Nato and the EU: Whither greater coordination?
They need greater crodination between them.
The winds of change are blowing across Europe. Recently there has been transformation in the higher command of Nato. The new Secretary General is former Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen. He has taken over from Jaap de Hoop Scheffer. Javier Solana has announced a few days ago that he will not seek a new mandate as High Representative (HR) for the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) when his ten-year term ends in late October this year. In other words, by December 2009, completely new teams will be in charge of Europe's security and relations between the two key regional organisations dealing with it. Even though the Alliance and the European Union Headquarters will continue to be in the same city -- Brussels, changes in their leaderships will necessitate re-calibration of their strategic planners. They will have to identify least common denominators all over again. It may be recalled that since the launch of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) and appointment of Mr. Solana as the first-ever HR for CFSP -- at the Cologne EU Summit exactly ten years ago -- closer links have been established, but not as close as many had expected. Some advances had been achieved but efforts will probably have to start all over again in most sectors. Nato has had a difficult time since 9/11. The first Bush administration preferred to deliver its immediate riposte in Afghanistan after the terrorist attack through a selected coalition of the willing. The USA ignored Lord Robertson's (the then Nato Secretary General) offer to activate the Washington Treaty's Article 5 for the conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom. Later on, the Alliance had to evolve its own strategy and relevance (for its membership) by becoming increasingly involved in Afghanistan -- first with the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Kabul; then through an ever-expanding counter-insurgency role in other provinces. It is now fighting for its reputation far away from its original theatre of expected engagement. Analysts have pointed out that like the EU, Nato, has also over the past decade, undergone a process of expansion not only of its membership, but also in its geographical outreach. Its functional scope has also become diverse. It is now dealing with tasks that were never envisaged before -- rescuing civilians in earthquake-hit Kashmir, guaranteeing air and ground surveillance for the 2004 Athens Olympics and the 2006 World Cup in Germany etc. Its membership portfolio has also changed with France formally returning to Nato's fold (43 years after General de Gaulle's decision to pull out of the Alliance's integrated military structure). There has been a remarkable evolution but Nato appears to be still struggling to find a new and shared vision of its role in the 21st century. Divergence of interests and priorities amongst its membership are not helping matters. On the other hand, within the EU, under Mr Solana's stewardship, European "foreign policy" appears to have moved forward. There are some who claim that it might have almost come of age. I don't know if I can totally agree with such an assumption. However, it is true that initial tensions with the US (and Nato itself) gave way in early 2003 -- just before the divisions over Iraq became apparent -- to the signature of the "Berlin-plus" agreement that eased military cooperation between the two Brussels-based organisations. Observers have pointed out that the impact of such an understanding has been more political and psychological than operational, especially since Cyprus joined the Union in 2004 and constant skirmishes between Nicosia and Ankara have rendered EU-Nato relations particularly tricky. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to deny that the EU has managed to develop an ability that has enabled it to carry out some 20-odd operations around Europe and elsewhere in the world (especially in Africa) to restore stability and security in troubled areas. These operations have been mostly small in size and short in duration, and have often taken over from previously existing missions (by the UN or Nato). They have been predominantly civilian in nature, if not always in form. They have also embodied, in other words, the Union's "yes we can" claim in what had hitherto been a no-go area for Europe. They have also demonstrated that the EU has strong potential when it comes to soft peace-building, thanks to its multiple competences and resources in increasingly relevant areas. Peace-enforcement has however remained a much more challenging and controversial goal for EU's 27 members. This has probably been because of what once Henry Kissinger pointed out-the inability of the EU High Representative to give the world one single telephone number that could give a face and a voice to Europe's common foreign policy. This detracting factor within the EU, pertaining to its High Representative, might eventually be overcome if the Lisbon Treaty enters into force and creates the double-hatted HR who will also chair the Council's foreign affairs meetings and be a European Commission Vice-President. There is no obvious candidate for this virtually impossible job, but there are indeed expectations and hopes that he or she will be instrumental in establishing at least a single 'switchboard' for the EU's international partners. On the other hand, one of Mr Rasmussen's most important challenges within Nato, Afghanistan notwithstanding, will be the drafting of Nato's new Strategic Concept, expected to be approved at the Lisbon Atlantic Council in October 2010. The last such concept was published in March 1999, just before the Alliance launched its first-ever large-scale military operation since 1949: the Kosovo war. The world, US, and Europe have all changed since then -- and so have the threats and risks they face. The role of military force as a tool to solve international crises has also swung back and forth, from the success of 1999-2001-2003 to the ensuing setbacks. The evolution of the international scenario clearly demonstrates that there is need now, more than ever before, for a comprehensive approach not only within the Nato and the EU separately, but also together. Appropriate planning and coordination will be required in this regard on the basis of consensus. It could start with Afghanistan and also help to move forward the peace process in the Middle East. Nato and the EU have many interests and values in common. They also have distinct functions and goals. I believe that for the greater interest of maintenance of international peace and security, Nato and the EU should not only learn from one another, but supplement their respective strengths.
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