Plain words

How serious was the crisis?

M B Naqvi, writes from Karachi
Combined Opposition's parleys with the government on July 27 last proved to be inconclusive. Still, they ended on a positive note, according to official sources, despite there having been no breakthrough on any substantive issue. Earlier, the government propaganda, to put the opposition on the defensive, was to the effect that the civilian political 'system' was under serious threat. Many inspired stories spoke of the exasperation of the COAS-President, with an oblique hint that the College of senior generals also was losing patience; the latter saw a Parliament paralysed for close on nine months and the Jamali government was proving to be a non-government. The entire political architecture supervised by Generals Tanvir Naqvi and Musharraf is threatened with collapse. It was freely speculated that Gen. Musharraf may take a 'drastic' step. The rest was left to the imagination.

It does look as if the civilian part of the government duly believed these stories. The opposition was also impressed in a general sort of way, though there were some who could not believe that the COAS would at this stage sack the whole lot of Assemblies, governments and take the risk and blame for a second coup -- that too against his own creatures. How would that be explained to world opinion, not to mention the egregious blow to the image of Pakistan -- a country notorious for military coups and for instability that these underline. For, coups always generate instability.

There was also the legal aspect of such a drastic step, not to mention its political fallout. Hitherto Pakistan Army and its Chief had had a figleaf of Supreme Court's limited and controversial validation for the first three years. Now what legal loincloth would they have, if they were to kill the direct offsprings of the last October's election at the end of three 'permitted' years. It would be yet another blow to what is left of the Constitution. It is hard to imagine Gen. Musharraf going again to the SC asking for another invocation of the Doctrine of Necessity and even ampler legal empowerment. No, that doesn't seem likely. Nor may the GHQ opinion be convinced that another shot at system-making by the same General will necessarily succeed. Well, in such an eventuality the military mind can only think of a tough no-nonsense Martial Law, probably under another General.

Another Martial Law in quick succession to almost four years of the COAS rule is too absurd a proposition, especially after the failure of the system the former built. It would be reinforcing failure. Think of the world reaction to the fourth -- or will it be fifth -- Martial Law. Think of what will hit the image of this country and the load of contempt the green passport holders will carry. No, that is altogether unlikely. Gen. Musharraf does not have all that many options. He is stuck with the system he has taken three and a half years to complete. He has to sink and swim with it.

Musharraf no doubt thinks he is negotiating from a position of strength. True, he has an army of half a million, claimed to be modern, under his command. He is really above law and can do almost anything. But that is theoretical, though his power is real enough for individual citizens. But on the national scale he has to think of the immediate and delayed reactions of 60 to 70 million Pakistani adults; nor can aspects of Pakistan's external relations permit unlimited exercise of power. To repeat, Musharraf and his subordinates not only do not occupy any high moral ground, theirs is a position of political weakness. They have shot most of what their quiver contained. The threat of drastic action is largely unreal and is a bullying tactic.

It also seems true that the Combined Opposition -- actually no longer quite combined -- is also not as formidable a force as its numbers and claims would suggest. Its unity is a thing of the past. The MMA broke ranks with ARD and other opposition parties, including the two major mainstream parties, in responding with a 'yes' to PM Jamali's invitation for talks. The rest of opposition wanted meaningful assurances from the government. On major issues also -- LFO, President's legitimacy and NSC -- MMA has shifted closer to the government's position on these matters. Hence a serious rift in opposition ranks.

The point of it is that the cries of a serious crisis or the dire threat to the 'system', as Mr. Jamali was putting it frequently, were overstated, not to say a part of psywar by the General against the Opposition. Look at the trend that facts make. On the President's side, there was an iron hard stance about LFO and the uniform; these were said to be given facts; they were not negotiable. Not so now. Earlier Musharraf had retreated and hinted he could take off his Army uniform. On his return from American-European tour he specifically said he was flexible on LFO, the more substantial issue. That was inviting negotiations, though still mainly with MMA. The General may have to retreat some more.

On the opposition side, the position of PPP and PML(N) remains iron hard. Maybe it is due to the dogged persistence with which the General is refusing to deal with them. Their test will come when the General would seek their cooperation on the putative real terms of allowing the exiled leaders to return. The smaller ARD parties have little option but to be highly principled. The MMA has already negotiated away its original demands. The MMA leaders are now publicly saying they will accept Musharraf with his Army uniform till Oct 2004, perhaps March 2005. They also say they will enable him to be elected as the President in the normal way after that. They promise to get LFO passed as Constitutional Amendments if certain agreed out unspecified changes are made in it. NSC's constitutional status is perhaps to be negotiated, as was the case in 1985 when too a General was roughhewing a 'system'.

With such astounding flexibility on MMA's part and some unspecified flexibility on the General's part, where is that horrible crisis? Both sides have no insurmountable or in-principle differences in their stances. It is quite as sordid powerpolitics as it comes. Where exactly do they finally clinch a deal in the current wheeling dealing is to be seen. True, the Musharraf side has more experienced psywarriors and his negotiating tactics are more effective because he is at the giving end. In such cases give and take is the master strategy in which both gain some and lose some.

That banishes the intimidating crisis? MMA will soon hit the right balance in weighing gains and losses and a deal will be cut. But if newsmen are not inventing, the two major MMA parties seem to have differing perceptions over what or how much to concede and what must be gained. They are Jamaat-i-Islami and JUI. Qazi Hussain Ahmed, the JI Chief, is not seen as keen to cut an early deal with Musharraf merely for flimsy gains or joining the government. He is said to have his sights set on next elections -- whenever they take place. He is said to think that if he plays the more high minded and principled statesman now, he might win power next time. On the other hand, the JUI Chief, Maulana Falzur Rahman is more realistic about preserving his actual stakes: the NWFP Ministry, not to mention what his party might be able to take additionally from Musharraf in a deal. His recent mission to India may have been an earnest of more to come.

Even so, can Maulanas Qazi Hussain Ahmed and Fazlur Rahman really afford to fall out? One doubts. Both stand to lose far more than either can gain by ploughing a lonely furrow. Both are said to be highly valued by the ultimate political authority in Pakistan, viz. the College of Corps Commanders. Their falling out among themselves would be seen by that authority as national loss. They would, it is said, succeed in making them stay yoked. If these omnipotent guys had anything to do with MMA's birth, they should be supposed to demand that MMA stays united. For, a deal with a united MMA would be more effective in giving Musharraf the maximum MMA votes in the Parliament.

This is however the crisis for the rich and the powerful; some may still see it lingering, as the deal has not been signed, sealed and delivered. But it was a bogus crisis nonetheless: it did not concern the common folks. To them what is so different in Musharraf's rule now and of one year ago or what started after the Oct 02 polls? How can they be frightened by yet another Martial Law? Their conditions will remain the same. Indeed, what is going on inside Pakistan, from ordinary people's viewpoint, is generating another and more real Crisis. Its potentialities inspire horror.

Who knows better than Pakistanis the horrendous cost of defying the well formulated popular demands, backed by adequate mobilisation. Just as all hell was let loose when Yahya defied them. That can happen again. True, Pakistanis are not so aware and strong as the Bengalees were. But repeated rapes of democracy through secret doctoring of poll results by "agencies" over time is another name of defying the populace. Similar causes produce similar results. And don't think that the worm cannot turn -- rather suddenly -- as has happened before.

Is there any way out? Well, yes in theory: since the trouble starts by distorting poll results -- with a view to effectively defying the people's verdict -- exit from the still gathering of a storm lies in holding a transparently fair election under neutral international auspices. Respecting the results of a free and credible election is the only way out for rulers. That may open up the high road to progress and stability.

MB Naqvi is a leading columist in Pakistan.