Are we out of the woods yet?

Kazi Anwarul Masud
Finally, Shaikh Abdur Rahman, chief of Jamaatul Mujahadeen Bangladesh, and his second in command Siddiqul Islam aka Bangla Bhai have been captured. Their capture hailed by many at home and abroad has been described by the 14-party opposition combine as a "staged drama" to shift the focus of attention of the people from pressing the politico-economic issues facing the country.

The opposition parties may have some logic behind their allegation. Even a most third rate detective thriller would not portray a man on the run to be accompanied by an entourage consisting of his wife, daughter, grandchildren and unarmed associates.

Given our penchant for knowledge about everything from birth to marriage to children to profession of our next seat passenger in bus, train, plane or steamer, the nature of Shaikh Abdur Rahman's "underground" stay has raised many eyebrows. What is surprising is not that he has been finally captured but that a person who so openly stays "underground" was not captured earlier.

Our poverty aside, sheer greed for five million taka reward should have put a large number of bounty hunters on his trail. If the opposition parties' accusation of the government providing covert support to the militants is to be controverted, then the remaining possibilities of an existential large following of the militants in Bangladesh making possible not only JMB's devastating and unhindered operations for the last few years possible and evasion of arrest of the militants, but also the inefficiency of the authorities in their apprehension and/or collusion by the authorities, become matters of greater concern.

Playing close to the chest is the second nature of the authorities in many fragile democracies still unable to free themselves from the ghost of authoritarianism. They almost invariably consider bi-partisanor independent enquiry as infringement upon their exclusive power to play the roles of both the judge and the jury in prosecuting criminals accused even of the crime of waging war against the state.

This instinctive tendency to exclude not only the opposition members of parliament, but also ruling party members, and of course the people at large, reflects the psychotic lack of confidence the authorities have in anyone outside the exclusive circle of the Praetorian Guards. Why is it so difficult to accept that the public at large, who has borne the brunt of militant Islam and who have most to lose unlike the people in power who are believed to have made alternative arrangements to enjoy the sun and the sand should they be given eviction notice, has all the rights to know the full facts?

One must, however, congratulate our electronic and print media for hounding the authorities for information on militants from the initial days of militancy (when the government accused the media of creating Bangla Bhai and tarnishing the image of the country by publishing reports on the rise of Islamic militancy in Bangladesh) till today.

Denial of information culled from interrogation can only help fuel rumours that the capture of Shaikh Abdur Rahman and Bangla Bhai was a drama staged to shift people's attention from the combined opposition parties' campaign for reform in the Caretaker Government (CTG) and Election Commission as well as the government's failure to control spiraling price increase of essentials and to solve fuel, fertilizer, electricity, and water crises.

The way the Prime Minister responded to the Leader of the Opposition's reform proposals, by suggesting formation of a committee on the last day of the parliament session, does not reflect seriousness on the part of the government to discuss the vital issues. While the government considers the opposition initiative as a gambit and a conspiracy to capture power, the opposition insists that the suggested reforms are necessary for holding of a free and fair election.

Opposition fear is based on the unilateral appointment of the Chief Election Commissioner, his frequent hospitalization coinciding with the dates of suggested meetings with foreigners wanting to see him, his reluctance to hold meetings with the two Election Commissioners till two new Election Commissioners, allegedly loyal to the CEC and the government, were appointed giving the CEC majority in the Election Commission, his unilateral decision to prepare a fresh voter list in the face of the High Court's observation that the existing list may be updated (the Election Commission has appealed to the Supreme Court against the High Court judgment), and appointment of a large number of upazilla election officers allegedly having links with the ruling parties.

The combined opposition parties' reluctance to participate in any elections without reforms in the CTG is based on their suspicion that the appointment of the next CTG head has already been manipulated and that the previous CTG did not take enough care to stop manipulation of voting done through money and muscle power in the last elections, and that CTG system itself, pushed through a constitutional amendment in a hurry, needs further reforms.

In the absence of credible popularity polls in countries like Bangladesh, a question arises whether a government, even if elected by popular vote, but not securing more than fifty percent of the votes cast, can legitimately and morally hold on to power when it has failed to deliver the political goods for which the government was elected in the first place.

For French philosopher, Michel Foucault governmentality as a conception of governance goes beyond the state's function to regulate the behaviour of its citizens which can pose a threat to good societal order. Foucault sees government as guiding conduct in active and positive sense throughout the whole fabric of society, beyond its formal face and delving into the inner most recess of society. When a government fails to do so, opposition parties notwithstanding, question may arise whether the government retains the legitimate basis to govern in Weberian sense. Max Weber felt legitimacy of authority may be drawn from three factors: (a) traditional, where authority is accepted on what had happened in the past, (b) charismatic authority flowing from the sheer force of personality of the leader e.g. Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's unquestioned domination over the hearts and minds of the Bengali nation prior to the Liberation War and thereafter, and, (c) legal-rational authority where legitimacy is based on rationally constituted rules. One is, therefore, beset with the question whether the rise of Islamic extremism exemplified by JMB is due to the inability/unwillingness of the authorities to recognize the geometric progression of this Frankenstein and to take corrective measures to eradicate this menace.

Undeniable governmental patronization of Islam through transformational politics since the 1975 brutal murder of the Father of the Nation to fill up the need for an ideological platform to justify its opposition to Awami League has contributed to the consolidation of Islamist movement in Bangladesh. It remained largely unnoticed by the deeply religious minded Bangladeshis till the West began its crackdown on Islamic extremism after 9/11.

In the interregnum, the carefully camouflaged movement financed by external sources spread its tentacles throughout the country under the very nose of successive governments. Though foreign funding has been reduced due to strict monitoring of money transactions by foreign and domestic agencies, the study by an eminent Bangladeshi economist that corporations run by religious fundamentalists make an annual net profit of twelve billion takas, ten percent of which is spent by the fundamentalists for organizational purposes including paying half a million party cadres and running armed training camps, puts cold water on the reported remarks by Shaikh Abdur Rahman to his interrogators that the bombing spree had to be stopped due to lack of funds. Such discrepancies strengthens the case for a totally transparent and open process, from arrest to interrogation to trial, if necessary by co-opting international agencies.

Though the ruling parties claim to disavow Islamic fundamentalism, the composition of the 4-party alliance and 14-party opposition clearly delineate two separate strands in Bangladeshi politics. The ruling alliance believes in narrow nationalism, defining national interests as being confined within the boundaries of the state, a not uncommon constipated thought process found in many insecure countries suffering from perennial fear of foreign domination, excluding the possibility of international connectivity and in total opposition to generally accepted concept of mutual dependence of states and national interests being largely governed by international collaboration.

Besides, Islamization plays a significant role in the ruling alliance's political agenda as evidenced by large scale persecution of the minority community immediately after the 2001 elections and equation of madrassa education with secular education. The very fact that Jamaat-e-Islami, a party initially opposed to the formation of Bangladesh and that remains dedicated to the establishment of an Islamic state in Bangladesh, is a constituent element of the ruling coalition, testifies to the present government's inflexible attitude on the question of Islamization.

Reputed reporter Bertil Lintner (Religious Extremism and Nationalism in Bangladesh) notes that the growth of Jamaat can be linked with the growth of Deobandi madrassas which numbered more than fifty thousand at the last count. Lintner alleges that Jamaat's youth wing -- Islami Chatra Shibir -- has close contacts with other radical Muslim groups in Pakistan, the Middle East, Malaysia, and Indonesia.

Besides, the recently banned Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI) also draws most of its members from Deobandi madrassas. It is intriguing that many of the detainees have confessed to their earlier links with Jamaat and/or Islami Chatra Shibir.

The 14-party combine, on the other hand, believes in a non-communal, progressive, and democratic system dedicated to close the gap between the "haves" and the "have-nots." Indeed the parting of ways between the Muslim League and Awami League began almost immediately after 1947, first on language issue, then on the question of autonomy of then East Pakistan, and finally on the question of the independence of Bangladesh.

Awami League had and still has a left-of-centre platform dedicated to an egalitarian economic system in which prosperity is more evenly distributed among the people with the spirit of the liberation war as a political backdrop. While under the present government, the rich have become richer and the poor have become poorer.

In fine, our law enforcement authorities deserve the nation's deepest appreciation for capturing some of the vilest human beings who in the name of Islam had been terrorizing the nation with impunity. This, however, is only the beginning of our war on terror. The authorities would be well advised to wage this war in the full glare of public scrutiny, both national and international, to reestablish Bangladesh as a truly sovereign state whose citizens live as free human beings and are not merely inhabitants of a juridically independent state.

Kazi Anwarul Masud is a former Secretary and Ambassador.