Islamic militancy and Bangladesh's strategic importance

But before that it, will be pertinent to state that different factors accord countries different degrees of strategic importance, which is generally taken to convey a positive sense rather than a negative image about that country, which it can exploit to its advantage. One wonders whether any strategic importance has accrued to Bangladesh after the rise of Islamic militancy in the country? While strategic importance is a force multiplier in the most comprehensive sense, rise of militancy in Bangladesh may provide more hurdles in our international interactions and is likely to restrict our diplomatic maneuverability.

The first question is what are the international/regional drivers behind the rise of militancy in Bangladesh, and whether there is any possible link between the domestic and international militants, especially militants in South-East Asia?

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This is a question that dogs our minds too and needs to be addressed objectively. The religious militants in Bangladesh appear to have been imbued with the spirit of Jihad in their effort to establish Islamic rule in the country. It would not be wrong to suggest that the word "Jihad" gained currency after the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Thanks to the US for making the word not only popular but also lucrative to the Muslim youths in the region, who were motivated by CIA propaganda that it was their bounden duty to rid a Muslim country of the "heathens." The word "Jihad" was as much revered and vaunted at that time as it is despised now. Bin Laden was CIA's baby that has now turned to be a Frankenstein's monster for them.

If there were those who were motivated to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan, they went wrong in assuming that an Afghanistan could be replicated in Bangladesh. For many of them, Bangladesh was a potential grazing ground after the US occupation of Afghanistan, and to which they turned their attention after being forced by circumstance to leave that country.

Obviously, such organisations cannot flourish without internal and external support, and they had plenty of both. However, it is still a million dollar question as to the extent of their external roots. Thus, while the motivations were there, whether the militants in Bangladesh were directly linked to al-Qaeda is something that will have to be established definitively. However, there are grounds to believe the possibility of a link between these elements and Harkat-ul-Jehad (HUJI). Mufti Abdul Hannan, who masterminded the July 2000 plot to kill the then Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in Gopalganj by planting a crude IED, was head of Harkat-ul-Jehad, Bangladesh (HUJI-B). He is said to be a veteran of Afghan jihad and connected with HUJI based in Pakistan.

It needs to be mentioned that there is an elemental link between HUJI and the Islamic International Front of bin Laden. One Fazlur Rahman was one of the six signatories of the Laden fatwa against the West in 1998.

After1998, Harkat-ul-Ansar (HUA), which was active in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) in India split into two, the Harakt-ul-Mujahedeen (HUM) and the HUJI-Pakistan Reportedly, it also provided training and arms assistance to the Rohingya Muslims of Arakan in Myanmar, the Abu Sayyaf in the southern Philippines, and the Chechens.

HUJI-B, had been reportedly in operation in the country since 1992, and, according to the statement of one of its arrested members, assumed the name of JMB in 2003, perhaps after it was listed as a terrorist outfit by the US in April 2003. However it was not until October 2005 that the Bangladesh government banned HUJI-B. However, the extent and scope of the link between JMB and JMJB with HUJI-B is yet to be fully established.

It is easy to hide behind the excuse of a foreign motivator; it is easier to overlook the internal factors that have helped the phenomenon to germinate in our country. While the US policies had provided a good enough justification to whip up religious sentiments, internal developments helped no end to give their effort a fillip. Rehabilitation of religious oriented parties in our politics with alleged links to the religious extremists provided them the opportunity to establish a foothold in the country.

The fact that the two major political parties were at each other's throats, provided the religious parties, and the radical elements linked to them, opportunity to consolidate their position even further. Statements of many of those arrested in the aftermath of the August 17 bombings suggest that many of them had received their initiation in politics under Jamaat-e-Islami, a major component of the four party alliance ruling Bangladesh.

The next question is about the government's role on militancy till date and how the future actions of the militants may affect the international scene.

The government's role has best been one of denial of any possibility of existence of the religious militants. Even after the US listed HUJI-B as a terrorist outfit in 2003, the Bangladesh foreign minister is on record denying the existence of any Islamic militant outfit in the country. At that time he said that he had not seen any "such activity in Bangladesh" adding, "The way Bangladesh is being painted with the same brush time and again, it seems that it is a conspiracy and an orchestrated campaign by some vested quarters."

There was denial in every quarter in the government including the home ministry and the Jamaat-e-Islami who saw this as an attempt to spoil the image of the country, till the balloon went up on August 17, 2005 when the State Minister for Home Affairs had to concede the presence of Islamic militants (JMB) in Bangladesh and their involvement in the August 17 bombings. By March 2006 the two most wanted persons were netted as also many top operatives of the JMB and JMJB.

One hopes that the arrests of top leaders of the two banned organisations, JMB and JMJB, would have sapped all the vigour of the militants and their residual members, for the time being at least. However, it would be a folly to see that militancy has reached its end in Bangladesh. While I am inclined to believe that these two outfits have little to cause trans-boundary impact, we must remain in constant vigil, particularly of any possible activity of HUJI-B.

The most important question that has been posed is the domestic, regional and international consequences of the rise in militancy.

Apart from its impact on national security and causing internal instability, militancy has imposed costs on several counts that the country has to bear while it combats the phenomenon.

Our image is one that is dealt the first blow. In our case it has suffered not because of the fact that the media had brought to the forefront the existence of militants in the country, but because, in spite of the constant denial by the establishment, their existence has been demonstrably proved, eventually. This has created a perception, internally and externally, of the government's weakness in tackling the issue.

These developments have also cast a stigma and provided the ammunition for those who had been trying to depict Bangladesh as a hotbed of Islamic militancy, going down the Afghan way. Willy-nilly we are being depicted as a cog in the Islamic terrorism machine; and our biggest neighbour casts a wary eye fearing that it might also be affected by the effect of religious militancy in Bangladesh.

In short, militancy has affected the law and order and social stability, our human and economic security apart from impacting on our politics and political institutions, sovereignty of the state and autonomy of the government.

Nothing of this would have happened had the government been more forthright in addressing the issue of religious militancy.

The author is Editor, Defence and Strategic Affairs, The Daily Star.