US strategic presence in South Asia

Since the events of 11 September, more than four years ago, a great deal has happened in both South Asia as well as the Middle East. The balance of power has gradually swung away from extremist elements towards a cautious support for the US agenda. A strategic shift has taken place since the US intervention in Afghanistan.

Despite existing difficulties, Kabul is now reasonably free of fundamentalist anti-democratic forces. The presence of international armed forces contingents has not reduced the level of production of opium, but has, at least, opened many windows for the long-suffering women-folk of that country. There is beginning to be a meaningful gender participation in Afghanistan's administrative process. Consequently, Bush's visit to that country, ahead of India not only underlined US commitment against the Taliban but also its continued presence in the re-construction of that war-ravaged country. This was required.

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In Pakistan, President Musharraf has had to do a delicate balancing act as a 'staunch' ally of the USA in 'their fight against terror.' However, on more than one occasion, both Afghan President Karzai and some US intelligence operatives have accused him of being soft in tackling 'cross-border foreign origin militants.' It was probably such criticism that induced the Pakistani authorities to carry out such a strong counter-attack against suspected Al-Qaeda militants in North Waziristan (while Bush was visiting neighbouring Afghanistan). Press reports have indicated that upto 40 militants, mainly of foreign origin were killed in that incident. Obviously, it was Musharraf's way of telling Bush that he was trying as well as he could.

The state of bilateral relationship between the USA and India has also undergone broad changes since Bush came to the presidency. This is evident in the initiatives taken by the current Indian Administration and also the past Indian government. They have both tried to reflect the aspirations of the 300 million Indians who are now termed as 'metropolitan nationalists' by Indian social scientists. The new Indian middle class is inclined to define its interests mostly in economic terms. This is dictating Indian foreign policy. Harish Khare has interestingly suggested that "these Indians want to improve their life-style, many times over in their lifetime, and they believe that a serious and sustained economic engagement with the US is the key to such hopes." They want a reflection of the American dream in India.

Obviously, such a quest demands greater availability of energy to fuel the economic cycle. It is this essential factor that has led India to modify its nationalist approach to international issues. We have already witnessed this in its voting in the IAEA over acquisition of nuclear capability by Iran. Consequently, 'enlightened self-interest' appears to have been the catalytic factor in India's accommodation of Israeli and US perceptions.

We understand what India wants within this new India-US axis. We need to now examine what the USA desires out of India.

The USA believes that the evolution of US-India ties is one of the most significant developments of the early part of the 21st century. For the US Administration, India exemplifies what the Bush team sees as the future of a peaceful and prosperous world.

It is in this context that the USA wants to encourage India to emerge as a meaningful partner.

Mr. Michael Greene, the US National Security Director for Asian Affairs has underscored two other important elements that have attracted the USA towards India. He has pointed out that in addition to India's established democracy and its growing middle class (with its burgeoning buying capacity), there is also the absence of Al-Qaeda (despite having a Muslim population of 150 million). Such an assessment, for obvious reasons will be a source of comfort for those US business interests who view India as a better place to invest for the long term as compared to China. Clyde Prestowitz, president of the US Economic Strategy Institute has supported this thesis even further, by claiming that contrary to China, India's banking and financial institutions are well established and have long been lending on the basis of market-based analysis, which explains their more mature use of capital. Such comments have helped to create an opinion that investment is less risky in India, in its democratic atmosphere, as compared to the opaque, authoritarian environment of China. One suspects that quite a bit of spin is involved in this assumption. However, it is bound to affect US entrepreneurial culture.

The US, through such a Presidential visit, the third in the last three decades, has sought to cement relations with a huge and fast-growing economy. At the same time they believe that building ties with India can indirectly and directly influence the strategic matrix between other States in Asia and giant China. On the other hand India's policy makers also see this maturing relationship with the USA as a possible step for furthering its status as a world power -- including, hopefully, a permanent seat on an expanded UN Security Council. Bush's visit to the region was wrapped in a multi-tier complex security structure, creating havoc for the local populations, but, at the end of the day, at least for India, it has paid dividends.

President Bush recognised that 'stakes' were not only high in South Asia but also that 'the opportunities' were 'unprecedented'. The Nuclear deal that has been agreed to by USA and India will cut through their past history and offer India a 'tailor-made regime' outside of the NPT. It has become clear from the agreement that although still outside the NPT, India has become vital for the United States. It has been termed by Bush as a key element in a strategic partnership. It has also been described as 'historic,' 'not an easy deal' but 'necessary.' Bush has also hinted that the provisions of the agreement would 'enable us' to work with the US Congress which till now has considered such an arrangement as smacking of double standards (particularly with reference to current efforts within IAEA regarding Iran's quest for civilian nuclear capability).

Right now, India derives only 3 percent of its energy needs from nuclear energy. It hopes that this latest agreement will allow it to develop its nuclear energy potential, thereby reducing its demand on scarce world supply of fossil fuel. This in turn is expected to translate itself into low oil prices for the US consumer.

The deal first agreed to in principle on July 18 last year aims to give India access to long denied US nuclear equipment and fuel to meet its soaring energy needs. The negotiations were challenging and demanded compromise from both governments. Differences had to be bridged over New Delhi's plan to separate its civilian and military nuclear programmes and to skirt around the subjects of proliferation, safeguards and inspection.

It is understood that India under this arrangement can have access to US civilian atomic technology. It will also help lift a global ban on New Delhi receiving nuclear fuels and reactors from the 44-nation Nuclear Supply Group to meet its energy demand.

Reportedly, India wanted to exclude their 'fast breeder' reactors from the negotiations. Indian scientists and nationalists were averse to any monitoring constraint being put in place as these fast breeder reactors can produce weapon grade plutonium required for nuclear bombs. One will have to wait and see how much has been given up by India.

China for obvious reasons is a bit nervous and has already indicated that it will be monitoring the situation very carefully. Their Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang has cautiously spelt out that the US-India 'cooperation must conform with the requirements and provisions of the international non-proliferation regime and the obligations undertaken by all countries.'

The nuclear agreement with India will also bother Pakistan. It will be evidence of a clear shift of USA towards India as opposed to Pakistan. Islamabad has also been lobbying for some time now for international access to civilian nuclear technology. Its efforts have however been opposed by critics who say that Pakistan has to first tighten up its non- proliferation measures before being granted such access.

President Bush realises that Pakistan will be upset with this latest US decision. Anticipating Pakistani disappointment, he has already gone on record in a news conference, where he has suggested that Pakistan should be patient with US nuclear cooperation with India. Pakistani analysts have interpreted this as a possible future agreement with Pakistan as well. Such an assumption however appears quite unlikely in the near future given Secretary of State Rice's comment on 3 March that it was 'not the time for such an arrangement with Pakistan'. Nevertheless, the scenario could change, if like the proverbial magician, President Musharraf could deliver Osama bin Laden out of a magic hat. That might enhance trust in the Pakistani leadership both within the US Administration and the US Congress.

In Pakistan, as well as in India, Bush apparently underlined that Kashmir should not continue to be a source of violence and distrust between these two countries. Bush is also supposed to have stressed that the USA supports a resolution in Kashmir that is acceptable to India, Pakistan and the inhabitants of Kashmir. There was, however, no indication that USA can mediate in this matter. Pakistan will try to take heart that the issue was raised. I do not however see how least common denominators can be identified in this regard, given the stated positions of the three parties. This opportunity having passed, I am also skeptical whether anything significant will emerge on Kashmir during the remaining term of the Bush Presidency.

One thing is, however, clear. Policy makers in South Asia now know that India is the only one sitting at the high table.

Muhammad Zamir is a former Secretary and Ambassador who can be reached at mzamir@ dhaka.net