Perspectives
Beyond the Pakistan elections
THE pro-Musharaf leaguers wanted at least another term in power, and hoped against hope that the general would oblige them. Belying those hopes, President Musharraf, who had earlier declared both Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto as the most corrupt politicians and accused them of destroying the institutions and bringing the country to the brink of economic collapse, allowed the duo to return and contest the election.
Two major factors could have compelled Musharraf to take the decision against the wishes of his well-wishers in the king's party. One is the pressure from the so-called friendly countries. Another could be similar pressure from the institution he comes from.
Late Ms. Benazir Bhutto, arguably the most popular Pakistani leader, returned in style, ostensibly with American blessing. Relatively conservative Nawaz Sharif, formerly a blue-eyed boy of the establishment, followed suit, presumably under the patronage of the Saudis who extended him royal hospitality for years. Both returned clean -- thanks to the provisions contained in the specially crafted National Reconciliation Ordnance (NRO).
The PML(Q), which came into being with the full blessings of intelligence agencies, served Musharraf perfectly well since 2001 by providing political support to his undemocratic take-over from an elected government, but it had no roots in the masses who were fast losing faith in the general amid widespread violence by the Jihadi extremists and countrywide economic hardship. Worried over Musharraf's falling approval ratings the Americans, desperately dependent on the general to fight their war on terror, wanted, in a last ditch effort, to burnish his tainted image by interfacing it with the charisma of Ms Benazir Bhutto, their favourite.
There was an undeclared deal of a sort between the general and Benazir Bhutto, which, however, never came to light. But implementation of some of the US-brokered arrangements under the deal has started. Bhutto returned in October to a tumultuous reception in Karachi, which perhaps unnerved the general as to his standing vis-a-vis Bhutto's.
There seems to have been a cover-up of the Karachi mayhem, for which the finger of accusation was raised against the establishment. A course change was apparently underway at the behest of the top echelons of the power wielders who, perhaps, found it difficult to face the combined power of the mobilisation by the erstwhile political arch rivals -- Bhutto and Sharif.
Musharraf's gambit, like that of an astute chess player, succeeded when he transformed himself into a civilian head of the state by doffing his uniform that had so long been like his second skin. But he followed a path that does not auger well for democracy. He first used his powers, which he assumed under a mini- martial law imposed on November 3, and the in preparing for assuming the civilian office he transfered all those extra powers to himself as president. Heads he wins and tails as well.
The "extraordinary conditions" for declaring emergency, which he claims forced him "to act or to give in," were reminiscent of the choice he had made leading to his 1999 coup: "To accept retirement or to fire Mr Sharif." It is a bit mind boggling how this kind of mental outlook will stand him in good stead in his role which, in essence, does not allow such a stark either-or course of action.
Unlike the culture of the military, a democratic process needs a strong propensity to not only give leadership but also to accommodate public opinion. General Musharaf does not possess either the practical experience or academic credentials to make ponderous statements about the political system.
Besides, the statements made by President Musharraf after the tragic death of Benazir Bhutto clearly indicate that he intends to remain a key player in the post-election power structure. The glaring aspect of his determination is the introduction of the concept of a troika, in which power is to be shared between three power centers -- the president, prime minister and COAS. In this way, Musharraf intends to leverage his influence by institutionalising a system that informally existed during the 1990s, when Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif were prime ministers.
By implementing this concept, President Musharaf wants to be the ruler in a new garb by reconsolidating his control over the society and relying on the loyalty of an elite structure that he nurtured.
Now, let's take a look at the election itself. It was a free, fair and peaceful election, with no instance of rigging reported anywhere. What Musharraf already did under the cover of his mini-martial law obviously spared him from soiling his hands with rigging. Instead, he has the confident look of a master player of the game.
In the meantime, the results turned out to be one prognosticated by most observers. Even the number of the seats won by the parties is according to prediction. Now the crucial question is about the end result. In other words, to what extent will this result be of use in transforming Pakistani polity; because the new equation for the country's future had already been put in place earlier on November 3rd through the Provisional Constitution Order (PCO).
The power to amend the constitution was given to President General Musharaf by the PCO, of which he publicly stated that the only illegal and unconstitutional act he had ever committed was on November 3 when he declared an emergency, dubbed mini-martial law by the opposition and media, and promulgated the PCO, wherein the die was already cast. All that the elected body can do now is to play second fiddle to real power -- more or less in the manner the PML(A) did.
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