Plain Words

Will the next summit succeed?

M B Naqvi writes from Karachi
The Indo-Pakistan summit last Wednesday (Sept 14) only succeeded in continuing the talks and saying that terrorism and other impediments will not be allowed to derail the dialogue. There was no word about further agreements. President Pervez Musharraf has put a positive spin on this blankness. One hopes he is right. The Composite Dialogue has failed in its first two rounds. It was expected that this summit would agree to inaugurate the third round. It has not done so. In a way, we are back to square one, if not further behind it.

Let's enumerate the issues that require resolution. One puts them in six boxes. The first is about Kashmir. The second groups Siachin and Sir Creek problems. The third comprises issues connected with water, the offspring of the Kashmir problem, that are growing up. The fourth is the nuclear issue, all the implications of which are not yet recognised. The ramifications of these weapons are far-reaching, and if the problem is not defined, debated, and resolved, no other settlement will work. It is linked to the overall purpose of the two countries: whether they will be friends or enemies will hinge less on Kashmir and more on nuclear weapons. The fifth are questions of free trade, MFN status for India, and the rights of Indian goods to transit through Pakistan. A lot of benefits for all is involved.

Finally, there is free travel and the visa regime between the two. Its importance is seminal. Unless there is free travel for common people of each country, there would be little progress on any issue. In that sense, all issues are inter-dependent, though some are more important. Among these are four: free travel, free trade, nuclear issue, and Kashmir.

Indications were that the New York encounter would sort out Siachin and Sir Creek. Well, it didn't. Whether the next encounters will or will not resolve them is the question. They are easiest to resolve. Everybody knows that a settlement on Siachin has been arrived at and a treaty has been initialed. Sir Creek is also not a grave issue. Will they settle these next time? Let's wait.

As for Kashmir, the assessment is like half-full or half-empty glass. Pakistan wants a settlement that "satisfies the two countries," though for PR purposes Kashmiris' satisfaction is frequently mentioned. The jointly accepted formulation is "to the satisfaction of the two countries." For Pakistan, Kashmir is a litmus test; it is still for "Kashmir first and other things later." As for a possible Kashmir settlement, Dr. Manmohan Singh has again identified the Red Lines beyond which India will not go: this is redrawing of the present boundaries of Jammu and Kashmir state, ie India's sovereignty over the state's parts it controls, cannot be questioned. What may be left is a half-formal and half-informal settlement in separate regions that President Musharraf had indicated at one stage. That Indian Prime Minister has shown annoyance at President Musharraf's mention of Kashmir in his General Assembly speech throws a blindingly clear light on the problem's current status.

Don't forget Kashmir has been a bone of contention for 58 years. Strong vested interests have grown up in both countries leading them to militarise, and has set each against the other. The history of three wars and many quasi-wars is militarisation's result. These vested interests work against India-Pakistan friendship, which would hurt them. Industrial-military lobbies comprise resourceful people with much influence, for they ride on the chariot of patriotism. Unless the common people on both sides determinedly pressurise the two governments to become close friends, the vested interests would always prevent a final settlement. That needs to sink in in both countries.

Nuclear weapons are a misunderstood issue. Two hostile nuclear deterrents, confronting each other from such close quarters, cannot permit friendship between India and Pakistan. Period. Nuclear weapons being weapons of attack only, with no defence against them, two such states can never trust each other. So long as the issue is not resolved radically to either make the two dDeterrents disappear or the relationship should become so close that hostility between the two becomes unthinkable -- such as is the case of France and Britain. Probably, Indian and Pakistani hardliners still believe in the illusion that a détente can possibly prevent the two from going to war and enable political agreements to work.

Well, no such détente has emerged in two years. A certain number of CBMs have certainly been implemented; some more are likely to be. But are CBMs a solution? For the relationship to be so reoriented as to make hostility between the two unbelievable, the two sets of hostile deterrents will have to disappear; nothing else will work. This issue needs far more debate to notionally define solutions. It is a big issue and surpasses Kashmir in importance.

The fourth set of disputes are again easy if the political will to resolve them pre-exists. If not, they too become a major issue. For Pakistan, water is increasingly being recognised as its Achilles' heel. It needs ever more water for irrigation and drinking for an exploding population. The hopeful factor in this is that both countries want to remain bound by 1960 treaty on Indus Waters. It provides a workable framework to sort out such issues, if necessary by arbitration. Baglihar issue has already been referred to the World Bank for arbitration. But given political will both issues can be resolved.

As for free trade and transit, Pakistan has made Kashmir the fulcrum on which everything turns. If Kashmir is not resolved, Pakistan would not give India MFN status, shun free trade with it, nor grant it transit rights for its trade with Central Asia. This is inconsistent with the need to exploit all economic opportunities. If no trade and no transit for four decades have not forced India to accept the Pakistani viewpoint, another forty years can also be wasted. The question is should Pakistan continue to insist on 'Kashmir or nothing'?

This policy has produced no results. It is futile. India refuses to see it as a strong pressure; it is unlikely to submit to Pakistan's wishes. It is profitable for Pakistan to take what is available and feasible. This means mutual enrichment of trading classes. Economic cooperation flows out of free trade, and development follows. The sky is the limit for economic cooperation between India and Pakistan, which can easily be extended to the whole of South Asia. Islamabad can unlock trade, economic cooperation, and development by giving India the MFN status and easy transit rights.

Lastly, there is the question of free travel and cultural exchanges between the two peoples. Hitherto both states have restricted visas to only a few on compassionate grounds. The paranoia of intelligence agencies in the two countries needs to be curbed; free travel by people will not undermine either state. The states are well established and strong enough to bear the "threat" of free travel. All civilised countries permit free travel.

The subcontinentals talk of a 6,000 year old civilisation. But their behaviour belies any respect for their inheritance. Ideally there should be no visas between India and Pakistan. If they become friends, economically cooperate, and engage in free trade, free travel, and free cultural exchanges, nothing injurious can happen and much will be gained. Look at what Nepal and Sri Lanka do. Scope for useful cooperation in culture and media needs no elaboration.

MB Naqvi is a leading columist in Pakistan.