Analysing Blair

Few would disagree that Tony Blair is a man of vision. He energised a moribund Labour Party and wrested power from the Conservative Party which had kept it at bay for more than fifteen years. He changed the ideology of his party and rebranded it with the enticing epithet "New Labour". He left no dobut that he had a vision for his party and for Great Britain. Following the ideal of the golden middle he devised an ideology which he called the Third Way. His goal was to see the country embrace best of both the worlds, Conservative's hardheaded pragmatism and Labour's social commitment.

When he came to power with a landslide victory over the Conservatives, Bill Clinton was in the White House in Washington. In Clinton's ideas and politics Blair found a close resemblance to his newfound ideology of the Third Way. As kindred spirits both were drawn to each other and established close rapport in both domestic policy and foreign affairs. After Bush Jr. came to power, it seemed that the special relationship that blossomed under Clinton would start to wane, both because of the ideology of the Republican Party and ultra-conservatism of Bush. It would be a formally correct working relationship but without much personal enthusiasm.

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Blair belied the prognosis and became as close to Bush Jr. as he was with Bill Clinton. Given the differences in their personal traits, political ideology of their parties and the divisive issues facing them (farm subsidy, global warming etc.) it was a puzzle that the two leaders managed to find common ground to forge a close and special relationship. The unthinkable happened because both had their own reasons and compulsions. Bush wanted to have an ally who could mediate between America and the European Union, particularly over trade issues and occasionally over matters of security concerns in Europe. NAFTA was not enough of a bargaining counter to deal with the ever growing strength of EU. It would matter a great deal if a country like Great Britain became sympathetic, even helpful to America in its efforts to tide over the pin pricks in relation to EU. If nothing else, UK could have a sobering influence in the deliberations in Brussels both in the European Commission and in NATO.

For Blair the compulsion for continuing a close relationship with the USA also had its origin rooted in Europe. Great Britain was a member of EU and continues to be so, but it has refused to submerge its identity under the greater entity of Europe. It knew very well when the first steps were taken for united Europe in late Fifties, in the form of European Coal and Steel Union and then in the form of a Common Customs Union, that in such an European enterprise her role would be overshadowed by France or even Germany in course of time. The problem with her was that she had lost an empire but was not yet cured of the imperial hangover. The choice before her was: Great Britain, standing alone or little England as a member of a bloc where it would be treated on the same footing as Ireland or Portugal. This explains why she at first tried to form a counter bloc with seven countries under the European Free Trade Association parallel to the French initiated European bloc of six countries. For a while Europe was literally at Sixes and Sevens. When this strategy failed and European Common Market became inevitable under the Treaty of Rome, Great Britain mulled over her predicament. At last, swallowing pride, she applied for membership.

But even after joining European Common Market UK zealously guarded her separate identity. The overriding objective seems to have been maintaining her sovereignty within the European arrangement so that she does not suffer decline in stature. That way economic and other benefits can be enjoyed while following its own policy in areas considered vital for the strategy of equal but separate. Following this strategy it withdrew from the European Exchange Rate Mechanism which would have led to closer monetary integration through the European Monetary Union. Likewise, she did not adopt the social protocol binding common labour laws and stuck to her own immigration regulation. When the majority of members of EU opted for a common currency, Great Britain decided to stay out. Since then it has kept the issue hanging in balance. Though the matter was to be decided through a referendum, no haste has been shown for this. It is not a question of shilly-shallying, but a case of deliberate postponement or even avoidance. Her thinking may be: if there is monetary integration, can political union be far behind? There would be nothing wrong with such an union if she could be primus inter pares. But France will not oblige her with that position. After all, Great Britain is a late comer and is seen as a spoiler.

America had more compelling reasons to attack Iraq and occupy it than Great Britain. The neo-conservatives representing the Jewish lobby had planned the war long before Bush Jr. came to White House. He balked at the idea for a while. September 11 changed his mind and he decided for regime change to remove potential threat of terrorists and to control Iraqi oil. America's campaign against Iraq was launched with Bush's 'axis of evil' speech. But it was too general and abstract. Bush and his minions formulated different justifications for different constituencies. For home constituency it was shown as part of the war against terrorism which made it easy to win over domestic support. For Iraqis the war was projected as a move to liberate them from the tyrannical rule of Saddam. In the UN, the argument was based on Iraq's refusal to get rid of WMD. When America bypassed the UN and invaded Iraq without giving time to UN inspectors, the reason given was clear and present danger because of WMD possessed by Saddam. Colin Pawell in his impassioned speech in the Security Council produced documents and other evidences to prove that Iraq was hiding WMD.

Tony Blair supported Bush in his diplomatic campaign and later in the war against Iraq mainly on the grounds of WMD. He appealed to the members of the Parliament and to his people, also with great passion, on this basis. He, too, produced a dossier to prove that Saddam was in possession of WMD. In the chasm that emerged between America and Europe over the Iraq issue, particularly in respect of WMD, Blair sided with America without hesitation. Theirs was a stand united from beginning to the end: If Britain had opposed or even had remained neutral, her position would be that of one among many European countries. This was not acceptable to Britain as the continuing policy has been one of maintaining a separate role which gives her importance and greater weight in international affairs. This geo politic, rather than security concerns, have led Great Britain to blindly take America's side. Blair's decision to join America in the Iraq war may appear as irrational, but there was a method in the madness.

Now that WMD has become difficult to find both Blair and Bush are being accused of prevarication, even indulging in downright falsehood. Bush Jr. will come out of this criticism unscathed because in American politics lying and cheating are not seen as great failures in character of leaders as long as a war has been won and the employment rate is high. In Great Britain both the people and politicians still set a great store by morality and probity in politics. After all, it belongs to the old world where some verities of life are forever. The demand for an independent enquiry into the WMD allegations will become implacable marking the beginning of the end of Blair. It would be a sad legacy for a man of great ability and vigour.

Hasnat Abdul Hye is a former secretary, novelist and economist.