Plain Words

Changing equations in Asia

M B Naqvi writes from Karachi
Two recent developments in Asia need to be kept in sharp focus to better understand the changing equations in Asia. The first is the growth and growth of intense affair between the US and India. They have signed two major agreements in recent weeks. One of them is the framework for defence cooperation in which the Americans have offered maximum military cooperation. This includes India's buying of military equipment, training in the US of Indian military personnel, more joint operations by the Navies of the two countries, co-production of F-16s and F-18s and of course inclusion of India in naval operations to interdict suspected nuclear material being carried in Indian Ocean. The other agreement between them is over civilian nuclear reactors. India is required to sharply divide its nuclear facilities into military and civilian. While the military ones will remain outside the international inspections, the civilian ones will be sold by the US but will come under IAEA bailiwick.

Under this arrangement India would get the same treatment that America's time-tested friends have received from America because they have signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty. There are many hitches in the implementation of the second agreement in the shape of resistance in the Congress and opposition from other friends of America within the fraternity that abides by NPT. The latter are likely to take umbrage at America rewarding a country that has stayed out of non-proliferation regime. Moreover, this agreement runs counter to current American laws. But the intent and the design of America is clear.

The second major development is the rapid growth of Sino-Russian economic and political cooperation that began over a decade ago. In the backdrop of American designs, China and Russia had created a body called Shanghai Five that later has become the Security Cooperation Organisation. Its intent is clear: it wants to put a stop to the spreading of American influence and military deployment in Asia. Their main demand has now come: they have asked America to rollback its military presence from Asian mainland. The American answer is terse: since we are here on local invitation, if the country concerned wants us out, it will say so and we shall comply. Which leaves matters in Asia in political flux.

The overall American design needs to be understood. In common perceptions and their own thinking, America is now the sole superpower facing no cognizable challenge. True, there are many states in Asia that are not fully under US control and have begun looking askance at American policies. Insofar as the Eurasian landmass is concerned, this is where the US wants to ensure its military domination in all parts of Asia and control the key raw materials which would confer on them the ability to deny the supplies of that key raw material to an unfriendly state in a serious crisis -- in addition to Europe.

The EU is a possible challenger in the future; it is not a military giant but an economic one. The Americans have strong military presence in Europe and have a good instrument: the NATO. Having ensured East Europeans' entry into NATO, the US can now use it as its instrument, reducing EU's role. It can influence Europe's policies through NATO. Geo-politically, the result is relative military inconsequence of the EU; it is a toothless tiger that would remain rich without being able to interfere with American designs either in Europe or elsewhere. The US would keep it limited to European economy.

In the Far East, the Pacific Ocean is largely an American lake where naval challenges are small. The Russian Navy and the Chinese Navy together are no match to American fleets. The Japanese, Australian and even Indonesian Navies are friendly ones. Now with the Indians actively cooperating with the Americans to keep Indian Ocean's oil lanes open, and patrolling jointly along the southern shores of Asia, threat to America in the Far East is reduced. Geography has taken care of seas north of Eurasian landmass. No naval competition is possible there. Thus it is only the southern borders of China and Russia that offer America opportunities and challenges.

America quickly seized the opportunities. It cultivated the post-Soviet republics very quickly and it has now a foothold in Georgia vis-à

-vis the new oil pipeline from Kazakhstan to Europe, independent of old route of Russian oil pipelines to Europe. This pipeline is directly controlled by the Americans and American military is not too far away and America stands guarantee for its security and has arrangements with Georgia. It has military bases in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. What with American readiness to invest huge resources in infrastructure, mining, oil prospecting and helping modernize their armed forces and their readiness to lend, the Yanks had a field day in 1990s. But the strong diplomatic reaction by China and Russia has ensured that Uzbek government has demanded that America winds up its activities and vacates the base. Kyrgyzstan is also saying similar things. This is a setback to the Americans though their economic advances remain in place.

China and the Russia were not close friends of the US the way the Europeans were. American strategic moves look uncommonly like containment and encircling of them. Russia is in a giant nutcracker between the Pacific and the Atlantic Oceans through America's naval domination of both Oceans. With Europe on the side of the Americans -- it is still so but the future may be somewhat less certain they are way ahead of the Russians and Chinese in power and influence. But areas south of Russia -- and China's west -- are vulnerable. They present a soft underbelly of both Russia and China.

The agreements with India underscore the American intent of making it a global military power; that means developing India into a counterweight to China that is growing at a roaring rate. They also drive a notional wedge between Russia and India. The Russians may lose their Indian market, if the Americans come in strongly in India, given their popularity in the Indian middle classes. Russian security's demands will make it very hard for Russia to continue with its old ways of dealing with India. All this adds up to a new line up in Asia, while the rest of the globe is in tow behind the US.

As it is the south is America's redoubt: in the Persian Gulf, Arabian landmass and Diego Garcia, the American forces are well entrenched. American design to keep permanent bases in Iraq and Afghanistan is known. It already has four bases in Pakistan in addition to several in Central Asia. What happens to the Central Asian bases is uncertain but the American defences in the south are strong and with the accession of India it will make it stronger still. This line up should inform the intelligentsia throughout Asia.

Whatever the global significance of India's clambering on the American bandwagon, its domestic and regional fallout is likely to be considerable. The Manmohan Singh government can come unstuck; the Left can scarcely abide by India's radical departure from traditional stances. Pakistan has served notice that it will take counter measures to safeguard Pakistan's security in some ratio with India's enhanced military capabilities. That translates into an intensification of the ongoing arms races. The peace process, now hopelessly deadlocked, might collapse, as Manmohanjee has already threatened. Much may depend on what Islamabad does.

MB Naqvi is a leading columist in Pakistan.