Wider Europe
European Commissioner Gunter Verheugen, responsible for enlargement, commenting on the current enlargement process, congratulated Poland on its excellent turnout in the referendum and pointed out that its affirmative vote was most encouraging for the Union as a whole. This approach was interesting and underlined the expectation that the newly acceding countries would strongly support a long-term and coherent strategy for a wider European policy. "Accession does not mean eradicating a dividing line in the heart of Europe just to create a new dividing line toward Belarus and Ukraine," Mr. Verheugen added. Within this context, Bulgaria and Romania were also praised for the strength of their reform efforts and the Commission hoped that this would help them to conclude the process of negotiation before the end of its mandate to avoid uncertainties. Such an attitude indicates the seriousness of the European Commission but one wonders about Turkey.
It may be recalled that Turkey is trying to meet the political criteria by the end of 2003, allowing for the Commission to take its legislative progress into account when it reevaluates Turkey's progress. Here comes the catch. The powers that be within the EU are not really satisfied, and are quick to point out that Turkey's efforts must also be reflected in the "reality on the ground." It would appear from this that the greatest challenge for Turkey today is ensuring that implementation is following through on all levels. European analysts feel that anti-European forces in bureaucracy and public services are apparently still at work and threaten to weaken the Turkish government's efforts substantially.
It is this that is the cause for anxiety. Turkey, one feels should not be sent mixed signals: the country's eligibility for membership in the Union was decided in 1999 at Helsinki and reaffirmed in Copenhagen. The question is now whether and when Turkey would be able to meet the agreed criteria. Given the current situation in the post-Iraq period, it would be to the great advantage for Europe, if it could integrate a predominantly Muslim country, with 'European' political structures and active civil society within its Union to serve as a 'bridge' to the Islamic world.
It is important that instead of a package deal for the Balkans, each country in that zone should be assessed on its individual merits for membership. It appears quite clear now that while the eastern countries have an implicit membership offer, this does not extend to the southern countries. However, a 'Wider Europe' strategy could resolve this perceived inequality of status. The report of former Dutch Prime Minister Wim Kok addressed these issues and underlined the necessity for the EU to "create a wing of stability and safety around us" on all sides of the border. Quite correctly, while the four fundamental freedoms should be made accessible and serve as goals for all bordering countries, a differentiated approach may be taken toward the new neighbours. Eventually, the EU might be ready to share everything with these countries (e.g. offer them full membership). In the meantime the Union strategy could be to reach preferential agreements on a broad range of domains giving neighbouring countries the prospect of enjoying the four freedoms.
'Neighbourhood agreements' under this matrix could focus on facilitating market access, cooperation in crisis management, access to energy and telecommunications markets and the possible creation of a research area to stimulate the promulgation of Human Rights and civic dialogue. These types of advances should be agreed upon in a focused action plan with a set object, time-frame, procedure and monitoring mechanisms. Europe now needs to use its social, economic, political and administrative capacity to ensure that the ambitions and abilities of these individual countries are adequately met. One-size-fits-all solutions will not work. EU must commit itself to suing various systems and approaches. Successful implementation of EU's agenda will depend on a differentiated approach and a strategy with true depth.
Wider Europe will also require internal reforms of the current Union strategies. The current instruments of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) will have to be re-examined as part of a larger strategy. It must be ensured that EU has the institutional processes in place that will allow it to pursue a coherent policy towards its neighbours. They have to speak with one voice. Mixed signals will only create difficulties for a Wider Europe.
It would be also important here to reflect a bit on the issue of Cyprus and a united Cyprus joining the EU on 1 May 2004. It is understood that the European Commission wants to maintain momentum in this process. Mr. Verheugen is expected to visit the island in the near-future and present a good-will package to the Turkish leadership in Cyprus which would allow for the Turkish economy on the island to make strides in catching up with the Greek part. The alleviation of trade restrictions in the northern part of the island is of particular concern to the Commission at this time. Mr. Verheugen apparently believes that a feasible, peaceful solution for the island cannot only be found, but that the Turkish side will realise, that reunification will ease their security concerns and help to stabilise their relations with Greece. The question is whether Turkey will agree.
Another area which continues to dominate thinking within EU is its relations with Russia. In this regard, senior officials within the EU framework appear to think that the four freedoms would be helpful, as the country currently still focuses largly on free movement of people and free access, although visa-free travel would still require a large effort from the Russian side. It is also generally agreed that political cooperation with Russia must cover a wide range of issues, but in the overall 'Wider Europe' scenario Russia remains a special case. It is also admitted that a holistic approach to the neighbouring regions might have to be accompanied by restructuring efforts within the Commission itself.
It would also be appropriate here to refer to Ukraine and its future within the new wider Europe. Its leadership appears to be seriously concerned about the gradual opening of markets, the eventual creation of a free trade zone and an individualised policy for all the countries in the larger European neighbourhood. Ukraine at some point wants to become a Union member. Ukraine has a particular importance in the sector of trading in Caspian oil, but at the same time acknowledges its lack of experience with full-fledged democracy and widespread freedom of expression. For the first time its government appears to be willing to overcome these drawbacks. It is also trying to extract itself from the "orbit of difficulties" in Russia and build an honest and pragmatic relationship. In this regard, Ukraine is now trying to project itself as being on the side of the Western-style democracies. It was this approach that promoted Ukraine to support the US in its military action against Iraq.
Another country that is closely following the widening European scenario is Moldova. Its identity is anchored to its geographical location in South-Eastern Europe. The Stabilisation and Association Pact framework has brought it new internal dynamism and an increased willingness to work with the EU. It also wants to benefit from the implications of the four freedoms, and preferential market access to limit asymmetrical developments. Conflict prevention and crisis management assistance through a permanent OSCE role (in negotiating conflicts in the region) has also given it aspirations. They have to be addressed by the European Union sooner than later as Moldova believes that there exists a necessity of signing an Association Pact with the EU before the accession of Bulgaria and Romania.
The possibility of a wider Europe is also being watched with great care by Egypt and other Mediterranean countries in the southern rim. It is being underlined that the EU and Mediterranean countries have shared interests in peace, security, stability and economic cooperation. It is also being pointed out that there needs to be greater mutual understanding if the enlarged Union is expected to play a greater role in Mediterranean affairs.
It is being suggested by these countries that the Barcelona process has not worked as expected and that differences are growing, not narrowing, e.g. on south-south trade. EU aid and investment is also alleged as being insufficient. Some are also critical about lack of access for agriculture. These are also growing concerns about 'Fortress Europe', especially when it comes to immigration.
The European Commission, in principle has accepted that there was an imbalance in the Union's approach towards East and South but this has been explained as being partly due to the historical imperative of reuniting the continent; and partly due to the more favourable investment conditions in the East. The Commission, while strongly supporting the Agadir process, also agrees that agriculture has been a difficult area.
Analysis of the current situation suggests that extending the Single Market will be a huge challenge for both sides, particularly because few non-EU countries will be able to respect the rules. It will be necessary to raise standards and establish what policies and programmes could be opened to third countries. Migration, it appears, will remain a sensitive issue.
Muhammad Zamir is a former Secretary and Ambassador.
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