Pakistan's new role in Afghanistan?

The CMNF countries are also occupying Iraq and largely underpin the western occupation of Afghanistan. India does not appear to be a part of CMNF, although Indo-American naval cooperation is something to write home about. May be the Americans cannot yoke both India and Pakistan to the same political chariot. So they had to draw concentric circles: one naval group is to monitor and, if necessary, interdict on high seas undesirable nuclear materials being carried in merchant ships that are not under the control of IAEA or of the five recognised nuclear powers. Pakistan is of course out of that. But it is needed in CMNF because of its long and intimate acquaintance of Afghanistan.

Afghanistan is an unattractive piece of real estate today because it is so undeveloped. But it can be of considerable importance for those who seem to control key raw material in Asia. There are rumours -- no more than that -- that there may be hydrocarbons among other minerals in the largely unexplored Afghan territories. Its current geo-strategic importance lies in its location in the soft underbelly of Central Asia where the action is expected in the coming decades.

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This may be one reason why the Americans started their War on Terror from Afghanistan. Factually Americans are safely ensconced militarily not merely in Middle East and Persian Gulf but also in Afghanistan. Their position in nearby South Asia is also strong with four bases in Pakistan and extraordinarily friendly ties with India. Other neighbours of India too are friendly. US is thus well positioned for the altered Great Game in Central Asia where emerging China is casting long shadows. Before becoming the main controlling force over most of Central Asia, it has to somehow counter the emerging Sino-Russian challenge. Which makes wobbly Afghanistan a part of immediate worries.

Afghanistan is a difficult place to hold and manage. The Americans have not found it an attractive or easy job. They have wheedled NATO to join this sorry business. NATO, for existential reasons, could not refuse. NATO, as distinct from EU, is an American baby, largely kept in existence on American insistence. But it too does not relish policing this God forsaken country. NATO per se has no geo-strategic interest in managing Afghanistan. Although, it may have agreed to relieve American soldiers the drudgery, it does not have its heart in the job. It seems that the US and NATO have found Pakistan a likely yeoman to do the job. It has multi-faceted acquaintance of Afghanistan and is available for a pittance.

But Pakistanis' memories are not so short. Time was when Pakistan was extensively used in Afghanistan by the Americans rather cynically: they paid cash on the barrel for services received and, once the job was done, they washed their hands off Afghanistan. That was of immense delight to Pakistan's generals. The latter thought that they can now call all the shots in Kabul. The Americans had known that they were pouring aid into rather porous vessels. What Pakistan got out of it, however, is for Pakistanis to ponder over.

The Pakistanis are immensely sorry that a Kalashnikov and heroin culture was all they were left with. That a few generals made themselves extremely rich is per se not of cosmic importance; but the 1980s experiences corrupted the Pakistan politics no end.

Narcotics, however, were the beginning and not the end of trouble in that there are a million or less heroin addicts in the country. What is of crucial importance is the dirty money, earned by narcotics exports, distorts and deforms Pakistan's public life; the narcotics mafia is a factor to reckon with.

This is not an irrelevant historical detail. It has a bearing on policy-making today. It is true that Americans have been helpful and have given Pakistan so much in aid during the last four years. No doubt, it was for services being rendered. A certain amount of gratitude is certainly due. But that does not necessarily mean that Pakistan must do as the donor demands without a question. True, expectations of more aid in future forces a compromise on Islamabad. But future aid will depend on the US assessment of the need for Pakistan's cooperation and not in return for continued subservience.

What is also true is that rulers of Pakistan simply cannot conceive of life without the assurance of American aid and support. Which is the reason that without any explanation or discussion, the government seems to have assured the Americans and the NATO that Pakistan's soldiery would be there to do the dirty job that NATO troops do not find worthwhile.

Pakistan government's decision to assume a bigger role in Afghanistan's security by contributing more troops cannot be riskless. The decision comes as a surprise to the people. Granted, Pakistan is not a functioning democracy; major decisions here are taken by faceless bureaucrats or GHQ. Pakistanis will not agree with this decision being the political price of the aid for which Pakistan has already incurred many financial debts.

Indeed, grants are politically more expensive than simple loans that require only interests and repayments. Grants are made in expectation of earning the right to utilise donee's services for jobs the Americans may find unappetising for themselves. Doubtless, since Islamabad has received extraordinary aid and also because Pakistan's rulers cannot opt for a future without American aid, there is little to do but to accept the unavoidability of Pakistan Army again becoming involved in Afghanistan affairs. It can be a long-term engagement. Pakistani Generals may again begin weaving theories of geo-strategic nature; they may again sing flashy songs of strategic depth. There are far too many political pitfalls. Islamabad should correctly assess the likely cost of this venture.

It is not necessary to detail the past experiences of Afghanistan to a Pakistani audience. This past includes an element that does need detailing. Who can ignore the possibility of Pakistani unthinking thinkers who may think that Afghanistan is Pakistan's opportunity: the Americans would eventually leave Afghanistan to Pakistan after the present Crisis there is overcome just as in 1990s when Pakistani generals exercised much influence in Afghanistan. Kabul was then supposedly beholden to it.

All that disappeared in few weeks, though not without leaving a legacy of hatred for Pakistanis among many Afghans. Would not that hatred grow when the Afghans perceive their occupiers to be mainly Pakistanis? Who can forget that Pakistani generals had built castles in the air in the past on the basis of their America-bestowed position in Afghanistan? There may still be some of their juniors in the Islamabad establishment. They may again dream dreams of greatness piggy back on American tolerance and aid.

When and if Pakistani soldiers assume the charge of policing Afghanistan from the NATO troops and Americans that would be the day when the accumulated dislike of Pakistan in Afghan hearts would begin to tell -- possibly on Pakistan's basic interests. Other than pleasing the US for the time being, Pakistan can expect nothing rewarding from its Afghanistan venture. It has no business securing Afghanistan for others.

MB Naqvi is a leading columist in Pakistan.