The woes of an unequal alliance

Just how favourably Washington responded to Pakistan's courtship of it depended on bewilderingly diverse factors -- from the state of Pakistan's confrontational relationship with India and the strength of its embrace of the West's mantras, the political democracy and free market economies to the spirit in which it incorporated Islam to its state identity and the freedom it took in the pursuit of its nuclear programme. However, more than any of these factors what always affected Pakistan's standing in Washington most significantly was its strategic utility: whether and to what extent its leaders seemed 'able and willing' to combine Pakistan's national interests with the US policy imperatives of the day. In a blatantly assymetric relationship it was invariably Washington's perception of strategic necessity together with Pakistan's capacity of adapting to it which, in fact, drove the US-Pakistan relations and obviously it was again the US which always called the shots.

Pakistan's capacity for adoption to US policy imperatives was put to what was probably its severest test in the period following the fateful event of 11 September, 2001. Washington's immediate identification of Taliban-ruled Afghanistan as the sponsor of al-Qaeda terrorist network and thus an active accomplice to the terrorist attacks and consequently the logical first target in the US global war on terrorism plunged the army-ruled government of Pakistan in acute crisis. For sheer proximity it could not possibly escape its involvement. Also Pakistan with its image of a country that helped bringing Taliban to power couldn't but be suspicious of being the US terror target. To make things tricky for Pakistan's military government, neighbouring India promptly offered Washington her total support for impending war on terror. Thus Pakistan's actual choice announced on 16 September to join the global coalition against terrorism surprised none.

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Addicted to an American connection since 1950s the bulk of Pakistan's military who matters in Pakistan's decision making almost spontaneously supported the government's volte face in portending a period of U-turn in the country's regional and domestic policy. With no compunction Pakistan went ahead to ditch the Taliban it once helped creating, severed its relationship with regime in Kabul and provided bases and extended other military facilities for the US' first war on terror in Afghanistan. In a quid pro quo the US lifted the sanction imposed earlier. Appreciating Pakistan's crucial support turning itself into a frontline state to fight terrorism, not only Pakistan's role was publicly applauded by none other than President Bush, the aids were resumed and military cooperation restarted. Thus an old alliance which had been on the verge of collapse when at the end of the last century all aid was stopped and even delivery of military equipment purchased was not allowed under Pressler Law could now be rescued and put on track -- thanks to Pakistan's riding an anti-terrorist bandwagon! That a sanction was imposed in 1999 for the military takeover and a sullen President Clinton, during his five hours' stay in Pakistan, on his way back from 5-day India visit called upon the country to fight terrorism and to restore democracy were forgotten altogether.

Eversince Pakistan meticulously followed the US' anti-terror script -- hunting down fleeing and hiding Taliban and al-Qaeda operatives, handing over terrorist suspect to American authority and allowing US Marines and FBI agents to walk in and out of the country with impunity. None could do the US' bidding in more perfect way than its redoubtable ruler General Musharraf who left no stone unturned in complying with US' diktat presumably also to promote his personal agenda. He took high-risk steps to silence the anti-American voices in the country but succeeded in maintaining an upward trend in US-Pakistan relations at the peak of which he was summoned to Mount Camp David -- considered an honour for any third world leader.

Understandably, the Pakistanis pinned their high hopes on the outcome of Camp David, particularly with regard to their country's core issue -- Kashmir, long-term partnership and compensation for the meritorious services rendered during Afghan war. But when their president settled for what many of them considered 'pea-nuts' -- a 3.1bn dollar aid package which is over-tied, largely conditional and of a time-span of five years -- it was a total disappointment. Even according to CENTCOM data of May this year Pakistani economy suffered, as a consequence of the US' operations in Afghanistan, the losses of over $10bn. The critics argue that Musharraf regime has under-sold the country!

As regards Kashmir, the issue of Pakistan's dispute over it with India was perfunctorily dealt with. President Bush only very briefly referred to it during his talk with the press. In fact that was hardly the way Pakistan's 'core issue' deserved to be treated. Obviously Bush did not seem to have pushed Vajpayee towards a dialogue with Islamabad on Pakistan's term as expected by the Pakistanis. After all, there could be a price tag for all of Musharraf's anti-terror reforms initiated under American pressure. On the contrary, Pakistan's opposition camp suspects even a sell-out! A PPP leader sarcastically said that the general's body language indicated that "he had done a dirty deal on Kashmir," whatever that was supposed to be.

The supply of F-16 warplanes urgently needed and specifically requested by Pakistan as part of its defence needs was summarily turned down at Camp David as if it was an irrelevant demand altogether. These coveted planes have emerged as some sort of a status symbol in Pakistan's military ties with the US. Pakistanis obviously grudge the fact that they could not be acquired even at the present state of relationship.

What is however disturbing most the Pakistani minds is a spectre of suspicion if Pakistan would again be abandoned as the US' war on terrorism is all but over in Afghanistan and her attention is shifting elsewhere to preempt the countries possessing WMD.

The generations of Pakistanis accustomed to ups and downs in the US-Pakistan relations are genuinely concerned about the continuance of the warmth between the two in the wake of the US' shifting interests and already there are syndromes of expediency in her policy. They bitterly remember that in 1990 immediately after the end of Afghan war when a battered and bruised Pakistan was in the need of continued US assistance and goodwill, the erstwhile ally was punished with the imposition of sanction. It is essentially against this background reeking with suspicion and mistrust that the Pakistanis viewed the outcome of Camp David.

The decade of 1990s witnessed a conscious decision by the US to shape relation with the countries of South Asia in the light of national priorities and India was singled out for being cultivated as the emerging power in the region that could be a counter to China. Though the US clearly attaches greater importance to its relation with India, it finds it expedient to maintain a good working relationship with Pakistan both as an ally against terrorism and as a major moderate Islamic state. The US' stakes have risen significantly in the region and for Pakistan's geo-strategic clout she cannot permanently abandon Pakistan.

The contradictions in the difficult relationship between the US and Pakistan have been best exemplified by Syeda Abida Husain, Pakistan's former ambassador to Washington while taking part in a TV discussion recently in London. She argued that "Pakistan has always desired marriage with America but the latter has preferred muta." She was referring to the derogatory practice of one night stand, considered permissible in some sects in Islam and still seen in parts of Iran.

Brig ( retd) Hafiz is former DG of BIISS..