Cold war being revived

It would reduce the need for heavy deployment of American soldiers in Asia-Pacific region.

Question arises as to who the enemy is? Apparently the region is not menaced by any big military power. Just as the continued existence of NATO has persistently elicited questions regarding its necessity, why an elaborate military machine in Asia based on an alliance is needed, if there is no cognisible threat? From American viewpoint, only North Korea seems to qualify -- to an extent. Insofar as independent judgements are concerned, no one else in Asia seems to feel any danger from North Korea, except ostensibly Japan. But North Korea is not likely to attack an incomparably more powerful Japan -- across the sea. Other states of Asia-Pacific region retain their sangfroid.

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Interestingly, the US Secretary of State Colin Powell is believed to have shown the plan to Beijing leaders. The Chinese reaction was less than enthusiastic; the Chinese have sat over the proposal ever since. It is understandable: why would the Chinese join a multinational force led by an American dominated alliance, when it does not want to gang up with pro-US Asian states? China's threat perception does not coincide with the US'. What do the Chinese think, will be taken up presently.

Meantime it is reported that Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, when given the plan in New York in September last, was quite responsive. If India finally joins the new force, it could open doors for India receiving latest technologies and possibilities of Indian forces acquiring a new role abroad. It may also seem to enhance India's status as a major regional power by joining a US-led alliance.

True, it will take some time before Indian government finally decides. This government comprises the United Progressive Alliance that also contains leftists. The latter's reaction is likely to be negative. Therefore there may be opposition in India in finally accepting the Rumsfeld scheme. That India will flatly refuse it is out of the question; initial reaction of Dr. Manmohan Singh shows it. But final acceptance is not automatic; there is bound to be a lot of debate in India. The forces for and against may be fairly well balanced.

But one circumstance needs mentioning. Americans are one of the most popular foreigners for India's 300 million strong middle class. India's burgeoning business class is all for forging close relations with the Americans. The Indian establishment is also anxious to import the latest dual-use technologies that are so far denied by the US on account of India not having signed the Non Proliferation Treaty. The quest for these technologies can lead India into joining the usual pro-American states. This membership, in addition to India and Pakistan, comprises Japan, Australia, Singapore, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Afghanistan, Khryghistan, South Korea, the Philippines and New Zealand among others.

But it is just this kind of a line up that will make those Indians bristle who are still under the influence of Nehruvian ideas of keeping India out of foreign entanglements promoted by superpowers. Indian nationalism of Hindutva kind having receded, a decision on this issue may create a crisis for the Manmohan government. The left may threaten to withdraw support. Sonia Gandhi and Dr. Singh will have to think furiously: A possible, may be likely, course for the Manmohan government would be to indefinitely postpone the decision and seek a via media in order to eat cake and have it too -- if possible.

But think: India's strategic partnership with America has been proceeding apace. Indian government is also cooperating fairly closely with the Israelis; it is buying high technology from them and some of the high-tech American technologies might be routed through Israel. A conceivable compromise between Americans and the Indians might lie through Israel to enable the Indo-American economic and strategic cooperation to go on while India does not technically join the new Asian NATO.

The determination of the enemy however remains a necessity; it cannot be dodged. Which is where the Chinese ideas come in. One of the first actions of the Chinese after they are said to have become a true great power was to re-establish strategic ties with Russia. This strategic partnership is in working order. The Chinese had responded warmly to the abortive Iranian notion of forging an Axis in Asia comprising Iran, India and China. The Chinese are an integral part of the Shanghai Five, now Six. The Chinese are as much interested in the oil and other minerals of Central Asia as are the Americans. The Chinese are also busy throwing cold water over American enthusiasm of taking a hardline with the North Koreans. China remains a friend of North Korea. It seems as if it may indeed be a friend in need for the isolated state. China's strategic thinking has underpinned the Sino-North Korean friendship for long. Which may be the main basis of North Korean insouciance vis-à-vis the US threats.

All in all it seems that clarity about Americans' thinking on the possible enemy against which they want an Asian NATO (in which the use of American troops would be minimised) will have to be inferred from their preferences. Whichever way one looks at US aims, two possible 'enemies' can be discerned: they are China and Russia, with China looming larger than Russia insofar as the US strategists are concerned. Apparently Americans seem somewhat less worried about Russia for certain reasons, while for China many rightwing strategists are far more apprehensive; Clinton's policy of engagement with China seems inadequate and a harder line looks more attractive to them. Americans are however likely to stick to the engagement policy; after all their investments in China may amount to a whopping $ 160 billion. The present Sino-US trade pattern cannot easily be broken. But American Right seems to be taking out an adequate insurance policy in the shape of military preparedness in Asia designed for China, if....

For Russia, the West, coinciding with NATO, is taking care of it by expanding NATO eastward; much of the buffer zone Stalin had put in by conquest during the Second World War is now NATO, or otherwise unfriendly, territory. Events in Ukraine show that there are growing cracks even within the Russian heartland; the opposition there stands for closer ties with the west -- at the expense of links with Russia. The riddle of retaining NATO even after the demise of its designated enemy lies in the western apprehensions of even the much reduced Russia. For good measure, NATO's scope of operation has been expanded to ME (Iraq for now) and even Afghanistan. To be sure, fissures have begun surfacing in the North Atlantic alliance; six EU countries led by France and Germany do not approve of American actions in Iraq. But they are only verbal critics without wanting a break with the US. Even they have gone along with NATO's eastward expansion and are now happily cooperating with the US in Afghanistan in addition to former Yugoslavia. Is the brouhaha about 'old Europe' becoming a new power centre exaggerated? May be it is not untrue as a long-term trend.

A new cold war seems to be shaping up in Asia. Pakistan, given the track record of its ruling elites, will happily sign up with the Americans. Islamabad is not likely to face any dilemma regarding the way Asian politics is being shaped by America or other possible roles for Pakistan.

MB Naqvi is a leading columist in Pakistan.