New Afghan strategy?
SO the US president has determined that it is in the US vital national interest to send an additional 30,000 U.S. troops to Afghanistan. After all, how many countries in the world have the misfortune of finding its security and safety rooted in another country half a world away from its shores.
And by the beginning of July 2001, US troops will commence withdrawal from Afghanistan. The moot point, the state of Afghanistan at that point in time, remains undetermined; it will be certainly in a state of flux, and may perhaps be no better off than at the start of Operation Enduring Freedom.
Although many see in the US president's speech a new US strategy in Afghanistan, President Obama's announcement of an additional 30,000 US troops in Afghanistan within the shortest possible time does not come with a new strategy at all. The aim, defeat of al Qaeda, remains the same.
One wonders whether there really can be a new strategy for the US other than a face-saving withdrawal, having muddled up the matter over the period of nine years in Afghanistan. In fact the US president's speech to West Point cadets on December 1 seems to be a "get ready to leave" message for his countrymen. President Obama has set a timeframe of eighteen months without, however, making any preconditions for the withdrawal. And that is what the main cause for concern is.
There were never enough troops to start with in Afghanistan, and the ill-motivated occupation of Iraq, the idea for which was mooted well before 9/11, misplaced troop priority from where the focus should have been.
What President Obama has done is what no military strategist would recommend -- reinforce a lost sector -- and for all intents and purposes that is what Afghanistan is for the US although the US president still seems to be suffering from an illusion that Afghanistan is not lost. It is not lost yet, but will the country be in the shape that the Bush administration had hoped the US occupation of the country help achieve -- defeat of Taliban, democratisation of the country etc, by the time the US forces leave Afghanistan?
At best, for a lost theatre, a stop-gap measure is the only option. That is primarily to buy time to regroup to take on the enemy in another area to reduce pressure on the threatened theatre of operations. Unfortunately, no such option is available to Obama. It would seem that 30,000 troops is far too many for a stopgap arrangement. On the other hand it would be highly optimistic to think that the additional troops would help in creating a situation in the next eighteen months, something that has not been possible in the last 144 months, which would allow a peaceful transition of responsibility to the Afghans.
And if the Taliban has gained momentum one is not sure what new tactics the ground commanders would employ to "seize the initiative, while building the Afghan capacity that can allow for a responsible transition of US forces out of Afghanistan." One wonders whether holding ground for the purpose of controlling the population centres would be of much use either.
The Taliban have now resorted to insurgency, a tactic used against the Russians. Thus, while the US and its allies on ground might know who the enemy is it would be difficult to determine where they are, and that will add to uncertainty and allied casualties. And what will the extra troops help dominate? The large country that Afghanistan is, population control for winning the hearts and minds will be a difficult proposition.
As for the restated aim that president Obama has articulated, it is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to prevent its capacity to threaten America and its allies in the future. And to meet that goal, the following objectives within Afghanistan will be pursued, like denying al Qaeda a safe haven and reversing the Taliban's momentum.
The aim is ideal, but are the objectives attainable, particularly when that has to do with countries other than Afghanistan. To defeat al-Qaeda and the Taliban it is necessary to divest them of their support base. Would it be possible to do so when the support base of the Taliban, both the Afghan and Pakistan variety, exists not only inside Pakistan territorially, but also within its military establishment. It is difficult to disagree with those who suggest that the current Afghan war will have to be fought in Pakistan.
The question is, what after the US leaves? Would it be enough, as the US president says, to train competent Afghan security forces, and to partner with them so that more Afghans can get into the fight and help create the conditions for the United States to transfer responsibility to the Afghans. Should transfer of responsibility remain the sole objective of the US in the next eighteen months?
An Afghanistan and Pakistan where the Taliban and al Qaeda remain intact has dangerous implications for South Asia in particular.
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