Is there more to August 17 than mere 'intelligence failure'?

It appears that such an explanation is designed to gain some reprieve from having to explain to the public for the moment why the bombings could not be anticipated. Indeed, there was a failure to prevent the bombings, but was it entirely due to the shortcomings of the intelligence agencies? Was it organic to the agencies or did the lacunae lie somewhere else? Time has come to such a pass that the relevant authorities must clarify as to what was behind this failure

But, given the disclosure made by many of the arrested suspects of the August 17 blasts, as well as revelations in many press reports since, one finds it hard to continue to conform to the idea of "intelligence failure" that was the problem. In fact, many believe that there is far more to it than mere "intelligence failure," and there is persuasive evidence to support this view.

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If there was intelligence failure, the natural corollary would be why did the apparatus "fail"? It is a question that bears resemblance to those asked after 9/11. The committee that looked into the intelligence failure of 9/11 has put its finger on the operational as well as political reasons as to why the CIA and other intelligence apparatuses in the US failed to predict one of the largest terrorist operations till date. It is hoped that our government, while going into the roots of 8/17, would not neglect to secure all information to determine where and why the intelligence agencies had gone awry.

At the risk of sounding repetitive it has to be said that that our intelligence agencies have been used primarily for purposes other than what they are designed for. And the fault cannot lie entirely with the agencies, those who direct and task them must also bear some responsibility for this failure. The outfit was clumsily used during the pseudo-democratic rule. Regrettably, even the democratically elected governments, claiming to reside within the democratic norms, have followed the tradition of utilising the intelligence set up for political ends, in some cases in an even more blatant way. Thus, the intelligence apparatus failed to deliver when it came to the crunch.

There is common belief that those selected to head the top agencies were put there primarily on considerations other than of merit or competence. Unfortunately, loyalty to individuals took precedence over any other consideration, much to the detriment of the nation. What the boss wanted to hear was more important than what he or she ought to have been told. Everybody was happy and the job was secure. Unfortunately, it was the nation and the country that was left insecure.

There is indeed the need to overhaul the intelligence agencies, but not so much in terms of their job description, which is fairly well defined, but in the form of technical and trained resources as well as in the way that these agencies are directed and tasked. But many commentators would like to believe that the national intelligence apparatus is not quite as sloppy or incompetent as some have made it out to be. What is the basis of these formulations?

It is that --in spite of the inherent shortcomings of the agencies, the quality of its human resources that leaves much to be desired, the utter lack of technical support, and the poor direction that is predominated by political considerations -- one finds it hard to accept that they did not get the wind of what these militants were up to prior to August 17!

While it is never possible to forecast the exact date or the type of operations a clandestine group would launch, inference drawn from collated information can give a pretty conclusive indication of the likely actions of any outfit, militant or otherwise. That is, if we actually have related information that we can convert into actionable intelligence, and more importantly, if we are prepared to believe that such a group indeed exists in the country and we do not put it past their capability to conduct such an operation.

There is enough evidence following the developments since August 17 to believe that not all the intelligence agencies were in a state of inertness. A very in-depth six part serialised report, appearing in the DS from August 21-26, recounts the growth of the militant outfits in Bangladesh. It portrays how these outfits took roots in our rural areas, apparently unbeknownst to our law enforcement agencies. In fact, the Special Branch of the police had prepared a report in 2003, which laid out the details of the threat that these militant outfits were likely to pose to the state. Is one to believe that the leaflets that were being distributed by the militant organisations in some parts of the country in February and March this year escaped the notice of the policy planners?

It is therefore not so much to the lack of intelligence or timely reports that one can attribute entirely the rise of the religious outfits in Bangladesh. It is the apathy or the unwillingness on the part of the administration to accept the ground realities and address them as such that has a lot to do with what we endure today.

The frustration in the intelligence community is only natural when reports forecasting grave consequences of the sinister activities of religious extremists operating under the shelter of some religious NGOs are left to gather dust. Another article regarding intelligence brief, made out in 1999, demonstrates the sloppy manner in which a case with specific intelligence was handled that allowed the suspects to go free. Can one be faulted for concluding that either not much credence was accorded by the relevant authority to the reports, or that actions were not initiated as a matter of policy?

If one were to take a stock of all the reports on extremist activities that appeared in the press between August 18 and now, one cannot but conclude that not all the developments in this regard over the last decade can be attributed to the failure of the intelligence agencies. Indifference to agency reports has much to do with the situation that we are facing today.

While some may feel that "intelligence failure" is a good excuse, they would do well to remember that a good excuse is one that cannot be used over and over again.

The author is Editor, Defence and Strategic Affairs, The Daily Star.