Beijing meeting on North Korean crisis

Given the almost total preoccupation of Bush administration with the triad of terrorists, tyrants and transfer of WMD technology to wrong hands American ire is understandable. It may be recalled that talk of war was in the air during President Clinton's first term of office following IAEA's declaration that the agency could no longer assure that North Korea's programme was not being used for weapons and then Defence Secretary's resolution that he would rather face the risk of a war now than of a still greater catastrophe at a later date. But President Carter's missionary zeal for mediation (he found in Stalinist dictator Kim IL-Sung a combination of qualities of George Washington, Thomas Jefferson and Abraham Lincoln) resulted in the Agreed Framework of 1994. Under this agreement North Korea would freeze its existing nuclear programme and in exchange she would be provided with two light water reactors and pending their completion, half a million metric tons of heavy oil annually amounting to almost half of the country's energy requirement. In addition various diplomatic and economic sanctions were to be lifted. But later Americans found out the 'duplicitous game' played by North Korea its economic fragility notwithstanding.

When faced with incontrovertible proof North Korea admitted unapologetically to a US delegation of her secret endeavour to develop nuclear weapons in violation of the Agreed Framework. Bush administration suspended oil shipments to North Korea and beefed up the US troops in the area. North Korea's response was belligerent and defiant. Bush administration's preoccupation with another member of the axis of evil, Iraq (wrongly prioritised as it appears now) pushed the North Korean crisis to the back burner for the time being. CIA Director George Tenet's Senate testimony in February this year that North Korea had probably been able to produce a few plutonium based nuclear weapons was duly noted. Tenet's testimony was preceded by IAEA Executive Board's unanimous resolution accusing Pyongyang of being in breach of UN safeguards thus effectively involving the UN Security Council. North Korea's kamikaze defiance was further displayed by its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) in April this year. Since its entry into force in 1970 NPT has grown to 188 members and North Korea was the first country to withdraw from the treaty.

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Albeit NPT stipulates that in the exercise of national sovereignty a member can withdraw from the treaty citing "extraordinary events" jeopardising "supreme interests of the country". Equally UN Charter provides for actions with respect to threats to peace, breaches of the peace and act of aggression such as economic sanctions, blockades, and ultimately use of force. But the UNSC at that time was reluctant to take strong measures against DPRK as China and Russia expressed reluctance and Pakistan, a member of the UNSC was allegedly involved in an exchange of enriched uranium fuel for missile technology and was therefore reluctant to take any strong measure against North Korea. UNSC after a closed door meeting expressed its concern over the North Korean situation and decided to follow up developments on this matter.

Many analysts have been trying to fathom North Korea's real intentions behind its pursuit of an absurd dream of possessing WMD in the face of unrelaxed vigil by the US to deny its proliferation. Philip Saunders (Confronting ambiguity: How to handle North Korea's nuclear programme Arms Control Association March 2003) hazards several scenarios. In his first scenario North Korean leaders have decided that nuclear weapons were essential for their existence particularly after the Iraq episode which has apparently convinced the reclusive Kim Jong-IL that had Saddam Hussein possessed WMD the Anglo-American war on Iraq would neither have been waged nor won. In the second scenario DPRK would be willing to barter away its nuclear and missile programme in exchange of US guarantee of its security and sovereignty. But here with the track record of North Korean duplicity and its immense capacity to secret away nuclear installation in underground mountain caves the question of "abyss of distrust" becomes paramount. Saunder's third scenario spells out North Korean desire to both possess nuclear weapons as an ultimate guarantee for security and also to have good relations with the US, Japan and South Korea. Implicit in this desire is the acceptance by the three countries of a North Korea possessing nuclear weapons few in numbers. This wish of North Korea is backed by the Sunshine policy of President Kim Dae Jung of South Korea and also Japanese desire to promote diplomatic interactions with the North which got derailed by the abduction issue.

While the above described scenarios are of defensive nature another scenario describes North Korean determination to possess nuclear weapons to force Korean unification on its own terms. One can only seriously consider such a scenario given the highly militarised nature of the population, Howard Hugh Caligula combination nature of Kim jong-IL and the total disregard of the people's welfare by the communist government.

What then can the US do? Even if one were to concur with the prescription of Joshua Muravchik of American Enterprise Institute that if American efforts of the last twenty years to dissuade North Korea from its charted path has ended in failure, then the US would in all likelihood face the possibility of having a North Korea becoming in Richard Perle's words "the nuclear bread basket of the world" or at least the under world of the failed states and terrorists. However much the US may want to take unilateral action to prevent such an eventuality it would not be able to take such action because of divergent policies of other key players. One may recall that during last year's Presidential election in South Korea President Roh Moo Hyun refused to visit the US, seen by the Americans as "anti-Americanism" but seen by the South Korean voters his attempt to be independent of the US tentacles and efforts to bring about a balanced bilateral relationship. In contrast his opponent Lee Hoe Chang spent seven days in the US meeting Dick Cheney, Colin Powell, Richard Armitage and Condoleezza Rice only to be beaten at the polls due to his perceived pro-Americanism. Nothing infuriates the Koreans more than to be regarded as vassals of the US to be ordered around. Of course after winning the Presidency Roh Moo Hyun made it up to the Americans by declaring his government's opposition to DPRK acquiring nuclear weapons. But he would like the problem to be solved through peaceful dialogue.

China believes that peace and stability in the Korean peninsula should be preserved; the peninsula should remain nuclear free; and the dispute should be resolved through diplomatic and political means. China is concerned over a nuclear North Korea which could instigate a nuclearised Northeast Asia (with South Korea, Japan and Taiwan following suit) threatening China's core security interests. Besides potential demise of North Korea resultant of military confrontation could bring American forces to the door step of China compounded by a united Korea with the North's nuclear capability and the South's wealth similar to Russian Rubik's Cube problem a la German reunification with a united Germany retaining NATO membership. Beijing believes that North Korean nuclear gamble stems from her acute sense of insecurity and vulnerability which should be resolved outside the UNSC because otherwise China may have to face a situation of supporting an intransigent DPRK or vote for sanctions thus cutting off fuel and food aid to North Korea and thereby facing the distinct possibility of housing thousands of North Korean refugees in her territory. Abstention in voting may damage China's image as a responsible world player.

Japanese policy towards North Korea has been cautious and reactive. Prime Minister Kiozumi's visit to Pyongyang had broken the traditional mould into one of proactive engagement diplomacy. But Kim Jong-IL's admission of abduction of Japanese nationals by DPRK has incensed the Japanese public so much that they are now likely to support the US hard line not because of North Korean nuclear policy but due to their insistence on a fair resolution of the abduction issue.Japan is gravely concerned over reported targeting of more than one hundred missiles against Japan by DPRK. Japan's North Korean policy is to avoid military conflict in the Korean peninsula; termination of DPRK nuclear programme; resolution of abduction issue; strengthening non-proliferation regime; safeguarding Japan from military attacks from DPRK; prevent Chinese or Russian dominance over Korean peninsula etc. Japan's objective is not regime change in North Korea but its transformation into a better economic and political system.

Russia is also opposed to North Korea becoming a nuclear power. Russian "frozen" policy of backing DPRK for over four decades was dramatically changed by Gorbachev in late eighties and maintained by Boris Yeltsin which saw bilateral trade falling from $3.5 billion to $ 100 million by mid-nineties. Moscow favours negotiations and gradual reduction of tensions leading to normalisation of US-DPRK diplomatic relations; security guarantee to both North and South by outside powers; economic assistance to the North; and reintroduction of UN inspectors in North Korea. In case of North Korean intransigence Russia is likely to lean towards USA but in case of US preemption Russia is likely to oppose such a policy along with China, Japan and South Korea moving closer towards DPRK to the ultimate detriment of the American interests.

Even though a military strike against DPRK is considered "unthinkable" because of the almost certain death of thousands of South Korean soldiers and civilians and American troops stationed there and wanton destruction of property and even nuclear retaliation by the North, appeasement of the North Koreans may remind many of Neville Chamberlain's "Peace for our Time" speech he gave to the Britons after signing the now famous Munich Treaty with Hitler and the advice he gave to the Britishers to" go home to go quietly to your beds". At the core of any possible conflict lies the Bush National Security Strategy (NSS) of 2002. While "restrictionists" interpretation of the article 51 of the UN Charter would insist on a would be victim to be a victim first before he can take action in self-defence, the "counter restrictionists" on the other hand claim that the very mention of the term "inherent rights" of individual countries in the article indicate that the framers of the Charter thought of continuation of the broad pre-UN Charter customary right of anticipatory self-defence.

It has been argued that since neither the International Court of Justice (Nicaragua vs. US) nor the UNSC has authoritatively determined the precise meaning of article 51, the language of the Charter clearly admits both interpretations about the permissive ability of preemptive force. Besides the supporters of Bush doctrine argue that both WMD and terrorism pose threats unanticipated by traditional international law and not considered by the framers of the UN Charter. But they advise that any use of preemptive force should have the approval of the UNSC having multilateral backing while seeking through the UNSC development of a legal regime that would be truly authoritative and controlling state behaviour but adapted to the needs of the day (International law and the preemptive use of military force Anthony Clark Arend --The Washington Quarterly Spring, 2003).

Legality argument on preemption apart it is an inescapable fact that North Korean violation of the non-proliferation regime unless countered effectively may encourage others to think that proliferation pays and that acquisition of WMD guarantees security. It will add to the strength of Pyongyang argument that Iraq would not have been overrun if Saddam Hussein had the weapons of mass destruction. And so in time the world may be crowded with not only hostile and suspected nuclear states. But if one were to accept the proposition that North Korea would not give up its nuclear ambition at any cost and that China, Russia and South Korea would not let the US seek military solution of the crisis, the US may have to accept a suboptimal situation of the existence of DPRK with a small nuclear arsenal ( e.g. Israel, India and Pakistan) but with a provision of strict quarantine and interdiction to prevent export of fissile materials to rogue states and non-state actors. The world may have to live with such a regime till such time a more effective non-proliferation system can be devised which will have both authority and control, essential ingredients for effective international law.

Kazi Anwarul Masud is a former Secretary and Ambassador