Running out the clock

Let us review the evidence of the past few months.

The AL returned to parliament after an absence of seventeen months on February 12 and with much fanfare placed its slate of reform proposals before the house.

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The proposals were then batted back and forth for over two weeks before the PM on February 28, the last day of the parliamentary session, counter-proposed the formation of a bi-partisan committee to take up the issue.

The two sides kicked this idea around for another two weeks until on March 15 the AL requested a written proposal for talks from the BNP.

On March 21, the BNP wrote to the AL asking for names for the proposed committee. The AL responded by asking for further clarification from the BNP on the modalities of the dialogue.

The BNP chewed on this for another two weeks and on April 1 finally sent its official proposal for talks to the AL.

No sooner had the BNP complied with its request for an official written proposal outlining the modalities of the dialogue, then the AL announced that it would not sit in dialogue with any member of the Jamaat.

This position was conveyed formally to the BNP on April 6 after a seven-member committee had apparently toiled for five days on the response.

The BNP mulled this over for the next five days before replying on April 12 that it would choose whoever it wanted to sit on the committee from its side.

On April 16 the AL named its five members for the committee. Since then, nothing.

Are you kidding me? The entire procedure has been like some kind of political kabuki theatre: an elaborate, stylized, ritualized charade. These are not the actions and responses of men and women who sincerely wish to sit together to discuss reform.

It is patently apparent that neither side has much real desire to sit down at the negotiating table and actually engage in the difficult task of discussion and compromise to come to a workable resolution acceptable to all.

But is this a wise game-plan for both sides?

On the face of it, the BNP's reluctance to enter into reform discussions seems more understandable. With its popularity plummeting all over the country in response to its woeful record, it is not keen to face the opposition at the polls, so the proposition of an opposition boycott of the election has its attractions.

In addition, to knuckle under to the opposition's demands and be brought to the negotiating table would be seen by the party high command as a loss of face, and, more importantly, runs the risk of creating the perception that the AL is in the ascendancy and that the BNP is losing control.

But the AL's apparent reluctance to enter into discussions to implement its slate of reforms is harder to comprehend.

After all, the opposition needs elections to come to power, and it needs to have at least some of its reform proposals implemented to secure the level playing field that it has long claimed is necessary to bring this about.

Perhaps the AL is taking cues from the people's power movement in Thailand that successfully unseated the Thaksin government without participation in an election that the opposition had denounced as compromised.

But for this tactic to work, the AL would have to transform its anti-government agitation into a truly national movement, which has not happened yet (though, if the government continues to act as high-handedly as it did in Kansat, it could).

In addition, the risk to the opposition in this strategy is that there is a chance that too much unrest could provide the government with an excuse to impose emergency rule or worse.

But there is more to the opposition strategy than merely hoping the government will implode or be forced to step down through people power.

The main reason the AL remains wary of entering into elections, is that even if the reforms that it has proposed are put in place, it remains unsure that it will be able to protect its voters and secure its votes.

The opposition feels that it must demonstrate that it is capable of projecting sufficient strength to protect its voters, and this is the reason it has taken to the streets.

Even if people want the government gone, they are not going to stick their necks out and vote them out of office unless they believe that the opposition has the strength to ensure a fair election.

If the government cannot control the streets then it will be unable to control the election, and this is why the opposition feels that it is so necessary to demonstrate its strength on the streets.

But the opposition should understand that protecting its vote is only half the game. Eventually it will need to win an election to come to power. Thus, at some point, it will need to come to the table to negotiate the reforms necessary to ensure good elections.

And it is unclear that the caretaker government will have either the mandate or the authority to institute such reforms.

Running out the clock until the caretaker government thus might ultimately work more to the advantage of the government than of the opposition.

Zafar Sobhan is Assistant Editor, The Daily Star.