Post Breakfast
Pakistan: The challenges ahead
THE complex and torturous process associated with any election to the Pakistan National Assembly and the Provincial Assemblies has finally been completed. Despite explosions, murders and suicide bombings, the Pakistan Election Commission has been able to conclude its responsibilities -- official notification of the results, and the distribution of the reserved seats for women and the minorities.
The Pakistan National Assembly is in business and a coalition government is in place in the new political landscape of Pakistan. In the previous elections of 2001 under the Musharraf government, it took more than 40 days to hand over power to the representatives. This time it has taken nearly four weeks. This, however, may be construed as only the first step.
The door towards democracy and stability has been opened, but there are still many challenges that have to be confronted by the new coalition government. It will require patience, bi-partisanship and understanding between the principal stakeholders -- the larger political parties, the armed forces and the bureaucracy. There will have to be political will and careful planning as to the strategic objectives.
The country's problems are so deep-seated that only long-term policies will help bring Pakistan out of its current cycle of authoritarian rule, instability, and underdevelopment. That will be necessary to tackle the evil of extremism in Pakistan, and to re-establish the rule of law and more successful development of the country's economy.
The most important single determinant of Pakistan's future remains the minds of its people. In this regard it would be worthwhile for the USA and other western powers to understand that Pakistanis should be allowed to decide the outcome of the current power struggle in Islamabad. Attempts by outside powers to influence the formulation, selection, or fragmentation of the leadership will fail, and also create resentment. Outsiders seeking to influence developments in Pakistan also need to consider the limits of their being able to establish a flourishing, pluralistic democracy in that country.
One is tempted to point out that even if there has been an election and the formation of an elected government, it has still left many loose ends for both President Musharraf and his principal ally -- the USA. Even Musharraf's close supporters are now saying that he might not be able to survive another year in office. Washington has also been left with some difficult choices.
It needs a reliable ally in Pakistan, but the multifaceted domestic political scene seems ready to produce more uncertainty in the short term. Given the scale of the US investment in Pakistan since 9/11, it will be viewed as a highly disappointing outcome for many in Washington. It will also be a major headache for the new US administration in January 2009.
It is a remarkable fact that in all probability no one really knows how much aid the United States has actually given to Pakistan. The sheer number of programs, many of them classified, has meant that it will be virtually impossible to have an accurate overview. It has been claimed by some analysts that US aid to Pakistan since 9/11 has amounted to at least $18 billion. That figure, it is considered, is made up of four funding streams for which there are published accounts -- Coalition Support Funds, Budget Support, Security Assistance, and Development Aid.
Classified funds have gone toward intelligence, covert military action, support to the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), training of Pakistani officers in nuclear safety, and cash payments to tribal leaders hired to fight Al Qaeda elements in their areas.
However, while the United States has been spending very substantial sums, militancy in Pakistan has been growing at an alarming rate. The murder of Benazir Bhutto, and the attempts on the lives of General Musharraf, the interior minister, the chief justice, the religious affairs minister, and many others, attest to this.
It would be worthwhile to note here that ten or fifteen years ago state officials in the military or the ISI allegedly sponsored most of the militant activity in Pakistan. Now ISI personnel are themselves targets. Terror is now manifesting itself through the jihadis (fighting in Kashmir), the Talibans fighting in Afghanistan, and the extremists carrying out suicide bombings within Pakistan.
When Pakistan deployed troops in Waziristan in 2004, under strong US pressure, it did so with some reluctance. Many senior Pakistani officers and experienced civil servants feared the campaign would backfire. Their pessimism was entirely justified. By 2007, the 80,000 Pakistani troops in Waziristan had achieved very little. In fact, in August 2007, the militants captured over 200 soldiers and held them hostage for over two months.
Eventually, the men were released in exchange for the release of 28 captured militants. For the first time in the tribal area, the army has been exposed as being weaker than expected and this, in turn, has emboldened the tribal population -- not very happy news for the new coalition government.
This situation suggests that the new Pakistani government needs to concentrate more on helping the tribal elders to win back power from the militants. One way out might be to integrate the tribal areas into mainstream society, a process that will inevitably involve dismantling tribal structures.
A restrained approach will also be required in Baluchistan. The PPP leadership has already shown wisdom by apologising to the Balooch people for all the atrocities perpetrated in the past (during the past PPP governments), and agreeing to take affirmative action to alleviate the concerns of the tribal areas. The US administration needs to actively help out in this regard. It has already approved a $750-million program for social development in the tribal areas. It is trying to replicate its efforts put in place in Iraq since 2006 with regard to certain Sunni tribal leaders.
The US administration is also planning a $350-million program of cooperation with Pakistan to recruit some Waziri tribes or clans to fight the militants. These are constructive measures. Winning the war on terror in Pakistan (against the Lashkar-e-Toiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed) will require both military and social programs. It has to be understood that unless handled with care, the two can be in conflict. One bomb dropped from a drone in the tribal areas can undermine tens of millions of dollars worth of pro-American attitude purchased by civilian aid programs.
There are myriad obstacles to democratic development in Pakistan, and not all of them have to do with the military. Illiteracy, the feudal landowners, the lack of rule of law, the dynastic tradition, and many other factors all play a role.
The lack of democracy in the country should at best be seen as a symptom of the problem rather than the problem itself. For as long as millions of Pakistanis remain illiterate, impoverished, and unaware of their rights and responsibilities in society, meaningful democracy will not be achievable.
It is true that President Musharraf is weaker than ever, but even with a genuine civilian government, the army will remain a powerful voice in Pakistani politics. The army remains indispensable to any future political order because of the tenacious hold that it has now established in the national economy, and because Pakistan, under any government however democratic, will face armed challenges from within or without.
However, there has also been a growth in awareness that the armed forces' long and repeated interference in Pakistani politics has harmed both the political development of Pakistan and the integrity of its principal mission of national defense against the country's enemies.
Consequently, it will be quite logical to anticipate that the coalition government will now try to establish the rule of law as the most powerful organising principle, and act through it to bring together disparate elements of the Pakistani polity. Judicial independence has now become central to the calculations of the politicians. Nawaz Sharif's insistence about the restoration of the sacked judges has made independence of the judiciary the central plank for broad opposition unity.
Consensus will be needed in most areas of governance to consolidate the political transition. In Pakistan's difficult social, political and security conditions, participation of all elements of society will be needed, including the armed forces.
Gary Ackerman (D-NY), during a recent US Congressional hearing, suggested that all further US assistance to Pakistan should be put on hold till the fired Supreme Court Justices are reinstated, opposition politicians and civil society activists are released, and independent media is allowed to reopen. The Democratic presidential candidates -- Obama and Hillary Clinton -- have also underlined the need for the US policymakers to focus more on the Pakistani people rather than on President Musharraf.
In a manner of speaking, this means that the new coalition government as well as President Musharraf are already on notice from Pakistan's allies. Others in South Asia and within the immediate region also have high expectations from the new government.
In these circumstances, on can only hope that the PPP and PML-N, now that they are in power, will try to implement the Charter of Democracy that they reached in 2006, and focus their efforts on releasing all the political workers and all those who have disappeared and are believed to be kept in military camps, on restoring the rule of law and media freedom, reinstating the Supreme Court and withdrawing all restrictions placed on freedom of expression and association.
They also need to deal with the major issues of poverty and the high cost of living, and start investigations into the abuse of power and gross violations of human rights. They should also work for a tolerant society and give space to the voice of dissent as a basic right. The coming days are crucial for Pakistan.
For all latest news, follow The Daily Star's Google News channel.
Comments