Is there a way out of this syndrome?

Authoritarians first took over in early 1950s. The democrats, mostly East Bengalis, vociferously protested. The few politically aware sections in West Pakistan looked up to them for leadership. The authoritarians could consolidate and for a whole decade played the democratic forces against one another. They largely succeeded in undermining democracy. Democratic forces were weak in West Pakistan but not in East Bengal, where protests were almost continual. April 1954 election in Bengal fired popular imagination there. Bengalis knew they were being exploited by West Pakistani establishment.

Bengali politicians asserted themselves frequently and finally succeeded in 1958 to fix the date of the first general election for February 1959. This led to the takeover by Army Chief General Ayub Khan in collusion with President Iskandar Mirza. Ayub quickly overthrew Mirza and began ruling as an authoritarian. Ayub did not lack collaborators. His Basic Democratic system was personal rule through votes from 80,000 elected Basic Democrats who handled improperly audited funds for local development. East Pakistanis had only to shut up and put up.

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All Pakistanis deserve some credit for making the ruling authoritarians aware that dictators are not wanted; a dictator is an illegitimate ruler; he has ultimately to go; and democracy is the final destination for Pakistan. Their denial of legitimacy put powerful dictators on the defensive. They always remained on the defensive. That is an achievement.

High points of protests include Language Movement and 1954 provincial election in East Bengal that killed the Muslim League. The 1954 election was a small-scale revolution. West Pakistani establishment was alarmed by it as it came soon after land reforms. They determined that, come what may, Bengalis would not be allowed to assume power. Ayub Khan's takeover was a resounding declaration of that resolve.

Initially people stayed quiet, though agitated. Most of the 1960s were a period of fermentation in East Pakistan. Opinion against the military establishment grew steadily. By 1966 the Awami League had formulated the Six Points for East Pakistan autonomy.

This alarmed West Pakistani establishment further. The determination to keep the Bengalis out of power grew strongly among the West Pakistani vested interests. But the real story is of a people's devotion to democratic ideal for its freedom and equality for all, with hopes for improved material living conditions. But it also speaks volumes about the dangerous myopia of (west) Pakistan's military-led establishment.

The highest watermark of popular agitation came in later 1968. A raging and tearing agitation in both wings shook the regime, though it resulted in another General's taking over. With unrealistic expectations, Yahya Khan held an election, the very first, in 1970. The Awami League swept it. Military establishment refused to accept the results because it did not want to transfer power to Awami League. Thus ended Pakistan of 1947.

The point to underline is that despite great agitations what the people got was another military dictator. After 1969, there followed an ostensibly civilian democratic interlude, run by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto of the PPP from 1971 to 1977. But the military establishment took advantage of anti-Bhutto agitation of 1977. That agitation too was both extensive and intensive. And that too resulted in the third Man-on-the-horseback arriving past the portals of democracy. That was General Ziaul Haq's takeover.

Zia was a cunning guy. He assumed the airs of a humble person, deeply religious and wore piety on his cuffs. He ruled for 11 years and might still have been ruling if God Almighty had not lifted him upstairs. Pakistanis tried a fourth major agitation in 1983 against the dictatorship of that Mard-e-Haq (the truthful one) whose lies included two postponements of two scheduled elections. The 1983 agitation was brutally suppressed.

After this Pakistani opposition politicians have been talking endlessly of a grand opposition alliance for fighting the tyrant of the day. But there was a serious diversion: from 1988 to 1999 the military ostensibly decided to let the civilians run the show, though it remained the locus of true power choreographing politics. That divided the mainstream political parties -- Benazir Bhutto's PPP and Nawaz Sharif's PML -- that discredited both.

Meantime PPP had undergone a radical transformation. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who gave a unanimous Constitution and claimed his regime to be democratic, was authoritarian in practice. Dictator really, Bhutto technically permitted the opposition freedom to speak in Parliament. That is where his democracy ended. He had earlier purged Left-leaning PPP leaders and had brought back the Americans, good and proper. The party still sometimes employs old rhetoric. But it is as conservative as they come and totally sold on Uncle Sam.

1999 saw reversion to direct military rule for the fourth time. The new Man-on-the-horseback claimed to be a super democrat by letting the press criticise him. That is true. He does allow critics, particularly in the English language press, to criticise him though he has made sure that Urdu press remains regime-friendly. To be sure, opposition's talk of uniting for democracy remains ceaseless. An Alliance for Restoration of Democracy was formed. ARD is still building a united front now on the basis of a Charter.

Three political parties are relevant today: PPP, PML(N) and Muttaheda Majlis-i-Amal (MMA). These are working together after a fashion. But MMA had voted General Pervez Musharraf the constitutional powers he wanted after elevating himself to become the President. Both PPP and PML(N) are deeply suspicious of MMA for being a B team of the Generals. They do not trust MMA not to help the Generals in a crisis. PML(N) is still deeply suspicious of Benazir and PPP about cutting a separate deal with Musharraf. So all three are suspicious about one another.

Country's issues are extremely divisive. There is the hardy perennial of Centre-Province relationship; three provinces are ranged against Punjab dominating the centre. The central government is the only real government, the provincial governments being glorified municipalities. Basic ideological division is between the westernised social elites and Islamicists who want Shariah law under a Caliphate. This radically divides the body politic. Mentally PML(N) inclines towards an Islamisation that PPP distrusts. The PPP and PML were sworn enemies of each other, having done maximum damage to each other. They have not composed all the suspicions, as noted. People remain apathetic. They occasionally demonstrate their impotent rage by mindless protests. There however remains a little-discussed aspect.

Look at who the Taliban and Islamic militants are? Most come from lower middle class or even lower classes, and are often products of Madrassas. They are young men who cannot be employed except as Mosque Imams or as day labourers. They are moved by expectations of a better life both here and in the hereafter. This is included in what the Shariah is supposed to promise: 'Not even a dog will sleep hungry' claim the proponents of the Islamic ideology. If he dies in creating a Caliphate, he will be well rewarded in Paradise. Aren't they the same, in the given Pakistani ethos, as Maoists in Nepal, Naxalites in India and Hamas and Hizbullah elsewhere? Young men without hope listen to extremists' advice readily. They are ready to die for the idea of a system that would give his kind a future, if necessary in the hereafter. Let's be careful.

MB Naqvi is a leading columist in Pakistan.