Indo-Pak deadlock lives on

The parameters, in the main, are the purposes the two countries seek to attain. Good sense, the failure of confrontation policies, enlightened self-interest and foreign, especially American, advice have combined to make them realise that they should seek a modus vivendi. It is assumed that with persistent effort, a modus operandi -- some kind of practical co-existence -- may be achieved. That is the present quest. I assert this quest cannot succeed, unless one set of parameters is reconciled. Which set of parameters is this?

It is the medium-term national purposes of both sides. India is embarked on a course of action that in addition to guarding national independence and homeland's integrity, the objective is to make India a great power, conceived as a strong military power, able to exert influence over others, far and near. The objective is thus more power for Indian state. Military strength is one of the most important, though not the only, element of power. Other elements constitute soft power or civilisational accomplishments which, all agree, India does not lack.

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What are Pakistan's objectives? Well, there is some confusion. Ruling elites over the years agree on one short- to medium-term purpose: to be secure against the supposedly inbuilt bad intentions of a militarily superior India and secondly to somehow have Kashmir, mainly the Valley, vacated from India's occupation. For an initial while, Muslim League leadership had vacuously dreamt of leading the Islamic World -- based on a pervasive pan-Islamic sentiment that had grown mainly in the 19th and 20th Centuries. Although its echoes were heard as late as 1974 when Z.A. Bhutto vainly dreamt of leading a revitalised Muslim world. Pan-Islamism is empty sentimentalism -- a dormant volcano that briefly erupts in an orgy of sloganeering, if a demagogue tries hard.

But one of the means adopted to achieve security vis-a -vis India's military power was to sign up with the US-led west in the grand east-west cold war. Pakistan, in that line up, could only be a camp follower of the US. But the US paid for this allegiance by arranging considerable -- by Pakistan standards -- military and economic aid. Over half a century, total aid amounted to some $ 90-100 billion. The net effect has been the strengthening of the Army and some economic achievements that made Pakistan more dependant on foreign aid. While the military never had enough of military goodies, common folks found the economic development to have left some 65-70 per cent of population in penury.

As it happens, Pakistan remains unstable. Emphasis on militarisation has destroyed democracy; has ensured Army generals' supremacy over the whole polity; has led Pakistan into repeated wars with India -- none of which could be won. It has also caused three major adventures in Afghanistan that have seriously harmed both Afghanistan and Pakistan; and has led to a budget structure that allocates roughly 82 per cent to just two items: servicing foreign debts and national security while sums for social sectors are laughably small.

The point is Pakistan's ruling elites regard continued acquisition of military capability of India as a direct and radical threat to Pakistan's security. No realistic assessment of Indian politics over the medium-term can however expect a change in India's priorities. Similarly, even the unlikely advent of democracy in Pakistan will not coincide with a swift change of perceptions among new rulers. These two basic policy orientations clash head on.

Now, superimpose on these adversarial perceptions the supposed ultimate guarantees for respective national security the two countries have created: the Nuclear Deterrents. Remember there is no known defence against a nuclear attack, all the motivated talk of missile defence systems notwithstanding. So long as the threat of atomic attack exists on either side -- and it is prudent to expect both sides to be as vigilant as the threat perception demands -- each side becomes an active threat to the other. So neither side can trust the intentions and words of the other. From a practical standpoint, it is a conclusive statement. Unless prior understanding is arrived at on the nuclear question plus some kind of a modus operandi on Kashmir -- the motive behind the Bomb -- Pakistan and India will never settle down as civilised neighbours.

One point needs to be made on the atomic question: the much bruited Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) or the Nuclear Restraint Regimes (NRR) are good insofar as they avoid accidents or mishandling or unsafe storage or transportation of atomic weapons and prevent their unauthorised launch. But CBMs are clearly premised on the two opposing Deterrents being permanent phenomena. That permanently freezes all Indo-Pak disputes. Meantime, both will go on making their so called "minimum" Deterrent "credible" by updating (improving) and increasing the nuke numbers for second strike and ample caution. That risks making the NRR wobbly, while basic differences will go on festering and no meaningful improvement in the ties can be expected. Nukes pose a problem that needs a solution, not palliatives. They have to be done away with entirely, however painful it may be to Bomb-lovers; nothing less will do.

As for Kashmir, two points are relevant: first, Pakistan has run through the gamut of all possible ways of solution seeking and has not succeeded: It has bilaterally negotiated any number of times; and had involved mediators -- remember UN mediators, British PM Clement Attlee and a representative of President Truman and 1960s Anglo-American intervention, not to mention informal efforts by Commonwealth. It wanted arbitration but that was out because India refused. It went to war twice and had any number of skirmishes, some quite serious. Finally, it tried proxy war in Kashmir; but that has only meant 70,000 to 80,000 deaths of Kashmiri youth; India's military hold is as strong as ever. Kashmir Jihad, apart from its blow back effects, brought on the biggest ever crisis in 2002 -- to no one's credit or advantage. In short, Pakistan cannot wrest Kashmir from India. It has no option but to live with the territorial status quo, however painful.

True, accepting that situation is no solution; Kashmiris, being alienated from both, will go on struggling as best as they can. But that should be India's headache. As freedom lovers, Pakistanis can go on sympathising with Kashmiris, perhaps contributing some money or extending consular help -- but no gun running or infiltration. That will, in conjunction with a true solution of atomic conundrum, open the way for Pakistan to make friends with India -- a stage after normalisation.

One final point is about what to desire in the Pakistan-India ties. The governments, in their power-driven wisdom, have chosen to work for "normalisation". What kind of normalisation is the question. Pakistan's relations with Peru or Ghana are quite normal as are India's with Iceland or Bourkina Faso. We must determine the quantum and quality of the desired Indo-Pak relations. Arriving at "normal" ties is chasing the indefinite. Fixing a definite goal, rather than a variable normalisation, is vital. It may help resolve the atomic conundrum.

The only goal that can lift both countries from their bilateral, indeed regional, difficulties is a true rapprochement from grassroots up -- on the Franco-German model. This reconciliation can easily be extended to the whole of South Asia. If a people-to-people reconciliation is to be strived for, most difficulties and disputes can be contained or resolved peaceably in the altered climate of opinion, even as the process proceeds.

MB Naqvi is a leading columist in Pakistan.