Franco-American relationship
France and America are not natural allies. It has all along been an alliance of convenience, an exigency of the realities of the time. They represent two separate courses of western civilization. The courses are marked by clear conception of their identities, the originalities of their roles and the separateness of their historical destiny. Franco-American relationship is going to see a serious engagement in dealing with the post war problems of Iraq.
The foremost task for the coalition forces is the revival of Iraqi economy. It is the lifting or relaxation of the sanctions that matters most to America. Post war Iraq is going to be a grinding and perilous task. As I understand, Bush administration is aiming at three things, unfettered access to Iraq's resources, to enforce a state of submission throughout the Middle East, and a graceful exit from Iraq. The recent lifting of UN sanctions will open up access to Iraq's resources. With the sanctions gone, the political and economic cost of rebuilding Iraq will no longer be a forbidding task for America.
The turmoil of political vacuum fuelled further by the populist fulminations of contending forces would make it extremely difficult for the coalition forces to improve life in Iraq. A revival of the economy with income from oil can attract maverick and self-seeking political forces in patching up a civil administration. Although, nominally representative in nature, it can be a useful starting vehicle for driving on to the goal of graceful exit from Iraq.
France is being engaged tenaciously. It will not be unnatural to think that the entire might of diplomacy, economic bait, feigned camaraderie and eyeballing was at work in obtaining France's support for the passage of the resolution.
The recent sequence of terrorist bombings in Riyadh, Chechnya and Casablanca united the world powers on the perils of relenting on the menace. It led to the passage of the UN resolution on lifting of sanctions on Iraq. China, their hands full with SARS lent their support with the understanding that the western powers will reciprocate by not using the hazard to constrict their commerce and export. Russia desperately wants to contain the Chechen problem and does not want Islamic militants to grow stronger in Central Asia. Besides, they do not want to jeopardize the prospect of their share of benefits from Iraqi contracts.
The considerations are different with France. They have a vision of leadership of Europe and its gradual emergence as an integrated global power. The ultimate goal is one Europe. A division on the lifting of the sanctions is not compatible with France's vision. There was strong possibility of Germany falling for America. It was to be seen from the softening of its stance. France needs Germany in building a united Europe. At the core of France's support for the resolution lies the thinking that the geo-political situation is not mature enough to take the matter to the brink. Besides France saw the benefit of letting the coalition off the hook in Iraq by creating opportunities for itself and for the return of ultimate leadership to the UN. It was well though out.
The moral consideration aside, France has done what serves France best. There is little the Arab and Muslim world can do by sulking over it. Because at the core of all issues lies the economic interest. And good decisions do well by listening to the realities, although such decisions may be culpable of moral expedience. The common stand of the western powers is not a product of compliance but of convenience. There is a big difference between cronies and partners. The cronies croon for every song you sing, while the partners may have a different taste. France always avoids the banality of being cast in the role of a second fiddle. It is very watchful about separate equality in its relationship with America. The two has never been the best of allies. Time will judge how effective is the common stand and how long will it last.
Franco-American relationship started from the colonial times, when settlement started in the new world. The two had their own ways of dealing with the Indian problem. The French colonials were relatively more constructive in their contact with the Indians. The Anglo-Irish settlers were rather intolerant in their engagements. Tension rose, whenever Indians pressed on by the settlers found tutelage under the French. The tension soured relationship between the two communities. When the seven years war broke out between Britain and France in 1754, it touched the new world as well. The French under the leadership of Samuel de Champlains of Quebec started aiding the war like tribes of Algonquin and Huron against the crown colony. In return, the Anglo-Irish settlers armed the Iroquois. George Washington led the Virginia militia against the French. His campaign however ended in failure.
America's 'New Men' viewed the French as Indian lovers. It was a fundamental difference of national outlook that exists even today. An outbreak of tension or war in Europe, an attrition of colonial ambition fuelled the Franco-American differences. Franco-American ties rarely rested on shared perceptions and lacked the vigour of common heritage, as it applies to Anglo-American relationship. French revolution as an event crystallized the American nationhood. It is the freedom of men from the constrictions of institutions of governance and control that galvanized the settlers of the new world. With new frontiers to explore in a vast land, freedom inspired profound creativity and prodigious enterprise. J. Hector St. John de Crevecouer speaks of this new man in his eighteenth century book "Letters from an American Farmer". In his words, 'The American is a new man, who acts upon new principle, he must therefore entertain new idea, and form new opinion...". The French however prides on an impervious separateness based on, and drawing sustenance from, the profundity of their own ideas.
Paris is the heart of this separateness that also feeds many parts of the world from staleness. American statehood is more pioneering in nature believing in the fecundity and vigour of its vastness and spirit. Naturally, the coming together of France and America has been a history of joining hands to preserve common interest, in meeting a common threat, and in commanding a shared mission. Once it was over, they went on to follow their own course. There has not been a permanence and continuity to mark it as an alliance.
The Normandy invasion was the high mark of Franco-American relationship. With the assumption of De Gaulle it has been a matter of conducting business as usual. It is all about periodic consultation, sounding each other's opinion, and about exchange of courtesies of normal diplomatic relationship. The passage of UN resolution on the lifting of sanctions on Iraq without bitter exchanges shows that the Untied Nations is a highly useful forum for the two countries. One can even call Franco-American relationship as UNfriendly.
However the exhortation of American Secretary of State Colin Powell on the passage of the resolution can harm France more than America. The American Secretary of State spoke of " the crusade of expanding the realm of liberty...". This sort of rhetoric is not unheard of. President GW Bush also spoke of crusade against terrorism. If this is the rallying cry for the coming together of the western powers, France surely has a lot to loose. The respect it earned in trying to prevent the Iraq War will be treated as the passing ploy of a western power. Unless France disavows such antiquated war cry, she runs the risk of further radicalising its four million Arab expatriate population. The separateness of France can have national ambition and pride beneath it, but it holds out for the world an assurance of a semblance of balance of influence. Without this balance, might will always get the day, and justice will become a rebel. In the battle between the two, the world will have no victory to rejoice. Only peace to mourn.
Syed Maqsud Jamil is General Manager, Summit Group.
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