A dangerous precedent?

M. Shah Alam
THIS write-up is in response to the article titled "A Dangerous Precedent" by Shahedul Anam Khan published in The Daily Star on February 19. Mr. Khan made some critical observations on certain sensitive issues stated in the army chief's biographical book. The issues brought forth in the book and the observations made by Mr. Khan touch on the fundamental principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state under international law and relations. Mr. Khan's observations cover three important issues: whether an incumbent in a high office should have come with such information on politically sensitive issues; disclosing the circumstances, facts and forms of the alleged UN interference in the internal affairs of Bangladesh; and legality of interference. First, I agree with Mr. Khan that it was rather unusual for a sitting army chief to describe the facts of the political events leading to 1/11 when he himself was one of the major actors, if not the main actor. Others involved in or witnessing the events may have a different version. Maybe the author of the book will later face "the flak and riposte." I believe that the CAS was not unaware of the risks involved in disclosing what he did. Perhaps he is prepared for his defence. Maybe he relied on honesty of account and purpose, principle of transparency, and the belief that he was not causing any damage to the nation by the disclosures. After our independence, especially since 1975, many stories have remained untold. Their disclosures, I believe, would add to the nation gaining in maturity and help in nation-building. The book could even contribute to ending the secretive and controversial ways power politics is played, where the armed forces are silent but agile and active witnesses. Second, Mr. Khan wrote: "He has done the people and the country a great favour by letting us in on many unknown facts, particularly on the manner in which threats and intimidation were brought to bear on a national institution like the armed forces by outside agencies." However, the way the CAS has presented the matter cannot be fully praised. The UN position may have influenced the army's decision in many ways, including "rent and revenue" factor. But emphasising that income from the UN peace-keeping missions was very important for the service personnel in view of their very limited earnings, and depriving them of this would likely create problems of discipline and administration in the army (p. 333 of the book), was a bit surprising. It is too honest an admission by the army chief! Third, the question is whether or not the UN position was interference in the internal affairs of a state. Article 2(7) of the UN Charter prohibits UN interference "in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state." In a globalised world where common problems are multiplying, where the traditional notion of absolute state sovereignty is outliving itself, and where ICT is rendering the state border concept irrelevant in many respects, it is not easy to find the borderline of the matters falling essentially within domestic jurisdiction. Human rights, environment, drugs and narcotics, human trafficking, and even natural calamities are no more issues of domestic jurisdiction only. Seen in the above context, domestic misrule, dictatorship, and political anarchy with their human rights consequences cannot be outside the concern of other states, not certainly of the UN. Rather, it is becoming a legitimate expectation, if intervention or interference be at all necessary, that it does not come from any state but from the collective authority of the UN. 1/11 was unique not only in Bangladesh, but in the whole world. The world community's concern was conveyed to us in many ways. Interestingly, the developed democracies and the UN were supportive of the army's role in some form in breaking the pre-1/11 impasse, whereas events in the last several years where the UN played a role in similar cases, typically show just the opposite. The UN record of not sympathising with army interference, rather its opposition to it, is well known. In Bangladesh, just the opposite happened. The reason can be found in the last paragraph of Mr. Khan's article: "Let there be no doubt that the postponement of the 2007 election was a good thing for the country, and one that had been welcomed by most." The UN looked more at the possible consequences of the impasse, and took a pragmatic position. The mode of communicating the UN message was unique, and defied accepted norms. Unfortunately, in the pre-1/11 situation, all civil agencies and institutions of the country had become inoperative. There seemed to be no other way of meaningfully and effectively communicating the message than the one opted for by the UN. The core issue is the creation of the pre-1/11 situation, which compelled the UN and others to take such a position. Outside interference, whether by any state or by the UN, is never desirable. Bur we had welcomed the outcome of the interference. Had we not? Only now we know the story behind it. Repetition of what had happened is, of course, not desirable. Mr. Khan has expressed genuine anxiety that "given the political wisdom of our politicians," a repetition may take place. Let us hope and pray that the incident of the UN interference remains an incident to promote the political culture and wisdom of our politicians, and does not turn out to be a precedent for the future.
Dr. M. Shah Alam is Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Chittagong.