The convention on the future of Europe: An assessment

It may be recalled that the Laeken Declaration acknowledged the failure of previous attempts at EU reform and set up the Convention with an open mandate. It was then clear to national leaders that the Union required a comprehensive overhaul to face up to citizens' expectation and to an evolving international context. This explicitly applied both to the institutions and to the policies of the Union.

Laeken included the four points listed in the Nice Declaration on the future of the Union -- the role of national parliaments in the EU, the status of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the division of competences between the Union and Member States and simplification of the Treaties -- and added many others. These included sensitive matters such as the election and size of the Commission, the rotating Council presidency, the external representation of the Union and the preservation of the institutional balance at large. Moreover, Laeken mentioned for the first time the idea of providing the Union with a fully-fledged Constitution, replacing the long string of overlapping Treaties.

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It is important here to examine how the Convention has performed in tackling these tasks? The overall assessment, is that while there have been some significant improvements, the text does not go far enough in equipping the Union to cope with the challenges ahead, as the Convention was mandated to do by Laeken.

The new Treaty contains a number of positive elements that should be welcomed. These include:

-the simplification of qualified majority voting (QMV) better reflecting population;

-the extension of majority voting in the Council of Ministers;

-the EU gaining legal personality;

-the simplification of the Treaties into a single document. (This simplification is a step towards greater transparency but the institutional structures, as well as the voting system, remain too complicated for most citizens to readily understand);

-the incorporation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights;

-no material diminishing of Union competence;

-streamlining of the Commission;

-an increased role for the European Parliament (EP), especially due to the extension of the co-decision procedure (now 'ordinary legislative procedure') and the ultimate say over all EU expenditure;

-the movement of several Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) policy areas into the Community sphere;

-the establishment of an EU Foreign Minister,

-recognition of the Eurogroup as a separate decision making body. (The agreement to allow for the Eurozone countries to take collective decisions on economic issues and to agree on appropriate measures to ensure unified representation of the Eurozone in international organisations marks a significant advance.);

-simplification of instruments and procedures. There will be enhanced involvement of national parliaments, but short of blocking the decision-making machinery;

-the preservation of the passerelle clause whereby the European Council can decide, by unanimity, to extend the ordinary legislative procedure where special procedures still apply, and to replace unanimity with majority voting;

-solidarity clause involving mutual assistance in a security or humanitarian crisis and

-citizen's right to call upon Commission to propose legislation if 1,000,000 signatures can be obtained.

The negative and questionable points are:

-the welcome extension of QMV to a number of new legal bases does not make up for the clear failure in applying some form of majority voting to common foreign and security policy (CFSP), trade policy in relation to intellectual property and services, fiscal policy, Article I-17 on EU competences, and future revision of the Treaty. Considering the impact of enlargement, this can be construed as imposing on the EU a suffocating straitjacket in areas of key importance;

-although there is much to be said for the Union being strategically led by an effective European Council which concentrates on its leadership role -- and does not waste its time exercising the arbitrating role which the GAC so often fails to fulfil -- the establishment of the European Council as a new institution with a permanent chair could well unbalance the institutional framework. Consequences are hard to predict, but much will be left to practice;

-the failure to agree on a clear separation of the legislative and executive functions of the Council has exacerbated the complexities already inherent in the present system involving shared executive competencies between the Council and the Commission;

-on the democratic front, there is still no readiness to give future Presidents of the Commission their own democratic mandate. There are some increased powers for the European Parliament but it is the European Council and not the EP that has the decisive say on the nomination of the Commission President. The best hope is that -- despite this setback -- the European political parties will bring the issue to voters in European Parliament elections by nominating their preferred candidates for the Commission Presidency. This would certainly increase the pressure on the European Council to really take into account the results of the European Parliament elections and carry out adequate consultations in making its nomination to the EP;

-the failure to break the link between Commission and Member States as far as both the size of the Commission and the procedure to appoint the Commissioners are concerned and

-the creation of a new post of EU Foreign Minister may prove an empty shell if the basis of decision-making remains unanimity.

It may be recalled here that an improvement in the external affairs machinery was one of the prime goals of the Convention. Laeken spoke of the Union needing to improve its external clout, a desire widely shared by EU citizens. Regrettably the Iraq conflict demonstrated vividly the disarray of the Union in foreign policy and led to a weakening of the draft articles that emerged from the Dehaene and Barnier working groups. The main change relates to the new post of EU Foreign Minister that will combine the roles currently played by the High Representative for CFSP, Javier Solana and the External Affairs Commissioner, Chris Patten. Intergovernmental procedures will now continue to rule most, if not all, policy decisions. This will also mean the creation of a European diplomatic service, replacing fragmentation between the Commission's services and the Secretariat General of the Council. This may be interpreted as an important step to foster the development of CFSP from the bottom up.

As regards enhanced cooperation in security and defence policy, three levels have been envisaged. First, there is a formula relating to crisis management operations involving some but not all Member States and acting in the name of the Union. Second, there is provision for 'structured cooperation' allowing Member States to develop stronger military capabilities and equip themselves to take on more demanding tasks. Finally there is also provision for those Member States wishing to give one another a mutual defence clause.

European analysts feel that since scope for discussion exists with regard to Part IV, including clauses for Treaty amendment, further thinking needs to be undertaken on how to abandon the requirement for unanimous national ratification. Likewise, it is being advised by many that Part III provisions related to the determining of the actual extension of majority voting across sectoral provisions need to be reconsidered.

The Convention has been an important exercise but it remains to be seen whether the proposed new role for the eurozone countries will translate into more effective economic governance with appropriate policies to strengthen the economic pillar of EMU. The reluctance to make QMV the general rule is unlikely to promote efficiency in a Union of 25 or more Member States.

The new EU Foreign Minister must also have full recourse to the Union methods including development aid, financial assistance and a strong connection to Europe's diplomatic representations abroad. European foreign policy is about understanding the "network" of policy instruments and using them coherently to further the EU's basic principles. The Foreign Minister's role in this regard will need a closer definition.

There will also probably have to be greater scrutiny and emphasis pertaining to the importance of including the Charter on Fundamental Rights in the Union's future constitution. The Union, unfortunately, is sometimes incapable of counter-acting human rights violations in Europe. The Charter is a step in the right direction, but, as President Prodi of the European Commission has pointed out, more needs to be done.

Muhammad Zamir is a former Secretary and Ambassador.