Tackling those shadowy figures

Muhammad Nurul Huda
THERE is no denying that the December 2008 general election of Bangladesh was an outstanding feat in the annals of democracy in our part of the world. The Awami League won the polls with a thumping majority. The verdict at the hustings was loud and clear. There is, therefore, a surge of expectations amongst the electorate from a government that comes as a result of such clear mandate. However, the premonition that is lurking in many hearts is whether those in charge of managing the affairs of the State are faltering or getting stalled on account of the malevolence of not-too-visible elements. Under a scenario as above, many questions arise. The first query may relate to the slide in crime and order situation. Concerned citizens keep on asking as to why law and order situation would deteriorate when government's control is undisputed and unquestioned? How credible are the fears of people that in several pockets, persons of criminal disposition end doubtful antecedents in league with delinquent enforcement officials are responsible for the inactions in protecting life and property? Are some such people asserting their authority by telling the mischief-makers that they need not be afraid of the police station and the lawmen that have been taken care of? Are some people visiting the police stations without cogent business, only to show their clout to the unsuspecting public? These allegations need to be probed to assuage the fears of the citizens. A serious area of mal-functioning will definitely be the authority's inability to ensure fairness in the process of submission of tenders for development activities in many areas of the country. If student and youth bodies affiliated to the ruling party are scaring away bonafide businessmen and contractors as alleged, then who would guarantee durable and credible progress? Work orders obtained under duress will only multiply people's woes. In the process the authority's writ over order and development would be harmfully diminished. These are bad signals for a democratic society. The erosion of good governance under circumstances as above cannot be denied. Suspected arrangements to extend political patronage to partisan elements are undermining bureaucratic discipline, eroding accountability, promoting inefficiency and encouraging pervasive corruption. We have to admit that a poor state of law and order is endemic to the system of governance. The failure to address the structural sources has meant that shadowy elements have been operating with immunity from law enforcement agencies. There are reasons to suspect a collusive and mutually rewarding links between them. The ruling party enjoys a special privilege in nurturing and protecting its own mastaans. As a result, the problem in law enforcement has become systemic. Since the problem is considered to be embedded into the working of Bangladesh's political system, regime changes may bring a limited impact. It has been felt that unless each political party commits itself to marginalize the mastaan elements in its working and to apply the law of the land, without reference to the political colour of the wrongdoer, attempts to restore order would not be real. Simultaneously, the structural constraints within the machinery of law enforcement cannot be ignored. The mutually beneficial relationship between deviant public servants and political parties has given rise to strong vested interests in many areas. In such areas there is very limited prospect that police will move, suo moto, against the major criminals. They will be active if they receive categorical, unambiguous, political orders to clean up an area and are threatened with the prospect of dire action if they do not comply with such orders. Care has to be taken to ensure that the instructions of the government of the day are not diluted and enforcement officials must not believe that business may continue as usual. In such circumstances, the commitment by the ruling regime to an agenda of comprehensive non-partisan law enforcement involving structural problems would be essential. The entire cultural and institutional basis of law enforcement will have to be overhauled. Such a process could be resisted from within the agencies that would be able to draw upon support from within the political system and from interest groups who have benefited from a system of personalized law enforcement. Thus a political consensus will have to be built up so that one party cannot take political advantage if a ruling party seeks to impose structural changes in the machinery of law enforcement. Reaching a political consensus as above will require an ongoing dialogue between civil society and political parties where all issues including those of just law enforcement will be publicly examined and credible solutions sought to establish a reform supportive environment. In other words, the political cost of malfeasant governance will have to be realized by the political players. The need for making a decisive assault on corruption resulting from administrative inefficiency demands urgent attention. The aspects of governance lie at the very heart of building a sustainable democracy which is no less paramount a goal than realizing sustainable development. Muhammad Nurul Huda is a columnist for The Daily Star.