The Iraq war: Doubts and hopes

We have witnessed chaos, confusion and carnage on the television screen. The brand-new Iraqi parliament has met in Baghdad under curfew conditions. Most of those elected appear to have lacked any sense of direction. March 20, 2006 issue of 'Time' magazine described their efforts as being directed "to pull together some kind of future amid warnings of civil war". The United States and the Coalition have tried to cast their own shadow by launching the over hyped 'Operation Swarmer', the biggest air strikes since the invasion, ostensibly to root out 'insurgents' north of Baghdad.

There has however been one slim sliver line of good news. Recent comments by President Bush and his team have indicated that they are beginning to embrace reality. Washington realises that chaos will 'continue for months to come'. They are also admitting that many tactical mistakes have taken place. The comment made by US defence hawk Richard Perle in this regard is significant -- 'America got the war right and the postwar wrong'. William F. Buckley Jr's observation about the invasion of Iraq has also been important -- 'the objectives were sound, but our reach proved insufficient to realise them'.

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We also have an analysis of the socio-anthropological-cultural reaction to this invasion. Francis Fukuyama, who described initial efforts in Iraq as 'real gains', has now gone on record 'that the balance sheet for the war at this moment is quite negative'. In this context he has noted that 'balanced against these gains are costs that go well beyond the direct human and financial ones. The occupation of Iraq has served as a tremendous stimulus for Arab and Muslim anti-Americanism and thus has made radical Islamist terrorism significantly worse than it would otherwise be. America's reputation round the world has taken a huge hit among ordinary people who are now more likely to associate our (US) democracy with scenes of prisoner abuse than with the Statue of Liberty'.

Many serious questions have troubled the world since the beginning of 2003. I have written more than twenty articles on Iraq during this period in different publications. I have also spoken about the implications of the war in several universities both at home and abroad. My concerns have been shared in the past by many other political scientists and historians.

Unfortunately, what worried me in the first quarter of 2003 -- the lack of a defined post-war plan -- appears to be true even now. The coalition is still tackling situations on an ad-hoc basis. Their objectives appear to be limited always to an immediate future where an environment can be created that would permit the withdrawal of US troops and reduce casualties -- aimed to satisfy domestic opinion back in the USA. Such an approach has obviously not helped. It has only reflected lack of determination to those who are ostensibly fighting occupation in Iraq.

Yes, US and Coalition casualties have been reduced but violence has not been reined in. In fact, fighting terrorism and militancy in Iraq appears to have been outsourced to ill trained and poorly motivated Iraqi personnel who on more than one occasion have demonstrated their inability to control a situation. This dangerous lapse has been further exacerbated through existing inter-sectarian feuds.

The net result is that despite an election, the divide between parties has not been bridged. No common ground has surfaced other than shared greed for power.

Despite recent urging by both Blair and Bush, the upside potential in Iraq looks rather limited. The central administrative system continues to be very weak. The Shi'ite factions have come together in an arrangement of sorts and have set forth their ideas about governance, but these do not appear to be fully acceptable to the other factions. In any case, liberal democracy also does not appear to be on the cards in the immediate future.

The United States obviously understands that they are under the microscope in Iraq. The war in that country started for different reasons -- supposed presence of WMD and links with international terrorism. It turned out that such assumptions were misplaced, to put it mildly. We then had a spin that the war was associated with the restoration of democracy and the ensuring of human rights. This was, as Kenneth Roth of the Human Rights Watch has put it 'an after-the-fact justification'.

Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz, a fierce critic of the war has accused the US policy-makers of having failed to have undertaken an objective, cool, hard economic analysis of the war and its possible effects. He has claimed that a study undertaken by his friend Linda Bilmes (a budget expert at Harvard) and himself has suggested that the war might eventually cost the US taxpayers more than US dollar one trillion. He has apparently also included in his estimate, the cost of treating the 16,000 plus severely wounded returned veterans, many of whom, are suffering from brain and head injuries and are looking forward to a lifetime disability.

He has also drawn attention to another controversial issue. He has referred to the fact that earlier claims by the Bush administration 'that the Iraq war would be good for the (US) economy' do not appear to be holding water. He has noted that things have turned out differently -- 'the oil companies are the big winners while the American and the global economies are losers'. Stiglitz and many others have now come forward and stated that the money spent on the war should have been allocated to domestic investment in roads, schools and research within the USA, which would have stimulated the US economy.

The USA has a problem in its hands. Nevertheless, time has not yet come for it to cut and run. There has to be a gradual and phased withdrawal. The destroyed infrastructure has to be revived and basic state facilities in the agriculture, health and education sectors rebuilt. Let the Iraqi population see the advantages of government without Saddam. Unfortunately, what they have witnessed till now is terror on the streets and absence of law and order. All those associated with sectarian violence need to be pursed and punished. A secular court and a special speedy judicial process would probably have to be set up for this purpose.

Conservative estimates suggest that the Iraqi government and the Coalition authorities now control 14 out of 18 Iraqi provinces. These are reportedly comparatively stable. The Coalition should seriously examine whether they can expand and also deepen Iraqi association in governance in these provinces. Instead of always supporting a Shi'ite-Kurdish combine; it might be useful to associate Sunni representation in these areas. The most important aspect for any peaceful reconstruction is to convey to the Sunni population in Iraq that they will not be marginalised in the scope of future governance in Iraq.

The other important step would be to sit down in a comprehensive dialogue with Iran -- the sooner the better. Inflaming further an already combustible situation with rhetoric and hints of divide and rule on the basis of ethnicity will not help. What is required is restraint.

The United States would also do well to establish a closer relationship with both the Organization of the Islamic Conference in Jeddah and the Arab League in Cairo. It should try to frankly discuss the problems being faced in Iraq, note what the members have to say, and not over-ride their views as being immaterial. This can help to ease tension in the region and eventually facilitate the creation of an Islamic peacekeeping force.

It will be tough out there, but militancy and terrorism have to be contained for the sake of a sensitive region. Civil war or sectarian war, whatever we might call it, has to be controlled. Otherwise, we might end up with a situation, which will spread across the desert as an oil stain into the neighbouring countries.

Muhammad Zamir is a former Secretary and Ambassador who can be reached at mzamir@dhaka.net