Can we say no to Uncle Sam?

This would be a repeat of the 1970s when American CIA and the Pakistani officials colluded for action in Afghanistan that finally resulted in Russian invasion of that country in December 1979 after which Pakistan played a supposedly heroic role in defeating the Soviets. All Pakistanis know what the outcome of that war was. True, there are many generals in Pakistan who take pride in having done what they did in the 1980s, despite the fallout of the Afghan events on Pakistan society, politics, and economy.

We are again in the same alley, talking things over with Uncle Sam that, apart from policing Afghanistan and safeguarding the interests of America and its friends, may include Pakistan doing this or that vis-a-vis any possible American or Israeli action against Iran. The Iranian stances are likely to come up in more than one context, not excluding the question of gas pipeline from that country to India via Pakistan and Iran's alleged nuclear transgressions being referred to the UN Security Council.

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Insofar as the Pakistan administration is concerned, what it is interested in is market access in America to start with. Pakistan wants more opportunities for trading with the US on an equal, if not preferential, footing. It certainly wants more FDI and other investments from American corporations as well as Pakistani expatriates. Then, Mr. Shaukat Aziz would also discuss the recent Damadola incident in which at least 13 Pakistani men, women and children were killed. Some remonstrations by him would be in order that by doing such things the US gravely embarrasses General Musharraf's administration. And such actions ultimately promote terrorism and do not eliminate it.

Probably he must also have repeated the demand of being treated on an equal footing with India in the matter of civilian nuclear reactors; Pakistan surely wants to import some nuclear reactors too as its recently announced ambitious programme requires. Actually Islamabad dislikes being excluded from the kind of nuclear cooperation that US envisages with India under last July's Indo-American agreement but knows that here the US cannot possibly oblige. It may also have made the age-old demand for more military equipment, including F-16s. However, the political content of the bilateral talks, whether or not that finds mention in the joint statement, is centred on political matters like American plans for India, Iran, and of course, Afghanistan.

What has not been announced by either Washington or Islamabad is the precise subjects of discussion in Washington by the PM, or for that matter what Nicholas Burns will negotiate in Islamabad. One has already mentioned the subject of the growth of cooperation over Afghanistan. American behaviour in Damadola bombing should also be mentioned. But the indications are that the Americans must have repeated what they have been saying in public: "Pakistan has to realize that America is at war and that its generals and policy makers cannot be dissuaded from continuing the hot pursuit of their enemy. If that happens to be in Pakistan territory it can't be helped."

Doubtless, Pakistanis would anyhow like to explore the limits, if any, of the Indo-American cooperation, especially in the field of atomic reactors and other related matters. One cannot ignore the permanent Pakistani wish that was sure to have found expression regarding ever more economic and military aid and some forcing of India to negotiate over Kashmir.

The basic fact must be remembered: The Americans are not the most popular foreigners in Pakistan. There has been a grudging acceptance in Pakistan that, after 9/11, a U turn in Pakistan's policies vis-a-vis Afghanistan was unavoidable. But that has created much bitterness and a sort of impotent rage against Uncle Sam. But that finds no clear expression in Pakistani state actions. Nobody has demanded a review of Pakistan's American policy. But, also, only a few are prepared to concede that the original policy of colluding with the Americans over Afghanistan or promoting Taliban was wrong. Some do argue that if it was not wrong in the 1970s and 1980s how can it be wrong today? And yet there are far too many inconsistent anti-Americans here, led by yester year's collaborators, the Islamic (extremist) parties, though most liberals also rail against American imperialism.

Let's keep in view what the US is asking now. One has already mentioned the US desire to have its Afghan burdens lightened by Pakistani soldiers on a perhaps longer-term basis so that the GIs, now grounded in Afghanistan, can be freed for action elsewhere. One has also mentioned the possibilities of American and Israeli military action against Iran. It is impossible that Pakistan would not be asked to do this or that in this context. The Americans would perhaps in time agree with Pakistan on the question of civilian nuclear reactors; the US has too many obsolescent reactors. It can do good business selling them to Pakistan and obliging it. But what would Pakistan be asked to do as political quid pro quo for this generosity should also be examined.

Pakistan must also have asked for US help to not only continue the Composite Dialogue with India but to make it more meaningful. That must have been music to American ears. The point is there is little chance of a deal with America on overall military cooperation; it goes against the grain of Indo-American honeymoon. The sane and longer-term interest of Pakistan demands that it does not entangle itself in Afghanistan further. Nor do anything to alienate Iran or the Shanghai Six. In short, can Pakistanis say no to American wishes?

One recognizes the difficulties involved; most Pakistani political class, including the generals and bureaucrats, cannot conceive of life without American aid and some support. American aid and support includes some handouts and aid from its friends as well as IFIs like World Bank, IMF and their subsidiaries. Government believes Pakistan cannot do without these crutches.

But the case for saying "no" is unassailable if Pakistan wants to have a respectable, indeed any independent, future. Despite Iraq and Afghanistan setbacks, the US remains embarked on an imperial course that can only benefit America while forcing Pakistan to accept the role of a bag carrier. Many so-called realists persuasively argue that the US is no longer able to carry through the full programme that was involved in the neo-con ideas embodied in US official documents like Annual Strategy Papers or the Project for New American Century. One argues that there is bipartisan agreement over broad strategic objectives that the US would follow. There are scarcely any coherent alternative strategic purposes being articulated by George Bush's challengers. Willy nilly the next US President will remain committed to the same broad goals, only slightly amended and, of course, much reworded. The US wants only to benefit some more by preserving the unipolar world and all that it involves.

What Pakistan gets by becoming an ally or more accurately remaining America's satellite, is some crumbs from the American table. This gain on the swings will scarcely compensate for the losses on the roundabouts in Pakistani cities. That will be a horrible political cost. In the ultimate analysis, that role will make more difficult for Pakistan to become democratic, peaceful, and united. It is important that we find ways of saying "no" -- as courteously and respectfully as anyone may like -- but still "no."

MB Naqvi is a leading columist in Pakistan.