Fearful polarisation

The phenomenon is wellknown in Pakistan. Earlier Karachi used to be the terror capital of Pakistan. It looks like shifting to Quetta where this massive attack is second within a month. The earlier one had killed about a dozen police cadets belonging to the (Shia) Hazara tribe with many more wounded. As usual, not one person could be identified or the conspiracy exposed. One of the major similarities in various sectarian attacks is that they are mounted on mosques at prayer times when the casualties can only be high. Time was when a mosque used to be a place of peace and safe asylum; anyone who take asylum in a mosque used to be sure of protection even against the police, food and a place to sleep. Now mosques and Imam Bargahs are regularly attacked, though to be fair, Christian churches are also attacked at congregation times. On Saturday some armed terrorists shot and killed a Roman Catholic Cleric. This practice of Pakistani terrorists is hard to find in other countries, though one is told that a few such cases have taken place in Egypt and Algeria.

There are three ways of looking at the incident. First is of the pragmatists, especially in the police forces, who generally take each incident to be a separate one caused by a combination of local circumstances, often personal animosity and tribal feuds. These gentlemen take pride in being realists. For them it is only a law and order matter. It is another matter that except in few cases the law enforcement agencies (LEAs) have seldom succeeded in catching the actual culprits or conspirators who generally walk away or ride away safely. Later many arrests are often made, some cases are initiated but more than half of them get thrown out of courts for lack of reliable evidence. So much for realism.

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There is another group that links the incident to the current crisis between the government and the MMA. Contrary to the earlier expectations of unavowed but considerable sub rosa cooperation between General Musharraf and the religious parties after their spectacular showing in last October's election, it was widely believed that the two are sure to cooperate. The very success of MMA was seen as having been due to the help rendered by the administration. Indeed they had come fairly close together over the contentious issues that divide the MMA from the government: acceptance of General Musharraf's fiat in amending the Constitution, the amendments being known as Legal Framework Order (LFO), and the question of Musharraf's taking off his uniform to get himself elected normally as a President.

The MMA wanted to accommodate the General to the maximum extent. It was prepared to help amend the Constitution generally in accordance with the wishes of the General, provided only if he gave a date on which he would take off his uniform. The MMA had given him a year to do so. But the General wants to take everything anyone has to give without conceding anything in return. At length the talks broke down. The two are now poised for a clash and Friday July 4 was the first major protest day observed by the MMA.

Liberal opinion is still suspicious of both the General and the MMA. It thinks that some day somehow the old links between them will reassert themselves and a deal will be struck. It is noted by all that the two cannot afford to alienate each other. Much rides on their tacit understanding and unavowed cooperation. But that is for the future to show. People should wait a while and see what does the MMA do.

MMA's main parties are sought to be divided by the government. They are Jamaat-i-Islami led by Qazi Hussain Ahmed, who also is the friend, philosopher and guide of the Hizbul Mujahideen in India, Kashmir and Pakistan. The second major party is Jamiat-i-Ulemai Islam,(JUI) which has two factions led respectively by Maulana Fazlur Rehman and Ex-Senator Samiul Haq. Both these factions had worked in close mesh with the intelligence agencies and both had provided the nurseries where Taliban were nurtured and sent out to Afghanistan to rule it. They are the professors of the hardest view of Islam, more or less akin to the Wahabi school of Saudi Arabia. The Mujahideen and the Taliban who made history in Afghanistan are also more or less the same people who are carrying out Jihad in Indian controlled Kashmir in terms of faith.

The most important face of these Jihadis -- and Taliban for that matter -- is that they double being sectarian terrorists. They are such Islamic purists that any perceived deviation from the faith in sectarian terms is utterly unacceptable. In terms of their faith the deviationists become Murtads or apostates, deserving to be killed. Indeed they think killing them is a matter of higher priority over mere Kafirs. This is the kind of orientation that the Deobandi School, the mainspring of these branches steered clear of sectarianism by becoming more tolerant and advocating secular politics. That was safer and Muslims could call themselves simply Muslims because they did not emphasise the sectarian details of their faith which is exactly the same as now being propagated by the Jihadis and their mentors.

The third group links the sectarian terrorism to the basic polarisa-tions that have prevented Pakistanis from becoming a nation. Quite early in the proceedings after partition, the Jamaat-i-Islami Chief, Maulana Abul Ala Maudoodi, after having opposed Pakistan, veered to the view that now that Pakistan has been created in the name of Islam it must become a true Islamic State. This term, the true Islamic State, has played havoc with Pakistan; it created a fundamental polarisation within the polity: the majority of voters led by more or less pro-west mainstream parties like Muslim League, Pakistan People's Party, and their various factions had talked loudly and long about Islam in order to keep the Mullahs marginalised. But the Mullahs' claim to know what Islam is, made them a factor in the polity.

Other mainstream parties imperfectly represented all the modernism there has been in Pakistan. But their rhetoric has reverberated and has come back to haunt everyone. It was all very well in 1950s and 1960s. The PPP and Pakistan Muslim League could get away with mere rhetoric. By and by after the Americans gave millions of dollars and arms for the first Afghanistan war in the 1980s, the Ulema, supported by the undercover agencies, began to talk grandly: We know what Islam is; these westernised types know nothing about it; if Pakistan has to be an Islamic State we will have to tell them; it will have to be based on Shariah. But unfortunately the Shariah among the Muslims is a variable concept. There are hundreds of sects and each one has its own Shariah. During British period, thanks to Jamiat-i-Ulemai Hind, the sectarian differences could be contained, though often incited by the British and their paid Mullahs. In Pakistan Mullahs now scent power. They are going flat out for power in their own right.

There are fears that General Musharraf, for all his undoubted power, reinforced by the support of George W. Bush at Camp David, there may be elements within the armed forces who would stand by MMA, especially the JUI part of it. Even the Jamaat-i-Islami Chief Qazi Hussain Ahmed seems to have a kind of confidence that is not warranted by his ability to bring down the government through street agitation. His relationship with General Musharraf has seen many ups and downs and he has often said extremely harsh things about Musharraf. It is an uncertain and fear inspiring situation.

Whether we relate the recrudescence of sectarian terrorism to Musharraf government's tussle with MMA or to the basic circumstance of Pakistan's creation in the name of Islam, the fact of the matter is that the society is polarised and the sectarian consciousness now amounts to what the Indians call communalism in their own context. It is a fearful situation because it is also a fundamental polarisation which is just one of the several basic ones. Briefly there are two others among the main ones: concerning the civil and military relationship and the foreign policy of making Pakistan a satellite of America. These differences at the most basic level remain to be sorted out. But the empty words spoken loudly and too frequently are now taking their revenge. Few know how to square the various circles that define the Pakistan polity.

Pakistan's experience more or less conclusively proves that for Muslim societies to remain united, free and modern, politics has to be secular, with religion being kept strictly out of the state business. Otherwise there would be troubles like we see in Pakistan, Algeria and Egypt, not to mention many others.

MB Naqvi is a leading columist in Pakistan.