Karachi carnage: What should we do?

The question is how has it grown? Some of it is an inheritance from history of Islam in historical India. Islam is the youngest proseletising and rather militant religion; a certain sense of righteousness and superiority inheres in Muslims. Although the vast majority of Muslims in the Subcontinent is converts from lower cast Hindus, the reason for conversion was to escape a hard fate and to enjoy some of the privileges that conquering armies had acquired. All around them was a sea of Hindudom and they naturally dreaded what awaited them if they ceased to be Muslims or did not sharply distinguish themselves from Hindus. Then, there was the rigidity of what made one a Hindu and the customs and caste system. Brahamins, the enforcers of Hindu faith and mores, were even more proud and inflexible; their livelihood depended on it. That made Muslims insist on remaining separate.

In this juxtaposition of two disparate faiths, moderated by common cultural pursuits, and the underlying economic interests, that gave birth to India's Hindu-Muslim problem. The British interlude (1750-1947) made religious identities the bases of governance and political system. That aggravated what distinguished the religious communities from one another and de-emphasised what was common among them. By early 1900s this problem had become intractable because of Muslims' paranoid fears of Hindu domination. Hindus' own rigidity and contempt for Muslims made a painful partition inevitable.

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Muslims in Pakistan, initially only three forth of the population, wore their religion on their cuffs; that was all the politics they had: be Muslims, shout Allah-o-akbar, look down upon all others and yearn for a united Umma. Muslim League, more aware of international realities, dreamt of leading the reunited Muslim world, to rival Nehru's penchant to unite all old colonies and poor nations a la Afro-Asianism. Arabs and other Muslim leaders laughed at Pakistanis' pan-Islamic enthusiasm and their naivite. Thus ended their original 'Islamic' foreign policy fantasy. Being mostly the sons of old toadies of the British, they quickly hitched their wagon to America's cold warring star. Their yeoman's services after initial left-bashing led to intensify latent and induced prejudices during 1980s when the US succeeded in trapping the Soviets in Afghanistan and helped create some three lakh strong informal army of fierce Islamic warriors who were also steeped in Pushtoonwali culture.

Now, let's focus on the common features of these Jihadis: Most believed in what the JUI believes in, though to be sure other Maslaks of Sunnis had their presence among them. Each was operating under ISI orders, guidance and with its support. He was ferociously brave, of course. He was also a particular stickler of Pashtoon code of honour. He was dyed-in-the-wool conservative, even reactionary. In religious matters, he was utterly intolerant, being usually unlettered. He was not averse to looting rich Afghans, though for all his religious zeal -- reinforced by ISI and their own leaders' indoctrination -- he needed cash and other supplies for each operation and never parted with the booty be occasionally brought.

His love for money earned him the gibes of being mercenary from secular Pashtoons; he boasted of being a religious fanatic. Later, Talibans were almost wholly recruited from JUI madrassas and were even more intolerant and extreme. None of these Jihadists was, or is, ready to give women and Shias (and other minorities) any place in their scheme of things. Even today ideas of what was Northern Alliance leaders' are not much different from Taliban's, though they did not do to Hazaras, women and the society in general what Taliban excelled in. They all loved money and are still remarkably rich.

Their distinction is not so much in personal piety as hatred of the 'other'. Look around: such religious types abound everywhere, though not so rigid in their mores as Pashtoonwali lays down. See how easily people become mad at any rumour of insult to Quran, the Prophet or imitation of Islamic rituals by Ahmedis. Look how easily a church or temple is burnt down. Misbehaviour with Hindu women is not infrequent in Sindh. Everyone knows how easily an Imam of a mosque can rouse people to destructive fury if the 'other' commits any sacrilege (in his eyes) or is merely accused of it.

Extra excitability of Muslims has to be conceded. On that foundation successive governments have built, especially the naked dictatorships of Ayub, Yahya and Zia. Their media policy was to excite Muslims' religiosity and encouraged competitive showmanship through competition of Qirat, Naat and Qawwalis. TV's contribution in spreading religiosity is still considerable. The process never ceased and is going strong. Such governments have no constructive programmes; they justify their power by rhetoric about Kashmir, Islam and security. No wonder mistrust and discord can be seen spreading.

The point is most Pakistanis are a rich raw material from which suicide bombers can be made. Hitherto all cases of terror have had some mention of Pakistan -- in all cases in UK, Europe and America. Peshawar had eclipsed all major Islamic centres. It seemed as if Pakistan was the world headquarters of a rising global Islamic Revolution. Much money of western powers and Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and UAE had gone into it in 1980s. An infrastructure of such an ideology had emerged among many small groups in Pakistan and elsewhere. It is truly an international phenomenon. It is a different matter that Islamabad is now embarrassed following the change in American preferences after 9/11.

The suicide bomber had arrived on the Pakistani scene quite sometime ago. Following the 'heroic' deeds of Hamas and Iraqi suicide bombers, Taliban have begun producing their own suicide bombers in both areas of Taliban interest: Afghanistan and Pakistan where the recalcitrant Shia minority invited their attention. Suicide bombing attacks on Afghan and or western targets are no longer news. Nor are such attacks on Shia congregations in Karachi and elsewhere unheard of. Taliban exhibit the glow of popularity and power at least in Waziristan where they maintain law and order; they collect taxes, try and execute those they think are evil doers. Pakistan's uniformed forces stay in their camp and allowed Taliban to do pretty much as they pleased. It is a different matter that there are other forces in the field also and there are fears of clashes among them.

Taliban are by no means confined to FATA or even NWFP. They operate, one is told, quite freely in Balochistan, which they use as the launching pad for attacks on Afghan/ISAF/US/NATO targets. But inside Balochistan they also indulge in their taste for Shia blood. Not that Taliban did not have recruits from Karachi and other areas of Punjab. The whole country abounds in pious Muslims who contribute money, protect Islamic revolutionaries and provide them cover.

MB Naqvi is a leading columist in Pakistan.