The terror supremo's meekly surrender and thereafter

Propaganda and deception
Readers may perhaps recollect that on at least two earlier occasions, the law enforcing agencies narrowly failed to apprehend the fugitive who stayed at the hideouts with a large number of relations including wife, sons, daughters and grandchildren. The mode of living and life style of the mastermind of the so-called religious terrorism do not fit in with the Spartan and secretive living pattern and habits of underground guerilla leaders/operational commanders/ideologues with which many of us are familiar. At least Shaikh Abdur Rahman did not appear to be very careful in hiding his whereabouts and certainly there was no element of cloak and dagger in his dealings.

In fact one would not be far from truth to say that the now netted terrorist leader was nearly casual in matters of choosing the hideouts and going about the business of daily life. It would also appear that he was fond of living with near and dear ones and perhaps could not care if such preferences could compromise the secretive postures and existence that was so essential to the maintenance of a fugitive life. Alternately, did he have good reasons to carry on regardless? These are questions answers to which may not be immediately available.

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The worries of citizens
However, questions that might bother an inquisitive and concerned mind relate to the reaction of the different layers of the so-called religious terror outfit when it comes to the last thing on life. Exactly that has surfaced in the episode relating to the surrender of Shaikh Abdur Rahman.

We can see that the terror supremo did not fire a single bullet, not to speak of blowing himself by means of activating explosives that were reportedly tied to his body or was handy to be used should there be a need. He was, on the other hand, found keen to speak to the media and political leaders. Therefore, the suspicion that is lurking in many hearts is that there is perhaps a group of ill-intentioned leaders or a small coterie that are recruiting unsuspecting young men of insolvent families to carry out the objectives of religious extremism in the name of religion. The well-judged premonition is that such young men are used as foot soldiers to further the destructive goals of the bigoted individuals and their cabalistic organisation while the planners manage to lead a protected and privileged life.

Therefore, the question naturally arises if such leaders like Abdur Rahman who do not have the resolve to take the ultimate action in furtherance of their misplaced ideology while advising and motivating the grassroots followers to do so, shall be accorded a different treatment as distinct and due to a criminal. This is very important in the campaign against terrorism because the state must be able to criminalise the modus operandi of the so-called religious terrorists.

The myopia
We may have to ask ourselves if a perception has developed among the terrorist group that the Bangladeshi State is inherently incapable of meeting their challenge and that it has become soft and indolent. We may have to ascertain if quite a few parties have developed a vested interest in a soft state, a weak government and ineffective implementation of the laws. Simultaneously, are foreign funds flowing substantially to various organisations and groups which serve, willingly or unwillingly, the long term objective of some political parties suspected to be aligned or sympathetic to the regional or international terror network?

Since terrorism of the so-called Islamic extremists has increased in its very nature thereby demanding changes in the strategy to counter it, are we ready to seriously study the problem, one may ponder. This is natural because we do not witness credible attempts being made to examine links between terrorist groups, the conditions in which they had spawned, the politician-militant nexus and other forms of patronage these groups receive, the proliferation of small arms leading to the growth of private armies, etc. The question is, are we trying to appreciate all the factors that contribute to the 'quality and extent' of internal security threats? Another specific question could be whether our failure to deal with the terrorist crimes is largely attributable to the inefficiency and corruption of the law enforcing machinery.

We have to know if the establishment has shown a great degree of indulgence to terrorist groups and if any covert sympathy has allowed the terrorists to cloak their methods in a garb of "Jehad".

The strategy
Our constitutional objectives vis-a-vis the programme of the extremists leave no room for any ambiguity. While at the macro-level it may be a matter of political direction to sort out disagreements through dialogue and persuasion, the field-level operatives, both in uniform and plain clothes must have clear directives and plan of action for preventing violent subversive actions. This is all the more significant now because the new enemy has an emotional and religiously sensitive alignment with the common folks of the county. One must not be oblivious of the fact that the enemy combatants are entrenched in places and institutions that are traditionally respected and revered in our society.

As part of strategy, the enforcement apparatus should succeed in separating an act of violence from its so-called politico-social context and thus criminalise a certain mode of political expression. In Bangladesh's context this line of action is very appropriate because there is a greater need to reject the religious extremist's right to legitimise violence as part of a larger social movement.

The so-called Jihadists must not be bracketed with political dissenters, although such differentiation becomes difficult from an enforcement point of view. Laws to be made for dealing with religious extremists should be such as to distinguish them from constitutionally oriented political elements.

The above has been emphasised upon because the mission and strategy of our crime-fighting and intelligence organisations had not been stable at least in so far as the domestic threat scenario is concerned. Those have invariably substantially changed with the change of a political government. It has been our unfortunate experience to witness the differing political agenda often clouding the pragmatic understanding of our real national interests.

The patrons and harbourers and the proscription

In order to apprehend and to effectively punish the extremists, the definition of extremism or terrorism should be expanded to an act of association with an extremist group. The objective should be to include patrons and harbourers of the extremists and fringe supporters within the ambit of law. The regulatory authorities should be quickly able to draw up a list of 'proscribed organisations' to which membership, funding or open support within the territory of Bangladesh shall be banned. This list should be periodically reviewed with an intention of making the fight against extremism in line with threats to internal security.

The concept of the above noted proscription should be such as to make it applicable across the broadest spectrum. It should be precise and unambiguous. In addition, there must be clear measurement and list of acts that would constitute support to a 'banned organisation'. The effort should be to broaden the applicability but narrow down the definition of extremism or terrorism itself.

The process of identifying an extremist should be discreet and transparent and enforcement efforts should be geared towards that. However, the extremists who use violence and the threat of violence as an instrument to propagate their view and ideology cannot be treated as political dissidents even though the roots are socio-political and governed by distinct and conflicting ideologies.

The government should attach greater importance to proscription and should be empowered to designate the extremist organisation. The objective should be to sap the extremist organisation of its material base, stopping routes of material replenishment and seizing its existing assets. In other words, the proscription could be a central feature in our attempt at fighting religious militancy.

The imperatives
Now that we know who is the self-declared adversary, there must not be any hesitation in the battle against the frontal attack on our constitution. There must not be any ambivalence in relentlessly pursuing the bigoted mischief-makers. Religious institutions or places of prayer should not be allowed to be used as sanctuaries. In order to do that quite a number of such entities should be subjected to well-planned surveillance.

Voluntary or charitable work or even religious teachings which are suspected to be used as cover by some organisations should be shadowed so that bonafide welfare work can be separated from malafide subversive ventures.

Foreign donations whether by individuals or organisations must pass through government scrutiny. This must be made mandatory. Along with this there must be a complete account of all educational institutions and the areas covered in the instruction should be known to competent authority.

Democracy has to allow the interaction of different shades of opinion of divergent views to ensure the vibrancy of a pluralist society. However, that does not mean that there will be freedom to convert the entire country into a theocratic dispensation by application of force and intimidation and the litigant public has to approach the clerics for resolution of disputes and judgment, as demanded. There is a challenge to our way of life. This must be realised by the mainstream political parties who are pledge-bound to uphold, protect and preserve our constitution. Therefore, the visible enemy must be caught by the forelock in large numbers and be dealt with under the law. A sovereign Republic born out of a historic struggle entailing epic human sacrifices demand that. We must not fail.

Muhammad Nurul Huda is a former Secretary and IGP