The UN capitulates

The stand taken by the members of the Security Council, excluding America and Britain, was historic. It was based on correct interpretation of Resolution 1141 and in accordance with international law. Most importantly, it upheld the cause of peace when war was avoidable and unnecessary. The worldwide demonstration on the streets resonated through the Security Council. At the end it could not prevent war, but nor did it authorise one that was palpably wrong and unjust. In its failure, in spite of itself, the UN came to enjoy prestige, confidence, good will and even credibility to a degree that was not seen before.

As the war in Iraq progressed the UN looked forlorn and shaky, as if mulling over the past. The Security Council appeared to wobble and waffle. Its resolve showed signs of weariness and it started to falter. The formal complaint lodged by the Iraqi Ambassador about aggression against his country went unheeded by the Security Council. No emergency meeting was called to discuss the war and the standard cease-fire. Obviously, such a move would have been vetoed by America, but it would have vindicated the UN's role. Just as it cannot be accomplice in an illegal war, similarly it cannot condone one by remaining silent. The sudden paralysis of the hitherto active and conscientious crucial organ of the UN was an anti-climax. On the other hand, the emergency meeting of the Council authorising the UN to administer the oil-for-food programme, instead of Iraq, seemed to write off the Iraqi government even before it was toppled. The Iraqi government as a member country of UN did not get its rightful hearing.

Tap here to add The Daily Star as a trusted source

After the war ended, predictably in favour of the invading forces, the issues of reconstruction and nation building came to the fore. These are the tasks for which the UN has built up credible credentials. In addition, it has neutrality and inspires confidence across the political spectrum. On both counts, the UN should have figured prominently in any plan for reconstruction and 'nation building' in Iraq. But this was not to be, as America stubbornly refused to recognise any meaningful role for the UN in post-war Iraq. This was not just because of the memory of the humiliation suffered in the Security Council. Sidelining of the UN had more to do with the nature and scope of 'regime change' in Iraq. This grand design did not involve only ouster of Saddam and his Baath party. More importantly, it is about introducing a comprehensive political, economic and security system that will guarantee protection and promotion of American interests permanently throughout the Middle East. The UN could be the fly in the ointment in such a sweeping and politically motivated restructuring. So keeping the UN out of Iraq is not just an act of retribution, but essential to the stratagem planned and the goal set by America. Frequent declarations by Rumsfeld that American troops will stay as long as necessary in Iraq leave no doubt about the long-term goal of America. Giving a central role to the UN could not be in America's real interest. Even her staunchest ally Britain failed to change America's mind on this issue.

But the UN, particularly the countries who opposed the war against Iraq in the Security Council, had a great opportunity, almost a trump card, to press for and obtain a central role for the UN. America, with all its bluster against the UN, required the help of the UN to lift the sanction against Iraq. Without this America cannot start selling Iraqi oil to pay for 'reconstruction' in Iraq, which will no doubt include all kinds of payments to its contractors and suppliers. Selling oil before the sanction was lifted would invite raft of litigation later, the very thought which could discourage potential buyers. That is why America was so eager to move the UN and frantically sought to win support from the Security Council members. For a while it looked as if Russia and France would balk at legitimising the war by lifting the sanction unconditionally. At the least, they demanded a central role for the UN. This involved return of the UN inspectors to complete the unfinished business since a declaration on absence or destruction of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) was a pre-condition for lifting of sanctions. Faced with the need to have the sanction lifted America seemed to be in a weak bargaining position in respect of both the issues. This fact could not be concealed, though in public she continued to insult and threaten countries, particularly France, for 'betrayal'. In true mafia style, America was bent on following a strategy of 'punish and reward' regarding its foes and enemies. But the issue of lifting of sanction became its Achilles' heel. From pugnacity it was forced to mellow into malleability, at least to a degree.

Given the strong bargaining position of members of the Security Council it is a mystery that at the final crunch almost an unconditional resolution was passed lifting the sanction and granting quite a few privileges to the occupation force in Iraq. Concessions made by America in the revised resolution are so minor and insignificant that these will not affect her grand design in Iraq in the least. According to the resolution the occupation force will remain in Iraq for one year which can be automatically extended for an indefinite period. During this period the occupation authority headed by America will control the fund built with oil revenue for 'reconstruction' of Iraq. The nature and scope of this reconstruction will be left to the occupation authority, as will be the right to give contracts and to engage in long-term agreements. In addition, America and Britain have been given the authority by the UN to run the country as they put together a new Iraqi government, but no timetable is given for this. The UN inspectors will be allowed to return after some time, to help the American team already looking for WMD and give post facto clearance for lifting of sanction.

The most crucial issue of UN role has been settled by changing the designation from 'Coordinator' to 'Special Representative' which is not even a cosmetic change as the Representative will play second fiddle to the American civil administrator, either acting at his bidding or merely reporting to the UN. In any case, his powers and functions have been kept conveniently vague. There is no definition of any UN role, most probably because the paramount role of American civil administrator makes this obvious.

What is intriguing is the question that given the strong bargaining chips at their disposal why did the members of the Security Council pass a resolution that legitimises the war, legalises the occupation of Iraq, regularises the handling of oil money unconditionally and relegates UN to a secondary role? This is not only capitulation but a complete sell-out. Can it be that the unique bargaining situation was used deftly and shrewdly by America to win support through promises of dividing the spoils of war? If the principled stand by the Security Council before the war made the majority of member countries feel proud of belonging to the UN, this sudden reversal in policy and acquiescence to American design have come as great disappointments. Many of these countries may rightly feel betrayed by the Security Council. This raises an important question: should matters of war and peace be discussed only by fifteen members of the UN when they seem so vulnerable to pressure, threat and temptations? What is the role of the UN General Assembly? Is it only to 'stand and stare', while decisions are taken in the name of the world body?

The way the UN has been abused and misused recently gives urgency to the need for restructuring to make it more democratic. The General Assembly may not be empowered overnight, but nothing prevents it from discussing emergent issues of war and peace. It did so at the time of the Suez crisis and again during invasion of Hungary. If nothing else, opinions and views were articulated representing the whole spectrum of public opinion. If the General Assembly delegates discussion at critical moments exclusively to the Council members it not only abdicates responsibility. It also betrays the cause for which the world body was formed. There has just been such a betrayal by default.

Hasnat Abdul Hye is a former secretary, novelist and economist.