What did the PM achieve in India?
There were reasons for such expectations. First, following a nose dive in Indo-Bangladesh bilateral relations over Islamic fundamentalists' activities in latter's country, a renewed initiative was taken by India-Bangladesh leadership during the recent Saarc summit in Dhaka. In particular, Prime Minister Singh's assurance to work jointly towards a prosperous South Asia was, indeed, heartening. Second, a positive change in Indian stereotyped thinking that propagated a closer relationship with Bangladesh is indeed in the interest of India seemed discernible, as evidenced from the articles and editorials of major newspapers. They argued that New Delhi needed to give an impassionate hearing and try to understand the predicaments of a small country about its genuine grievances like its common river waters sharing problems, gargantuan trade deficit that accounts for over $2 billion, border management/fencing issue, non-demarcation of 6.5 kms along the common border, maritime border, non-implementation of 1974 Mujib-Indira Border Treaty and exchange of enclave and adverse possessed land issues in order to usher a new era in Indo-Bangladesh relations. On the sensitive issue of alleged harbouring of insurgents from Northeast on Bangladeshi soil and alleged Bangladeshi links of terrorist attacks in Ayodhya, Delhi, and Varanasi, powerful newspaper daily The Times of India advocated that due to these developments (as perceived by India) an increased focus on Bangladesh by external ministry is needed in positive manner. Eminent Indian political analyst and columnist C.Rammohon advised the Government of India to go for constructive engagement on India's above mentioned security concerns instead of repeatedly accusing Dhaka. He also called for delinking its preference for Bangladesh's one political party, known for its pro-Indian stance, over the other, having the opposite view for its long term interests. And lastly, from Dhaka's side, like always, there was no dearth of goodwill and considerable efforts for a qualitative change in Indo-Bangladesh relations.
In reality, however, the outcome of the summit has been disappointing. Bangladesh has been unable to extract any substantial agreements that would bring down the huge trade balance, termed by Khaleda Zia as "unsustainable." Dhaka's plea to dismantle trade barriers and allow preferential duty free exports to boost trade between the two countries fell on deaf ears. Even with huge efforts no Bilateral Investment Protection Agreement could also be reached. New Delhi stuck to its policy of strict reciprocity as evidenced from the revised trade agreement of 1980, which is a win-win formula, despite Finance Minister P. Chidambaram's confident outburst that India was now as bigger nation ready to be more generous towards its poorer and smaller neighbours. Interestingly, even in this win-win formula proposing the use of each other's territory through road, rail and river links, as and when it is spelled out, New Delhi's immediate gain is more than that of Dhaka because of the inability of Bangladesh to tap the trade potentials due to the untruckable road conditions in India and security problems in transit route. On the vital issues like non-implementation of 1974 Mujib-Indira Border Treaty that generates border incidents and ill-feeling among the people of Bangladesh and "life and death" schemes like the river-linking project and the Tipaimukh barrage Dhaka got only verbal assurances.
Why such "insensitiveness" on the part of New Delhi? It seems New Delhi is still unsure of its emergent regional and global status, and instead of being generous prefers to stick to its old style of dealing with its small neighbours by keeping them under pressure. Fresh accusations have been lodged against Dhaka of harbouring and training insurgents from India's northeast and infiltration into India by illegal Bangladeshi immigrants, both of which are denied by Dhaka. This time, however, the dimension of accusations is ominous in the context of an unidentified Indian interior ministry senior official's statement that "these camps are being run by al-Oaida with the connivance of Islamic fundamentalists of Bangladesh," and linking of Bangladeshi militants' alleged involvement in the recent bomb attacks on Indian soil. It is noted that New Delhi shared its evidence of these alleged terrorist activities in Bangladesh with US President George Bush during his visit to South Asia earlier this month. All these are tantamount to equating Bangladesh with cross-border terrorism into India perpetrated by Pakistan, which does not augur well for moving away from the past and initiating a break through in the bilateral relations. The fact is that as long as such deep-rooted suspicions remain in the Indian psyche, the relations between the two cannot be improved and no constructive steps can be taken to improve the relations. Similar mindset is discernible with regard to the issue to alleged Bangladeshi illegal immigrants into India from Opposition leader LK Advani's meeting with Zia.
The point is that India and Bangladesh are neighbours and they will have to live together peacefully. A mutually beneficial relation between the two is in the best interests of both. One can discern that Bangladesh, from the very outset, has been trying its best to have friendly relations with New Delhi. It did not evolve due to the conflicting expectations. New Delhi hoped that Bangladesh would be eternally grateful for its role during the liberation war and would accommodate its interests without question, whereas Dhaka felt India's overarching presence and exaggerated expectations were too overbearing. Mutual suspicions and mistrust prevented what was expected and even in initial period when there were no so-called threats to India from Bangladesh and its insensitiveness to New Delhi's security needs, there were strains in Indo-Bangladesh relations.
Mutual trust is the key to overcoming the irritants between India and Bangladesh. In this context, bringing trust in our relationship is expected to be forthcoming from the big and powerful neighbour. It takes confidence to show magnanimity, which India by now should have plenty. This was an opportunity when New Delhi could have taken one or two concrete steps in order to have Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), like going for the much awaited implementation of the 1974 Border Treaty or reaching a mutually beneficially water sharing arrangement in order to break the psychological barriers. Dhaka was ready to make concession as evidenced by Dhaka's willingness to allow Indian goods into Indian northeast through Bangladesh territory. Why did not India respond to that gesture? Similarly, at a time when New Delhi talked about having a strong and viable Bangladesh in its own national interest, there were no decision to allow generous Indian market access for Bangladeshi goods or any proposals for any large scale investment/developmental assistance.
What has transpired at the summit is that both sides have discussed all issues of relevance in order to have multi-faceted relations, and decided to hold regular high level meetings, set up Joint Commissions on major issues, and form various bilateral working groups and committees to resolve problems. Each side has complaints about each other, and the best way deal with them is to remain engaged. Much to the disappointment of many, this probably is the net gain for Bangladesh.
Comments