President Bush in India

Kazi Anwarul Masud
The most recent visit to India by President George W Bush signaled above all that India's preferred destination has changed from Moscow to Washington. This gradual transformation in the Indo-US relations have been occasioned by, in the words of Indian Foreign Secretary Shaym Sharan, "the end of the Cold War and consequent rearrangement of interstate ties." He finds the defining moment of this transformed relationship in the visit of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to Washington in July last year when the two countries agreed to move beyond the bilateral framework towards a global partnership based on common values and common interests.

Addressing the Asia Society a few days before his visit, President Bush detailed his expectations for the forthcoming visit. US and India, he said, face the threat of terrorism (more commonly known as "threat of Islamic extremism") and he hoped to make India a "more effective partner in the global war on terror."

Unlike the US, terrorism faced by India is polycentric, ranging from Kashmiri militants to Maoists to Naga separatists to hosts of others trying to destabilize the country. The most virulent of them all being the Islamic extremists, both the US and India have found common ground to face this dreadful enemy. Indian experience in Kashmir and American experience in Iraq with terrorism, one from across the border and the other homegrown, convinced both that the practice of democracy was crucial to fight this menace. President Bush was exultant to inform his audience at the Asia Society of the Indo-US launching of Global Democracy Initiative and of their leadership role in advancing the United Nations Democracy Fund.

India has been the largest practicing democracy in the world for over five decades. But the constraints of Cold War dynamics and India's espousal of the non-aligned movement prevented growth of Indo-US relations. But then the end of the Cold War and India's emergence as the fourth largest economy in the world (as measured by purchasing power parity) with a GDP amounting to $3.36 trillion, among others, contributed to reassessment of the US policy towards India. India, says President Bush, is now one of the fastest growing markets for American products, India's middle class, estimated at 300 million, is greater than the entire population of the US, and India's growth is creating opportunities for American business, notwithstanding loss of American jobs due to outsourcing.

It is no secret that the Bush administration had already decided to help India become a major world power in the 21st century. This considered decision, according to Ashley Tellis (Carnegie Foundation for International Peace), was the product of the strategic vision of Condoleezza Rice that a strong and independent India represents a strategic asset, there being no intrinsic conflict between the US and India, and that this policy would not be affected by Pakistan's ire but dictated by the intrinsic importance of India and Pakistan to the US interests.

In May last year, the Financial Times published a Pentagon Report advising the Bush administration to take more seriously the possibility of China's emergence as a strategic rival to the US. Under the National Defense Authorization Act 2000, the Pentagon has to submit an annual report on the current and probable future course of the Chinese army and Chinese security and military strategy.

According to the Pentagon report, India, Russia and China are key determinants of international security environment in the 21st century. Of the three, Russia is considered a constructive partner while China "has the greatest potential to compete militarily with the US and field disruptive military technologies that could over time offset traditional US military advantage."

Despite such a disquieting report, the Pentagon advised that US policy should remain focused on encouraging China to play a constructive role in the Asia-Pacific region. There is a school of thought which believes that US recognition of India as a civilian nuclear power has probably more to do with China's investment in asymmetric military power "beyond Taiwan" than for love of Indian democracy.

Harvard Professor Joseph Nye, however, doubts that China would ever be able to achieve the position of peer competitor of the US on a global basis given the fact that the US would continue to outpace the rest of the world in defense expenditure so that the US, as promised by President Bush, would never have to enter into an armed race with any country, and the fact that the stunning Chinese economic growth is faced with inefficient state owned enterprises, growing inequality between the rich and the poor, straining social cohesion, massive internal migration from the rural to the urban areas, corruption, inadequate infrastructure etc, and no less importantly the 1996 Clinton-Hashimoto declaration as the basis of post-Cold War stability in East Asia shall act as an impediment to nascent Chinese militaristic ambition, if any.

President Carter's National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brezinski firmly believes that Chinese leadership is not inclined to challenge the US militarily because China's phenomenal economic growth is contingent upon good relations with the US, Japan, South Korea, and other trading partners, the US being the fourth largest trading partner and the source of largest US trade deficit.

Chinese expectation of foreign direct investment of $100 billion in 2005, and increasing number of the Chinese middle class make it difficult to believe that the Chinese leadership could embark on any adventurous military policy against the US.

Additionally there is no reason to believe that from Nixon to Carter to Reagan to Clinton to Bush that any US president has deviated from the premise that a China that lives in isolation from the international community can be more devastating than one brought within the orbit of internationally accepted rules. There is evidence, however, that the American efforts to build up India as a global power was designed to use India as a countervailing power to possible Chinese expansionism.

After the Chinese revolution the US came to believe that the newly independent India was the only potential regional power that could check Chinese dominance of South East Asia. The American design was thwarted by Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru who refused play along. After the 1964 Chinese nuclear test, the Pentagon considered the possibility of providing India with nuclear weapons under US custody. The idea was dropped as it ran counter to the non-proliferation agenda of the US administration.

Bill Clinton's March 2000 visit to India bound the two countries to "work together for strategic stability in Asia and beyond." The January 2004 declaration titled: "Next Step in Strategic Partnership" and the India Defense Relationship Agreement of June last year are believed to have China in sight, elucidated by Ambassador Robert Blackwell's rhetorical question: why should the US want to put a check on India's missile capability that could lead to China's permanent nuclear dominance over democratic India?

But the recent Sino-Indian overtures do not give any indication at all that India, despite former Defense Minister George Fernandes's inopportune remark that China remains India's number one enemy, has any intention to play the role of the US sentinel in Asia. The Bush visit was not to strike a Faustian bargain but to recognize the reality of India as an economic and military power house.

US Under Secretary Nick Burns, speaking to the press in Delhi, frankly confessed the choice faced by the Bush administration regarding India's nuclear program: is it better to keep India in isolation or is it better to bring India into compliance actively with major international agreements that govern the disposition of nuclear materials and nuclear energy? India, the Bush administration concluded, despite having nuclear technology for over three decades has not proliferated as opposed to North Korea and Pakistan and Iran which "lied to the IAEA."

The US Congress and the 44 nation Nuclear Suppliers Group must both approve the agreement reached at Delhi which will give India access to billions of dollars of the US and other foreign atomic technology and fuel to meet India's soaring energy needs. The agreement's passage through Congress, however, is not guaranteed, particularly in an election year with the possibility of the Republicans losing their majority in Congress.

One ranking Democratic member of Congress described the deal as "undermining the security not only the of the US but of the rest of the world." Non-proliferation issue aside (strongly refuted by Shayam Saran in his Washington speech), questions have been raised as to whether India (or for that matter Pakistan) needs nuclear weapons at all and of possible harm to the Indian populace from a continued expansion on India's nuclear complex. Besides, it has been claimed that the cost of producing nuclear electricity in India is higher than the cost of producing electricity from other sources. Chernobyl scenario and disposal of nuclear waste cannot be over-looked.

Supporters of the nuclear deal sees it not only as a way out for India's soaring energy needs but also a virtual US recognition of India as a nuclear power because, according to the Joint Statement, India will have "the same benefits and advantages as other leading countries with advanced nuclear technology like the United States." Detractors, however, point out that domestic uranium, freed as a result of uranium purchased from the international market, would be used to increase India's nuclear arsenal.

It is quite possible that the Indo-US deal would start an arms race between India, Pakistan and China -- all desperately poor countries though India and China are role models for the developing world.

In short, Bush's visit to India was to confer on India American blessings for India to play a global role. The Cato Institute's Hand Book for the US Congress recommends that the US administration should focus on India as a leading diplomatic and economic partner of the US in South Asia and as a strategic counterbalance to China. Cato further recommends that India be treated as a central player in the US led war on terror and radical Islamic forces in South Asia.

The Bush visit has followed this advice and more. The very fact that the situation in Burma and Nepal was mentioned in the press conference addressed by President Bush and Prime Minister Singh testifies to the possibility of wide ranging discussions on neighbouring countries and other issues of international concern at the summit meeting. The Bush visit was effectively India's coronation as a global power and perhaps as the regional hegemon in South Asia.

Kazi Anwarul Masud is a former Secretary and Ambassador.