The India question

Anti-Indianism has long been a focus of Bangladeshi politics. This anti-Indian focus took centre-stage when the BNP made it a key component of its political platform in the 1970s in response to the perceived obeisance of the AL towards India and growing discontent with India's policies towards Bangladesh.

The platform has continued to serve the BNP well and is seen by the current high command as a no-lose political position. No effort is spared to promote anti-Indian sentiment among the population and to identify the AL with India.

Tap here to add The Daily Star as a trusted source

It has been a remarkably effective political gambit and one that has been a significant contributory factor in the BNP-led four-party alliance's current commanding majority in parliament. The only down-side is that it threatens to tie the hands even of the BNP when it comes to negotiating with India, as it is finding out now that it is back in power.

The issue of transshipment of Indian goods through Bangladesh is a good example of how the BNP has been very successful in bringing to a halt a policy with charges that the policy in question unduly benefits India at the expense of the national interest.

In 1999, when negotiations over transshipment had reached a serious stage, the then opposition BNP used it as a wedge issue against the then government AL, calling three days of hartals, and successfully (if unfairly) using the issue to paint the AL as the hand-maidens of New Delhi.

For India, transshipment facilities would ensure cost-beneficial transportation and faster delivery of goods to the otherwise almost inaccessible areas of its North-Eastern states. Bangladesh would have gained from increased revenue earned through additional employment generated and transshipment fees paid.

As the then president of Federation of Bangladesh Chamber of Commerce and Industry noted: "Transit will not only bring foreign exchange for Bangladesh, it will also develop our transport sector and benefit our economy." The Bangladesh government in 1999 estimated the benefit to Bangladesh in the range of $400 million annually and an additional 200,000 jobs.

I use our disinclination to grant transshipment as an example of a Bangladesh government policy where concrete gains to the country have apparently been sacrificed on the altar of domestic political considerations (at best) or hostility to India (at worst).

The reasons put forth by opponents of transshipment remain unconvincing, and there is little doubt that permitting transshipment of Indian goods through Bangladesh would be beneficial to both countries, albeit of greater benefit to India than to us. At the very least, there should be a reasoned public debate as to the pros and cons, which given the current climate is not possible.

Another example of where our confrontational posture towards India has back-fired spectacularly is in relation to negotiations for the route for the Trans Asian Highway.

The Bangladeshi gateway to the highway network is through Tamabil in the North-East and Banglabandha in the North-West. In 1995, when negotiations over what route the final highway network would take began in earnest, India lobbied strongly to attempt to persuade Bangladesh that entry on the North-East side should be through Ostrogram rather than through Tamabil.

The difference to Bangladesh would have been small -- indeed there is a strong argument to be made that Ostrogram would have been more advantageous from the Bangladeshi perspective -- but due to the existing infrastructure and terrain of the North-Eastern Indian states thus linked to, it would have been much more advantageous to India.

Bangladesh dug in its heels and refused to countenance using Ostrogram as the entry point. The reason was that Bangladesh was reluctant to take steps that would be of such obvious benefit to India.

Interestingly enough, after the change of government in Bangladesh in 1996, the new government convened a series of seminars on the route, which finally recommended that Ostrogram would be the best entry point. But by this time India has already built 500 km of roads to connect its North-East states to Tamabil and refused to return to the plan it had originally requested.

There we have it. Bangladesh passed on the opportunity for an entry point of the Trans Asian Highway that would have been of greater benefit to the country than the entry point finally agreed upon because it would have been of even more benefit to India.

It is no wonder that India is currently cool to the idea of a road through Tripura to Chittagong to allow port access for its North-East states, and is building a road through Mizoram to Akia port in Myanmar.

The point I am trying to make is that again and again we act against our own self-interest due to our hostility to India.

India is far from blameless when it comes to the sorry state of bilateral relations. Time and again, it too, has acted in a confrontational and unfriendly manner towards us. From trade relations, to water sharing, to demarcation of the border, we have any number of legitimate points of issue with India.

But looking at things from a strategic point of view, our focus should not be on nursing grievances, but on what is good for us, and how to finesse the bilateral relationship for maximum benefit.

Lately the idea that we can turn away from India and instead link up with China and the Asean nations has gained currency. This is a pipe dream. China and the Asean nations are interested in us mostly because they see us as the gateway to India. They have started to negotiate workable arrangements with India, and we need to do so as well if we do not wish to be left out in the cold.

For instance, right now there is a tripartite road being built from Thailand through Myanmar and into India. This road could easily have encompassed Bangladesh, but due to our disinclination to permit India transit access, we have been left out of the planning.

In fact, India is currently building an extensive road network to connect itself to the Asean countries. It would like to do so through Bangladesh as that would be the cheapest and quickest route, but in the face of continued Bangladeshi hesitation is fully prepared to leap-frog right over us as if we were not there.

We need to sort out our relations with India before it is too late. Any vision for the future needs to squarely address and resolve the problematic relationship we now have with India.

Regardless of how one might feel about India or Indians, or how hard done by we think we have been by their policies, it is simply not in our long-term self-interest to continue to adopt a confrontational posture.

Once hostility to India was merely a question of souring the bilateral relationship. That was bad enough in terms of the opportunity costs foregone But now such hostility threatens our relations with China and the Asean nations, too.

We need to go back to the drawing board and re-envision a working relationship with India that maximises the benefit of the unique position we hold at the cross-roads of South Asia, South-East Asia, and China.

It is no use waiting for India to come around to our way of thinking. We have no power to make it happen, and will be waiting a long time. We have to deal with the neighbour we have, not the neighbour we would like to have. Unfortunately, we need India far more than India needs us, and we need to recognise this simple if unpalatable truth if we are to fashion an India policy that works to our best advantage.

The chest-thumping approach might give us some psychic satisfaction, but the question I have for those who advocate a continuing bellicose and confrontational posture with respect to India is a simple one. Look around you and answer honestly. How is that working out for you?

Zafar Sobhan is Assistant Editor of The Daily Star.