The big picture in Asia
There are two major events that have recently taken place in the Northeast and Northwest of Asia. In the case of the latter, the recent meeting of the American and Russian Presidents in Moscow has yielded a significant pointer. The second comprises somehow connected events that involve the US, Russia, China, Japan, Taiwan, and North Korea. Indeed, two clear-cut crises are being perceived about: One is over North Korea's possession of nuclear weapons and the second is even more explosive: it is the crisis over Taiwan.
Insofar as North Korean nukes are concerned, it should, by now, be easy to see that North Korea is using its atomic weapons as a lever to pressurize the US in order to obtain sufficient quantities of economic aid, particularly the much needed fuel. But it has already had a far reaching effect elsewhere: Japan was alarmed, or affected to. True, there are historical reasons why Japanese can not be too careless about what the two Koreas do. But then, since the Second World War, North Korea, despite its non-negligible military machine, is not in the same league as Japan; it is relatively poverty-stricken and with little capacity now or in the foreseeable future to be able to invade Japan or anyone else, except possibly South Korea in exceptional circumstances.
But the Japanese, it is salutary to remember, were certainly disturbed, and there were some murmurs in the Japanese rightwing circles about finally ditching their peace constitution and acquiring atomic weapons of their own. Their good friends in America did not speak on the record but the American media and think tanks did: They all "expected" -- without any alarm or regret -- Japan to go nuclear eventually. One has read it as an advice from the American thinking sections and probably it may have been a hint from the powers that be in America to the Japanese that should they go nuclear; it would be understood in the circumstances.
The second crisis is rather strange. Taiwan is said to be under threat from China. For their part, the Chinese have repeatedly said that they would never tolerate Taiwan becoming independent and they would then take appropriate measures. They specifically included possible military action in these steps. The firm enunciation of China's Taiwan policy by its President in the People's Congress last week shows that "peaceful reunification" remains China's firm policy, while the threat of militarily opposing Taiwan's UDI (Unilateral Declaration of Independence) remains predicated on what others do. While the wish for independence among the Taiwanese authorities is not to be doubted, the facts on the ground tell a different story.
The Taiwanese investments in China might even exceed those of the US, for all one knows. Everybody knows that the Chinese also, since Mao's days, have followed a policy of never to militarily attack another country with a large Chinese population, whether it is a majority or minority. The daily traffic between Taiwan and China proper is certainly massive, not to speak of the trade volume. Anyhow there might soon be daily direct air services between the "renegade province" and the mainland. The idea of the China and Taiwan going to war is a non-starter; far too many interests are intermingled to permit a war between these two. The crisis looks phony.
Even so, it has led to a development of far reaching significance. The US and the Japanese, close allies for long, have come even closer than they were. Japan's security guarantee by the US has been upgraded, and its defence against possible nuclear attack by puny North Korea -- another unlikely possibility -- has led to an agreement between Tokyo and Washington under which the Japanese would come under the mainly American anti-ballistic missile defence system perhaps more fully. The Japanese contribution in it would grow. The explosive potential inherent in an even closer alignment of Japan with the US is predicated on the fact that China perceives this to be directed against itself.
It is true that in the new closing of ranks between Japan and America and the smaller (and more or less theoretical) threat from North Korea might be one of the factors. But the new US-Japan agreements are predicated directly on Taiwan. Therefore the US-Japan alliance is directly aimed at China. This is a major strategic move by the US and Japan with explosive possibilities. Hitherto, the world had regarded China as a growing market for American capital. The US investment in China is something like $65 billion. The various American administrations have called China their ally, not excluding the Bush administration. But this kind of action in the military field would seem to go directly against the perceived American economic interests. Who can say that the Americans, when they were signing the agreement in Tokyo, were unaware of their own economic interests in China? For that matter, even the Japanese could not have ignored the fact that China is their biggest trading partner and Japanese capital seeks further consolidation in China. What is going on?
It is inconceivable that the Americans are likely to do anything foolish in the near future vis-a-vis China. Nor can Japanese economy sustain a rupture with China. But the agreement involves heavy investments on the part of both Japan and US in installing the new defence system, with Japan probably breaching the 1 percent of GNP barrier for its defence spending. The 1 percent of GNP is already over $40 billion and the Japanese self-defence forces are a respectable military might already. Indications are that the American hint about the nukes might have been even clearer than one has noted. The Japanese rearmament might be the name of the game, all in the holy name of balance of power. The fact that economic reasons prevent any real disconnection between either Japan or China or US and China, all this power play can only be a longer-term alignment being agreed upon and prepared for a relatively distinct tomorrow. Nevertheless, this power politics might have its own economic reasoning, albeit faulty insofar as it will benefit only war industries in all the concerned countries, and short-sighted withal.
The one point to emerge clearly is the permanent US presence in Asia's North East and Far East, with growing military strength comprising what the Americans and Japanese war industries can provide (with less manpower being required than in earlier times). It is also to be remembered that the Russians are not enamoured of what the Americans are doing in Central Asia and the rest of Asia. Who can forget the growing number of American military bases in Asia -- outside their so-called backyard: the Arab Middle East? Russia regards all this as anti-Russian. There is more that divides than unites the US and Russia.
Anyway, the kind of American presence is scheduled to be overwhelming in and over all parts of Asia. Several questions will have to be asked and answered by Asian governments over what they propose to do over questions or proposals that they see as purely Asian questions.
MB Naqvi is a leading columist in Pakistan.
Comments