Two contrary trends

Mere normal relations, without fullest bilateral cooperation, cannot be sustained because of existing differences and competitive militarisations. These animosities ignore the commonalities and go on intensifying themselves. Which is why negotiations between them are going nowhere. The effort required for mere normalisation is much the same as is needed for a thoroughgoing programme of reconciliation and cooperative partnership in most spheres. A people-to-people reconciliation, a higher aim, can be achieved by much the same effort -- a bargain. A cooperative partnership can improve human condition of Pakistan rapidly.

Historical legacies produce the second trend: every other day, the two neighbours test fire their updated missiles. What is involved? It signifies an accelerating arms race in nuclear weapons' and missiles; the latter is being adapted for different designs and sizes of improved warheads. Only adapted missiles can carry virtually a new warhead. This unabating arms race can only be predicated on eventual nuclear warfare. And both governments have again reiterated their resolve to go on improving their deterrents. Although no details are known, it is all but certain that both sides are increasing the size of their nuclear deterrents as well as improving them -- the better to fight the envisioned nuclear war. They have not merely inducted these weapons but are deploying them on expected battlefield stations. This two-sided arms race -- vertical and horizontal -- is an insistent reality. This is a quest for -- what? A victory in an expected war. Otherwise, it will be futile to incur the huge expenditure -- no one will use nukes.

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At this point, let's notice the confusion in moralistic rhetoric: it is heard on both sides that the nuclear weapons are evil. They had better not be. But the two countries feel compelled to go on updating their nuclear deterrents' safety and effectiveness as the final back up for their conventional deterrents. As it happens, Indian publicists have deployed great intellectual sophistication to justify India's nukes. They forget the time when India led the Non-aligned Movement and was propagating against nuclear weapons. It however test-exploded a nuclear bomb as early as1974 and by 1998 showed the world that it is a significant nuclear power. Pakistanis, not being too sophisticated, merely blurt out that Pakistan needs the Bomb to compensate for its weakness in conventional deterrent. It unabashedly proclaims its nuclear deterrent to be India specific. Complications follow.

Indians, with a mixture of condensation and contempt, say that Pakistan has no business matching India's capabilities. India is a great power with wider responsibilities and bigger coastlines. It has to worry about major powers, particularly China. Earlier the US was mentioned in this context, though not so now. Pakistan is a smaller country and it need not entertain ideas of rivalling India. Pakistanis reject these ideas, of course.

Pakistan has been fixated on Kashmir dispute ever since independence. It has fought three wars, two directly for the sake of Kashmir and the third also had some relevance to Kashmir. The fourth was the quasi-war for Kargil heights in which Pakistanis felt bruised by their meek withdrawal, similar in effect to 1971 disaster.

The fact is Pakistanis are unable to move beyond their original stance of not becoming friends with India or to trade until it helps solve the Kashmir problem. Despite making significant retreats, the substance of that stance survives. The Americans forced it to promise not to allow Pakistan's soil for sustaining Islamic Jihad in Kashmir. It is after this promise that Indian Prime Minister agreed to talks and two countries worked out an elaborate agenda in January 2004. Talks did start but failed; they were rescheduled after Sept 24 and Nov 24 encounters. In the talks, both sides are still scrupulously trying not to stray far from their original positions. Progress naturally eludes them. Would they ever change?

Talks on Kashmir and nukes are now hopefully scheduled for Dec 27-28 at the Foreign Secretaries level. On the nukes, the objective is to evolve a Nuclear Restraint Regime. The very formulation is misleading: it does not restrain further proliferation of nuclear weapons or missiles. It merely comprises Confidence Building Measures between the two militaries. These CBMs aim at making the nuclear deterrents of both sides safer in storage, transportation, operational handling and preventing unauthorised or accidental launches. NRR lays down procedures of the two informing each other of their various moves such as more tests or to scotch rumours or reduce high tensions. Anyone can see that the NRR, when and if agreed upon, would make the two nuclear deterrents permanent. The governments now want to aim at assuaging fears of accidental or unauthorised launches.

Nuclear deterrents are extensions of conventional deterrents. The two make a whole. No one can forget that a conventional arms race is more costly -- indeed ruinous. Both sides are proceeding apace to expand and improve conventional deterrents also. That costs a lot more money. It is an all-out race in all fields -- probably not excluding biological and chemical Weapons of Mass Destruction. Apart from the cost factor, so long as these arms races are proceeding, the level of mistrust of each other's intentions has necessarily to go on increasing. That prevents any normal risk-taking in making compromises or regarding the neighbour to be entitled to civilised behaviour. Aware people in both countries need to work for civilised coexistence between the two neighbours. Instead much progress is being made in the opposite direction.

Two good reasons make the current relationship unviable. One, economically the arms races are no longer sustainable. Forget about India or what happens there; that is aware Indians' business. Pakistanis can do little that is useful except to set a good example. Remember just as the Soviets went under because of the excessive arms spending, so can Pakistan. Indeed Pakistan is less rich in resources and resilience.

Second, the present courses involve: (a) no resolution of the dangerous problems posed by Kashmir, nukes and water; (b) it is sure to involve frequent crises and tensions amidst escalating mistrust. The latter enhances the chances of war. The lesson the two countries can learn from their 2002 experience is that neither side can expect to win the war that can graduate into a nuclear exchange; neither side can sanely start it. Ergo, the policies that lead to collisions need to be abjured and more peaceable ones have to be adopted with a view to radically changing the nature of Indo-Pak relationship -- as good as humanly possible.

It has to be admitted, alas, that dominant elites do not see the matter in this light. Their current efforts aim at cosmetic changes. One reason for that is they do not want any reduction in ever growing arms spending. That benefits all elites financially and politically: It is easier to garner votes (or other support) by wrapping yourself in national flag and proclaim to work for awe-inspiring national greatness. The PR departments of arms manufacturers do the rest. Haven't we heard of kickbacks? Which is why peacemaking is less popular than whipping up national fervour in which ever more ambitious plans for arms build-up are nurtured.

One particular Indian stand -- ostensible enough on surface -- has done a lot of damage. Indians regard themselves as a great power with greater responsibilities. It is significant that smaller Pakistan has also developed conventional and nuclear deterrents, necessarily smaller but meant for neutralising India's overwhelming strength. No matter what other responsibilities India may have, it has to counter Pakistan on a priority basis. That makes India on a par with Pakistan as a rival and both are set on a course that inexorably leads to conflicts and wars. There is therefore an inescapable need to reorient the thinking in both countries regarding the kind of relationship that has to be aimed at. If they merely aim at normalisation without any solution or understanding over contentious matters, that understanding will prove a will-o-the-wisp. This has relevance to the Foreign Secretaries meeting. True, CBMs, in their own way, would be good to have. Needless accidents or absence of Command and Control Systems cannot be preferred.

But don't forget that the CBMs do not address the real problem. The inimical attitudes and purposes are the problem. Maximum concessions that the two governments appear to be making to civilisation is to talking sweetly while keeping the powder dry. The point is where can they go from here? One is perhaps too idealistic and too unrealistic in insisting that the two countries should evolve practical understandings over all the contentious issues -- as a first step toward their long march to improved human freedoms by meeting social and economic needs of the peoples of India and Pakistan. This requires a well-considered scheme of reconciliation from the grassroots up. We can do worse than adopt the Franco-German methodology, including a commitment to regional cooperation and indeed integration. One refuses to be so realistic as to accept the reality of perpetually competitive militarisa-tions of such huge societies. It is better to be unrealistic.

MB Naqvi is a leading columist in Pakistan.