The rumpus over Iran's nuclear potentials
The IAEA officials, however, claim that they found traces of weapon-grade uranium in Iran's nuclear plant. The evidence can be interpreted either way. On the pro-nuclear side, the Iranian uranium enrichment capability can always be switched over to military use. The Iranians, for their part, explain the detection of the offending traces in a different way, arguing that the plant was already contaminated with weapon-grade uranium when it was purchased from the black market.
In the absence of any definitive proof of Iran's involvement in making nuclear weapons, the international community, led by the US and Europe, has now started questioning Iran's intentions in this regard. The general consensus is that Iran is in all probability trying to build its own bomb. It is difficult, however, to measure-up the intention, which remains largely a matter of conjecture.
Why should Iran, after all, build a bomb when it has signed the NPT and faultlessly cooperated with the IAEA-initiated inspections ever since aspersions were cast on its intentions. But then it has, according to one conjecture, witnessed the first Bush administration attack and occupy two countries in the vicinity. Neither of them possessed a nuclear bomb, but a case was built up at least against one of having weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The complaints of Iraq having WMD later proved to be a hoax. Had the aggressors not been sure that Iraq did not actually possessed WMD they perhaps would not have attacked that country. Iran has curiously observed that a country like North Korea is claimed to pose an "unacceptable threat" but has been spared apparently only because it has an open nuclear weapon programme and possibly also the weapons. Israel's vast nuclear arsenal is only too well-known.
Iran's Ayatollahs are wise enough to figure out the paradox -- that if you pose a real threat to the US you will not be attacked. So, why not make a bomb which is the best safeguard against foreign invasion? When such incentive to make a bomb is viewed in the context of the dubious circumstances that surround Iran's nuclear programme, its intentions raise suspicions in the minds of the habitual sceptics.
Even if the Iranians are merely not choosing to be engaged in any debate and are simply adhering of their official position of having only a civilian nuclear programme, many who matter in the international community do not believe them. No amount of Iranian explanations, excuses, or pleas have so far placated the concerns of the international community, this makes Iran nervous about submitting to the international demand to totally suspend uranium enrichment in its nuclear plant.
The repeated US warnings about Iran's nuclear intentions have, in the meantime, sparked widespread fear of a new confrontation in the Gulf. The Bush administration, the first and now the second, has been taking its habitual approach of bearing a stick and sending threats. In tandem with this approach is the European approach -- that of constructive engagement. Thus Iran is faced with the prospect of both carrot and stick.
Europe has offered to supply light water reactors for Iran's civilian nuclear programme and asked Iran to totally suspend uranium enrichment. Even if Iran has suspended its uranimium enrichment programme, the US has consistently drawn the worst conclusion from anything coming out of Iran. In its dealings with Iran, the EU has also not been any less abrasive -- its softer approach notwithstanding -- and is making unpleasant noises while dangling both carrot and stick to attempt to defuse the crisis.
Iran has not, however, kindly taken to these threats and noises although she is virtually torn between willingness to compromise and the urge to maintain national pride -- the pride with which she held the "Great Satan" at bay for the last quarter of a century. Even if Iran is under multiple pressures, it is far more confident today that it can withstand them. The tension between Tehran and Washington has always been complex -- haunted by Iran introducing militant Islam for the first time and the hostage trauma -- the insult with which the US could never come to terms. Today the bitterness between them is far deeper because of Iran's support for Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Palestinian Islamic resistance movements as well as Iran's suspected nuclear weapon programme.
As Iranians intensely debate how to deal with a belligerent America, the changed situation has strengthened the ideologues in Tehran who advocate "standing firm" on nuclear issues. The internal political shifts have also changed the dynamics of the US-Iran stand-off. A year ago, Iran's president and the majority of the members of the parliament were reformers who wanted to end the mistrust between Iran and the West. Today, the chaos in Iraq and higher oil prices have emboldened the Iranian regime. Iranian analysts warn that any US military action on Iran's suspected nuclear sites could backfire, echoing the impact of the US-blessed Iraqi invasion of Iran in 1980 and re-igniting Iran's highly chauvinistic nationalism.
In its war on terror, global security has most definitely not been promoted by America's immoral invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq. There is nothing to suggest that an Iran adventure would be any different. Iran is a united country with a strong sense of nationhood and strong determination to defend itrself. Any potential aggressor will be just sucked into its quagmire.
Brig ( retd) Hafiz is former DG of BIISS.
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