State of strategic discomfort
IT will not be an exaggeration to suggest that at this point in time Bangladesh finds itself in a very uncomfortable position, particularly with its eastern neighbour. This is in part external, caused by certain actions of our neighbours, while some are internally generated because of the policy adopted by the GOB related to strategic matters that are perceived by many at home as fulfilling the strategic requirement of a neighbour, which might eventually impinge our national security.
In the first instance Myanmar, our eastern neighbour, has reportedly amassed large numbers of troops that have very little relevance to its border security. There has been no development on our side of the border that could compel such aggressive reactions from the government in Yangon. That is why the unwarranted build-up of conventional forces by Myanmar on the border leaves one to wonder, why? It is a matter of serious concern for us.
On the other front, that is the Indian, our strategic location is proving to be a headache for our policy planners. Contrary to some antiquated views that our position on the map is a strategic tyranny the reality is that our geographical location can be a boon for us, if we realise the significance and utilise that to our advantage. The question is, have we been able to do that sufficiently enough to best serve our national interest? That fact that our location invests us with tremendous power to call the shots has neither been realised nor utilised as a bargaining weight skillfully.
For today, we shall only concentrate on our neighbour in the east and take up the issues related to India later.
Admittedly, the eastern neighbour, one must admit, has not been on our strategic antennae continuously. Perhaps we took it for granted and there might have been a degree of sympathy for the military rulers in Yangon during the late seventies and up to the end of the eighties, there being a dispensation of the same ilk in Bangladesh during that time. But then there were frictional issues as in 1979, the Rohingya push in, and the border incident in early '90s, which had strained the relationship if not damaged it. Perhaps it has also a lot to do with our "one neighbour" fixation.
While we had been neglecting Myanmar and did not even consider it worth evaluating its threat potentials, the government in Yangon had been building up its military to a point that has now reversed the force balance in favour of Myanmar by a factor, on the average, of 1:3.
The nine light infantry battalions that are now on the border, which make up three brigades, are supported by not only organic artillery, there are reportedly also heavy artillery and a regiment of tanks to boot, not to speak of two divisions that are in a state if readiness as a backup.
Under these circumstances one finds the foreign minister's characterisation of Myanmar's action as routine movement of troops as rather strange. And that is the moot point. Moving such a large element of a conventional force is not routine movement and is certainly against the norms of border management. Any such movement within a particular distance from the border, as agreed upon by the two sides, has to be notified to the other well in advance. One wonders whether that was done.
That brings us to the question, why the sabre-rattling by Myanmar? Is the posture a consequence of its special relationship with the PRC? Or does it have to do anything with the fact that even the US is now warming up to it, having failed to get the Asean to chastise the Myanmar regime.
There are some that feel that this is a prelude to something more serious. That it is a preparation for resumption of maritime exploration from which it had to pull back with a "loss of face" in October last year.
One finds it difficult to subscribe fully to that view. Given that Bangladesh has chosen the option of arbitration, anything precipitous would disturb the status quo, something that Myanmar had undertaken not to do at the meeting of the two sides in Yangon in July this year.
Myanmar may feel that it was hard done by since it was within the line in the Bay that was readjusted to cater to the interest of both the parties. However, one understands that the readjusted line of 1974, offered by Bangladesh in 1979, was not formally accepted by Myanmar, and Bangladesh would like to follow the principle of equity which had been accepted as a principle of delimitation in 1982.
One would like to think that the rulers in Yangon understand that coercion or use of force will not help resolve matters. Outstanding issues should be resolved through discussions. As for Bangladesh, it is our conviction that our military is ready at all times to thwart any violation of our territory.
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