How long can the NPT survive?

Some of the world's most senior diplomats spent almost four weeks trying to strengthen the treaty, but the accord has broken down. The blame for the failure depends on who you talk to.

One group says: "What is the point of going on if past commitments have not been delivered?" The other group says: "Look we are all under threat from nuclear terrorism, from proliferation. It is no use of focusing on the past." It seems the two groups of states have not be able to engage with each other.

Tap here to add The Daily Star as a trusted source

For Western countries including the US, countries such as Egypt and Iran were responsible for failure in stopping nuclear proliferation to new states. On the other hand, non-nuclear weapons states blame the stance of the US at the conference.

Iran and Egypt argued that the Middle East should be free from nuclear weapons, implying that Israel should be a party to the NPT and the Bush administration should not ignore the possession of Israel's nuclear weapons, while they have targeted Iran in the region. Furthermore, non-nuclear weapons states accuse nuclear states of backtracking on their commitments to reduce nuclear arsenals made at the1995 and 2005 review conferences.

Two-way street
The treaty is a two-way street. Nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states have obligations under the treaty to implement the preamble and the provisions of the treaty. If nuclear weapons states fail to abide by their obligations, non-nuclear states think that insistence by nuclear states on their adhering to treaty obligation is hypocritical.

The treaty is a compromise between nuclear and non-nuclear states. While nuclear states agreed to pursue negotiations "on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date, and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control," non-nuclear states agreed not to "receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive device or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly and not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear devices."

Since the treaty came into force in 1970, nuclear states have not kept their obligations of reducing nuclear weapons and of agreeing to take concrete steps on general and nuclear disarmament.

Although the US and Russia have reduced nuclear weapons, they have kept nuclear heads in storage and the weapons can be brought back, if they decide to do so.

If the treaty is flouted by one party, the obvious corollary is the other party can also flout it. If nuclear weapons states do not keep their obligations on disarmament under the NPT, why should non-nuclear states keep their obligations? This was the point on which the review conference broke down.

North Korea has withdrawn from the treaty, largely because of the flawed and aggressive policy of the Bush administration. While the Clinton administration was dealing with North Korea successfully, the present administration, in particular, the Under-Secretary of Arms Control John Bolton (nominated as the UN Ambassador to New York, yet to be approved by the US Senate) had a different approach towards North Korea. As a result, it withdrew from the NPT and expelled the UN weapons inspectors two years ago.

Who has nuclear weapons and how many?
The Director General of the UN Agency of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) stated that 40 nations have the technical know-how to manufacture nuclear weapons. Unless the provisions of the treaty are faithfully adhered to, it is not unlikely that many of the 40 nations will possess nuclear weapons in the foreseeable future.

There are currently nine nuclear states, the big five (US, UK, France, China, and Russia), Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea. According to the US research organisation, Arms Control Association, the count is 6,000 nuclear warheads for the US, 5,000 for Russia, 400 for China, 350 for France, and under 200 for the UK. India has between 45-90 nuclear weapons and Pakistan 30 to 50. It is reported that North Korea has between 3 to 5 and Israel 200.

The danger to the treaty regime is that the Bush administration, instead of disarmament, has focused on manufacturing new "smart" nuclear warheads and reversed the policy of ruling out first use of them.

From the inception of the Treaty, India and Pakistan did not become party to it. Pakistan did not do it because India refused to become a member. India's reluctance was partly due to China's possession of nuclear weapons. Not being parties to the NPT, both India and Pakistan could test nuclear weapons in 1998 ( India first tested in 1974 but declared voluntary moratorium on further nuclear tests).

No justification to retain
The destruction of nuclear weapons is immense. Any use would be catastrophic.

Current nuclear weapons are a thousand times deadlier than the bombs used on Japan in August 1945. They pose an intolerable threat to all humanity and its habitat. Yet tens of thousands remain in arsenals built up during the Cold War period. That time has passed, yet assertions of the utility of nuclear weapons continue.

It leaves the world even more uncertain as to how to stop horizontal expansion of nuclear weapons. One big loophole is that a non-nuclear state can develop full enrichment technology for peaceful purposes. But the know-how can be used to make a nuclear bomb. Experts say for peaceful purpose uranium has to be enriched only 3 per cent and to make the bomb 97 percent, but the methodology is the same.

There is no doubt that, if the peoples of the world were merely more fully aware of the inherent danger of nuclear weapons and the dire consequences of their use, they would reject them and not permit their continued possession or acquisition on their behalf by their governments, even for an alleged need of self-defence. It is argued that nuclear weapons diminish the security of all states. Indeed, states which possess them become themselves targets of nuclear weapons. They must be removed.

Paul Keating, former Prime Minister of Australia saw no need of possession of nuclear weapons. In his book, he argued: "Three possibilities exist with regard to nuclear weapons and three only. First, that they will be used, either deliberately or accidentally. Second, that they will not be used, but will be managed forever by wise, prudent and well-meaning governments and military forces and will never fall into the hands of terrorists. Or third, that we agree to get rid of them. The first possibility offers catastrophe to the human race. The second requires us to make assumptions about the future that run completely counter to logic and experience. The third is the possibility that can secure our safety."

Double standards
The US Senate did not ratify the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, despite President Clinton urging the Senators to do so. With the Bush administration coming to power in 2001, progress on nuclear weapon arms control and disarmament in the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament had stalled. This has been due partly to dissension within the Conference on Disarmament about nuclear weapons priorities.

One of the most important aspects of non-nuclear proliferation is to agree on the Fissile Materials Cut-Off Treaty ( FMCT). It has been under discussion for years, strongly supported by the European Union. Its aim is to seek a global halt to the production of highly enriched uranium and plutonium. Its main purpose is to curb the spread of weapons of mass destruction and is specifically aimed at nuclear-armed states, not parties to the NPT, such as India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea.

The Clinton administration backed the fissile materials treaty in 2000, but the Bush administration dragged its feet. Eventually the administration gave the go-ahead for negotiations, but on conditions. The conditions were that the US would not support the inclusion of binding monitoring, verification, and inspection provisions. The US knows very well that any new non-proliferation treaty is all but unenforceable without effective monitoring and verification. Inspections are essential if the treaty is to work. The allies of the US, such as Britain and Australia, were disappointed at the US stance.

For much the same reason, the key aims of the 1997 Chemical Weapons Convention remains unfulfilled. It is reported that between them, Russia and the US possess more than 97 per cent of the world's known chemical weapons, but neither will remotely meet the 2007 deadline for full elimination.

Iranians and North Koreans are under intense pressure to cooperate with inspectors from the IAEA. But to the Bush administration, it seems international verification procedure is a one-way street and it unilaterally rejects similar inspections over its own arsenal of weapons of mass destruction. Is this not a double standard?

Conclusion
The failure of the review NPT conference demonstrates that nuclear weapons states are responsible for reducing the treaty to a piece of paper. What the US did at the review conference was not to discuss their obligations as a nuclear state, but concentrate on Iran and North Korea.

The conference saw the contest between disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. It is a contest between the nuclear states versus the non-nuclear states. The failure means that the US is likely to concentrate unilaterally on producing smart atomic bombs, much smaller and deadlier, and Russia and China will not be idly watching it. The nuclear arms race is likely to begin and the future of the NPT seems to be doomed.

Barrister Harun ur Rashidis a former Bangladesh Ambassador to the UN, Geneva.