, and deservedly so, but the system has the strength to proceed with calm and continuity. There should be no surprise therefore that Dr Singh has shown no hesitation in pursuing the peace process with Pakistan initiated in the last phase of his government by Atal Behari Vajpayee. In many ways he has strengthened it, both by his own involvement as well as by proving that this is a bipartisan effort. (Those in the BJP who would have loved to sabotage any peace with Pakistan, and whose ebbing strength must have revived with the gradual marginalisation of Vajpayee, must be feeling trapped. They are welcome to squirm in their self-imposed prisons.)

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Sincerity is Dr Singh's strength. He began as a reluctant Prime Minister, which itself is a rarity in the grab-culture of Delhi. No one thought that his reluctance was a sham, as is so often the case with politicians who torture renunciation to death. Over the few months in office, this sincerity has created ripples of goodwill that have reinforced his credibility and built a bond of trust with the nation.

Could candour become a weakness? He was candid when he said in Srinagar that he had no mandate to change the geography of his country, implying that the best deal that Pakistan could expect from any negotiations over Kashmir is the status quo defined by the Line of Control. This was construed in Islamabad as a snub because President Pervez Musharraf has said more than once that if the LoC was going to be the solution then it could have been found in 1948. President Musharraf's instant reaction was to check the voltage of the light at the end of the tunnel.

Indo-Pak relations are both about horizons and process. Process demands a succession of open windows that both sides must strive to keep open. The offer to talk is not tantamount to a retreat from held positions, otherwise there would never be any space for diplomacy. Process is about optics and semantics as much as public negotiations and private parleys. It is a game of discretion in which patience is the ultimate virtue.

President Musharraf has been throwing any number of balls into the air in order to check which of these might come into play. This is fine, and necessary. But the temptation to score a point comes in the way of scoring a victory because, paradoxically, this is a game which can be won only when both sides can declare victory.

There is also the thankless task of preparing the minds of people, including of those whose minds have been sealed by the rigid glue of hyper-patriotism. This is a fever that Army establishments are particularly prone to. President Musharraf must address both the cantonment and the country outside, heavily populated by jihadis who have created a five-decade vested interest in war with India. Prime Minister Singh has to look over his shoulder for the Modi brigadiers who believe that they can win elections only by demonising Muslims and Pakistan.

The delicacy of their mission makes the need for balance that much more essential. It is well known that you must not let your knees tremble when making a public speech. You cannot allow the knees to jerk either. There was a bit of the latter in President Musharraf's instant reaction to Dr Singh's Kashmir statements. The gloom-and-doom squad is already preparing obituary notices. But a little time should restore the equanimity that they created with their extremely successful meeting in New York.

Dr Singh's problems should not be underestimated. Dealing with Pakistan is difficult enough. He also has to contend with an insurgency in the Kashmir valley that many sound people in Delhi are convinced would not survive without the active support of powerful elements in the Pakistan establishment (all right: that is the polite phrase for ISI and its allies in uniform, the bureaucracy, and political life). Just in case anyone wanted reminding, insurgents welcomed Dr Singh with a gun battle in an area that was supposed to have been sanitised in advance of the Prime Minister's visit. Its failure does not diminish the audacity of the attempt, or the explosive impact of even marginal success. There was a strong last-minute attempt in Delhi to abort the trip, which the Prime Minister over-ruled. The temptation to harden the line under the stress of provocation is almost irresistible in government. Dr Singh did not shift his line. The decision to reduce troops was unaltered.

There has always been a debate in Delhi on how to deal with an insurgency between the "crush-them" lobby and "talk tough but also talk" group. International experience with insurgency suggests that the first lot rarely win. The French tried it in Indo-China between 1945 and 1954; the Americans between the mid-Sixties and 1973. The French failed in Algeria as well as did the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Any attempt by Israel to declare victory in Palestine sounds what it is, hollow. The one great success in a problem of similar magnitude was recorded by the British in Malaya, but the British succeeded because they treated it as a police problem rather than an army one, and the difference is significant. There was a parallel political process through which the communists in Malaya were marginalised and eliminated from the independent power structure.

Both views, hard and soft, are represented in the mix that constitutes any government, and their influence rises or ebbs with circumstance. Even as he pursues his options with Islamabad, Dr Singh has sent signals to the valley that reason and dialogue can achieve what bullets and guns cannot. The presence of soldiers always creates incidents that embitter people, and little can be more hateful than even an isolated case of brutality.

Change is a slow dance, and nothing is more injurious to a dance than a push, even if it be a well-meaning push in the right direction. A push destabilises the dance, and any choreography between India and Pakistan needs the management of classical experts. As noted earlier, a scene has been set, and the drama has been set in motion. But this is not Kathakali. It is a political version of the Japanese Noh drama, where meaning must be read into absence of movement even as nothing ever stands truly still.

Pakistan does not want to be deceived by stagnation, which is a fair worry. India does not want to be rocked by pace, which is equally hazardous to the health of the subcontinent. We need doctors who can find the correct dose for the right moment in an illness we know to be critical, for while medicine heals, an overdose can also kill.

The doctor must be patient. And that of course is not the only paradox in the affairs of India and Pakistan.

MJ Akbar is Chief Editor of the Asian Age.