Simple facts about Balochistan

Let's begin with what has been grabbing the headlines first: trouble in Sui and Dera Bugti. The March 17 clash in which 10 soldiers and over 60 civilians died and many more were injured was a major tragedy. Damage to property in Dera Bugti was, in view of the general poverty of its populace, very considerable. That was supposedly the retaliation for what the Bugtis had done in menacingly surrounding the Frontier Constabulary's camp -- housing some 300 soldiers who were being supplied by air. Now, this action and an ambush of LEAs were themselves in retaliation for what the FC had done to protesting tribesmen, angered by the gang rape of Dr. Shazia Khalid inside the hospital run by the gas company in its Sui installations.

In addition, there is a regular campaign of sabotage and ambush while bomb blasts continue in many places. A shadowy Balochistan Liberation Army is claiming credit for these attacks on infrastructure -- railway tracks, gas pipelines, and governmental symbols. Trouble in Sui and Dera Bugti is not an isolated event, sparked either by the rape incident or by the revolt of Sardar Akbar Bugti. The situation on the whole is one of a slow burning of the fuse of a Baloch nationalist revolt, with occasional spectacular flare ups like the Dera Bugti one. Such incidents are symptomatic. The central reality of a nationalist struggle, at the end of its tether, must be gasped.

Tap here to add The Daily Star as a trusted source

To continue with the map of Balochistan politics, the second major force is extreme Islamicist forces; they comprise, in addition to many militant Islamic outfits, various Jihadists who participated in the two Afghan Jihads, viz. of 1980s and after 1992, various Jihadi organisations that waged Jihad in Indian controlled Kashmir. There are, of course, Talibans and their protectors. These forces include religiously-oriented political parties, now constituting MMA, especially JUI with its splinters, that provide a broad-spectrum political cover to all these Jihadists. Contrary to the normal view of Pakistan politics that Islamicist parties were no more than of marginal importance, these now control one third of National Parliament and two out of four provincial governments. They have to be taken seriously, more so for the future because of the 2002 polls.

Obvious significance of this force is the presence of Taliban in fairly large numbers that had made the American Ambassador to Afghanistan and the top US General there complain publicly that President Musharraf is not showing equal diligence in arresting or killing Taliban, mainly in Balochistan, that he is displaying with regard to al-Qaeda fugitives. But for Pakistanis, there are more worrying facets of this force.

The first -- and hopefully temporary -- is the interpenetration of these Islamicists with the Pakistan Army, especially its intelligence agencies; anyone can make the connection: if there are so many Taliban in Pakistan and the army has not done to them what it has done to al Qaeda, an obvious conclusion follows: Either it has strong sympathies with Taliban or it is afraid of the reaction of their friends and protectors. Insofar as the military controllers of Pakistan's policy may wish to retain the option to reactivate the Jihad in Kashmir when necessary, they would scarcely want to decimate their old and would-be recruits.

Ideological physiognomy of the Jihadists is relevant. They may have originated in the Deobandi seminaries (being an offspring of JUI) but they have sharply veered from the historical legacy of Deoband's Darul Uloom: in pre-independence India Shia-Sunni riots never involved Deobandi Sunnis. In Pakistan one face of all these Jihadis is their intense hatred of Shias. The same person can in one phase be a Taliban, and in another be a freedom fighter in Kashmir, and in yet another phase be a sectarian terrorist. That post-Zia army's and Jamaate Islami's ideological contributions have gone into the making of their current political philosophy.

Some point out the strange phenomenon of the current riches of Islamicist parties; to all appearances money has been no problem for any religious party or leader. Earlier there was an easy explanation: ample funding could be relied upon from American CIA and Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Iran, Libya, etc. But that phase came to an end by about 1990, though some could still be coming from the Arab sources. After 2001 the Americans have not, for some odd reason, focused on the funding of MMA parties and their spiritual offspring. They have escaped all serious scrutiny. That is strange and needs study. One big rally today costs two to three crore rupees. Where are their billions coming from? From the measly contributions of their members?

While the context remains Balochistan, it is necessary to note two or three circumstances. Balochistan is an arid desert with sparse population that is extraordinarily poor. But that does not exclude some extraordinarily rich individuals. Mainstay of the province's economy is patches of agriculture and fruit growing, some minerals, sparsely exploited, except of course the natural gas. But smuggling, narcotics and gun running trades, with Afghanistan and NWFP connections, have flourished and have generated a lot of money. The profits from heroin and cannabis trades are massive: western estimates are $3 to 4 billion and this is pocketed largely by a small number of the politically important individuals. Could it be that the super-rich buy respectability here as well as the prospect of lenient treatment from the Almighty on the Day of Judgement, if they fund Islamicists?

The third major force in Balochistan is, of course, the Pakistan state that operates largely through the army and paramilitary forces. It has both money and overwhelming force. From the viewpoint of an ordinary Baloch, this state takes from him too many (indirect) taxes but delivers -- what? Its record in establishing schools, hospitals, and providing jobs in Balochistan is worse than that in any other province. It just shows a stern face. It has left large swathes of territories to be governed at the tribal Sardars' will; human rights of these people are not equal to those in Punjab or Sindh. This state has never bothered to develop the area despite its resources; if the poor people have no realistic prospect of finding a job, who should take the rap?

Authority has deliberately neglected and occasionally it propagates against the Sardars while the fact is that this pre-independence arrangement has been carefully preserved as a matter of policy. Why? Is it because bureaucracy has more opportunities to do as it will without any accountability?

One fact needs underlining: the province has been neglected while some improvements are visible elsewhere. Given its clear-cut ethnic identities, different from a non-democratic Centre where all power, money and authority reside, is it strange that a nationalism, conscious of injustices done to it, has arisen?

Once this is grasped, what is to be expected is the working out of the dynamic of a deprived nationality's struggle -- with its ups and downs -- for attaining power for itself. How much power to reorder their lives they want, much will depend on how the central authorities handle the issue now. Watching Islamabad's past and current mindset -- reliance on a too clever by half tactic of stern military action followed by sweet talk with some money to go on buying time for the status quo -- is profoundly distressing.

MB Naqvi is a leading columist in Pakistan.