Slips between the cup and the lip
The main issues were: the future of King Gyanendra along with the institution of Kingship was to be put to popular vote by electing a Constituent Assembly which would draft a new Constitution to finally decide all issues. It is a fact that the multi-party democracy, abolished by Gyanendra on February 1, 2005, had failed to deliver.
Meantime, the Maoist revolt against the King, Parliament (as it was), and the system was succeeding. Since 1996 Maoists have acquired control over half to two thirds of the country and their revolt against the Royal Army was so effective that it could enforce a blockade even on Kathmandu. People of the capital have voted for Maoists with their feet. Maoist sympathizers had made all the difference to popular protests since February last.
What the King has conceded is: (a) restoration of the Parliament he had suppressed; and (b) readiness to transfer executive power to a nominee of the seven party alliance for Prime Minister's office. The Parliament met on April 28. But new PM, veteran Girja Prasad Koirala, could not attend or take oath of office due to illness. Would this formula work?
India's third successive emissary, CPM's Secretary Sitaram Yechury, succeeded in making the Maoists reverse their boycott of the parliamentary road for now; Maoists have given three months to the Parliament to implement the program they insist on after which they will resume Khatmandu's blockade (and bring down the whole government). How will the Parliament implement the crucial program remains to be seen.
Earlier the Indian Prime Minister had chosen two "royals" -- Kashmiri "Maharaja" Karan Singh and later "Raja" Jaswant Singh of the BJP party -- to go and persuade King Gyanendra to bend. (Choice of emissaries made by Dr. Manmohan Singh shows how well-adjusted America and India's Congress and BJP are who appear to think alike in trying to save King Gyanendra; wouldn't they cooperate in fighting India's own Maoists)?
The net result of the Indian diplomacy and the action of King Gyanendra can still come unstuck if the seven parties fail to implement the Maoist demands: a newly elected Constituent Assembly for a new constitution. Maoists have promised to give up the "gun" in favour of democratic politics on the basis of the old assembly doing what they demand: transfer of effective power immediately to the seven parties to implement their demands. The way mainstream Nepalese parties, comprising the more or less discredited politicians, have accepted the King's offer with alacrity might mean their reverting to old games.
A break in opposition unity would please the King no end. So far India and America had wanted the King to survive. For them, it did not matter if virtually the entire population of Nepal was restive and had demonstrated against the King's continuance. The people want him out and insist on a Constituent Assembly to draft a new constitution, obviously a republican one, and power to be taken from the King in the here and now. That has been denied the people on the promise that restored Parliament can do all that. But the mainstream parties controlled Parliament, having three months to play power games, they might collude with Indo-American designs, including saving the kingship. The bottom line would be to keep Maoists out. That will be QED for the US and probably India.
But will that solve Nepal's problems? What that means is that parliamentary parties will betray their own people. Popular struggle was not for retention of King Gyanendra or keeping out the Maoists. The King might again stage yet another coup later, and assume total power, if he can get enough foreign support and aid for his Army. The Nepalese army's loyalty being to the King, the revolutionary situation would resume.
No section of the Nepalese, including individual bureaucrats, was on the King's side. Recent demonstrations had shown that there was no significant popular support left for the King. The writ of the King ran only where the troops were present at any given time. At other times, the writ of the Maoists ran. No great sagacity is required to foresee what the Maoists would do then.
They will resume the war against the King and make life even more difficult for the King plus the politicians who may govern with, if not under, the King. The chances of that government plus the King do not amount too much unless, of course, foreign troops can be inducted or foreign aid is truly massive to create new killing fields in Nepal. Would or can India go on siding with Gyanendra?
What the Maoists can do is known. Even more importantly, the people of Nepal have also shown that they no longer accept the King and that they will willingly obey the Maoists. The recent new enthusiasm in the opposition movement came largely from the Maoists, it bears repetition.
It was Maoists' contribution that had made all the difference to the political struggle against the King and his army. Trying to take the people back to square one is a perilous course. It is no longer practical politics to ask the Maoists and the country to go back to ancien regime. Something will then have to give way.
The issue is not strictly local to Nepal. India has its own Maoists and the two are in contact. In the US perception, India's own future is involved. The US can be expected to lean on India to go on supporting Gyanendra and to help him. Much depends on the Congress (UPA) government in New Delhi. If it continues to move into America's corner internationally and decides to crackdown on its Nexalites, good and proper, it will try and enable Gyanendra to wipe out his Maoists. That is the worst case scenario.
There is another and more optimistic scenario: Indian government has to do more damage limitation and to avoid alienating the Left altogether by being perceived as supporting the tyrannical Gyanendra. It was this consideration that made it send CPM's Yechury to mediate between the seven parties and Maoists so as to arrive at the modus operandi he helped arrange.
Whether his formula for the unity of parties with Maoists will work is an open question. What is certain, however, is that the Maoists will not settle for anything less than an elected Constituent Assembly to write a new constitution.
Will the King and the hyper-power let a new constitution, obviously a republican one, come into being? Also, have second thoughts in New Delhi gone far enough to accept the Maoists demands? Only time will tell. What may be more likely is renewal of the long war in which the victorious side is likely to be the Maoists. The parliamentary lot will have very largely discredited itself conclusively.
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