Should Iran go nuclear?

Iranian President's love for the Islamic Ummah and his anguish over Israel's continued occupation of the Arab lands along with attendant unjust war inflicted upon the Palestinian people are beyond doubt. But the question remains whether threats leveled by the Iranian regime against the Bush administration which is marked by its contempt of international law and aversion to reach consensus unless it accords with its point of view coupled with its natural tendency to flex muscles is going to deter the Bush administration from its firm resolve to deny Iran the capability to acquire nuclear weapons.

Iranian theocracy, opines Kenneth Pollack (of the Brookings Institution) "have continued to define their foreign policy in opposition to the United States and have often resorted to belligerent methods to achieve their aims". In pursuit of this policy Iran is believed to have tried to undermine Saudi Arabia and other US allies in the Middle East and have demanded a predominant role in the Persian Gulf region which is beset with a restive population frustrated by the inability of the regional governments to provide either the fragrance of liberal democracy or the fruits of economic development which many in the oil rich countries believe their petro- dollars should have been able to provide.

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Unfortunately many Middle Eastern countries are suffering from tension between mainly two strands of domestic political forces -- one aspiring for Western model of governance based on democratic values and the other forsaking modernity in order to return to its sacred past based on purist interpretation of Islamic values. The space provided by this unresolved conflict between the opposing forces has been appropriated by non-state actors who preach terrorism as the way to deliverance from national humiliation, injustice and despair caused by the failures of their national governments who in turn are dependant on largely unpopular external power for their security.

Iran is often cited by these Middle Eastern countries as the cause of their demand for external security because Iran is alleged to continue its support of the Hezbollah, has sponsored at least one direct attack on the US troops in Saudi Arabia in 1996, and currently is meddling in Iraqi domestic affairs. Iranian ideologues, according to the Western sources, believe in exporting Islamic revolution across her borders as Castro-Che Guevara tried to export communism in Latin America. But the pragmatists in the post-Ayatollah Khomeini period advocate a more judicious international course for the regime's survival being acutely aware of the fact that majority of Iranians born after the 1979 Islamic Revolution have little attachment to the Iranian theocracy and lack reverence to the "martyrs" killed in the long Iraq-Iran war. One should not, however, lose sight of the fact that despite Bush administration's dismissal of the Iranian Presidential elections Ahmedinejad polled 21 percent of the vote cast in the first round and 61 percent in the second round in the elections. There may be some merit in the President Bush's observation that "Iran is ruled by men who suppressed liberty at home and spread terror abroad... Power is in the hands of an unelected few who have retained power through an electoral process that ignores the basic requirements of democracy". But then President Bush's 2000 election, the muddle of Florida vote count, and ultimate resolution by the Reagan and Bush Sr appointed Supreme Court takes away much of the sting from the Bush observation on Iranian democracy.

Iranian democracy is not perfect. Indeed even by the measure of intermittent democracy in the Islamic countries Iranian system comes nowhere near the acceptable standard of democratic practices. But the Western worry at the moment is less focused on Iranian democracy which is antithetical to theocracy anyway and more on Iranian intention to acquire nuclear weapons. Despite Russian and Chinese reservation about a Western sponsored resolution (under Chapter VII) in the UNSC on Iran there appears to be an emerging consensus in Washington that war with Iran is inevitable. Learning from the lessons of the US experience in the UNSC in the prelude to Iraq invasion US would like nothing better than to have tough sanctions imposed on Iran with implicit authority to take military action, if necessary. But the sacking of Jack Straw as British Foreign Secretary who had ruled out any military action against Iran indicates that even "Bush's poodle" may not have unqualified support from the British people for another military adventure.

Even if one were to accept the argument that Iranian nuclear threat is more real than Saddam Hussein's presumed nuclear threat, President Bush's bristling character of aggrandisement (he may not get Congressional mandate to attack Iran) makes it theoretically possible for the repeat of another Osirak incident (Israeli bombardment of suspected Iraqi nuclear establishments at Osirak in 1981). But as some analysts point out that the Bush administration must surely know that the US does not have the kind of intelligence about target locations for successfully preempting Iran's nuclear programme. Iran is believed to have dispersed, diversified and concealed its nuclear centres to a dozen or more potential sites. Besides, Iran until now restrained from using its influence among Iraqi Shiites could inflict serious damage to American forces in Iraq, can destabilise US efforts to encourage Iraqis to bury the hatchet and form a cohesive government, and could use its influence in the global oil market to shock Western economies in today's energy starved world. And no less importantly a military strike on Iran could destroy chances of Iranian reformists to change the theocratic character of the regime from within and irreversibly tarnish the US image and reduce US influence in the Islamic world.

Iranian nuclear issue is complex and seemingly intractable. Iranian hardliners believe in the inevitability of a conflict with the US and therefore the survival of the regime and its ideals demand acquisition of nuclear weapons which, they argue, if Saddam Hussein had then the Americans would not have dared to invade Iraq, and has so far successfully prevented US military strike on North Korea. Brussels based International Crisis Group suggests that if "zero enrichment option" i.e. Iran's indefinite relinquishment of its right to enrich uranium in return for guaranteed supply from an off shore source as suggested by the Russians does not materialise, then Iran may be induced to accept "delayed limited enrichment" plan by which the West would explicitly accept not only Iran's right to produce peaceful nuclear energy but also its "right to enrich domestically". In return Iran would agree to a several years delay in the commencement of its enrichment programme, limit its size and scope, and accept a highly intrusive inspection regime. Should Iran refuse to accept both the options, then Russia and China would have to join the West and support actions by the UNSC and establishment of an escalating sanction regime. One hopes both the parties would be flexible enough to prove Huntington's Clash of Civilizations thesis inadequate to explain the current global turmoil. What we are witnessing today is not so much a reenactment of the crusades but a complex mix of disproportionate distribution of global wealth and uncertainty about appropriateness of values to be adopted by different and widely divergent segments of the global society.

Kazi Anwarul Masud is a former Secretary and Ambassador